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ABSTRACT
The decade of the 1960s marked a turning point in the
history of post World War II America.

The presidency of

Lyndon Baines Johnson took place during five pivotal years
in the middle of that decade.

His administration,

representative of America in the 1960s and bearing the
Johnson personality and political style, initiated foreign
policies that set in motion a myriad of socio-political
forces that changed the way Americans viewed themselves and
the world.

Within two years of Johnson's move into the Oval

Office, his rhetoric regarding the conflict in Vietnam
played a central role in this social transformation.

This

study analyzes Johnson's Vietnam rhetoric during the
escalation period of 1964-1965 to uncover what effect his
place in history, his personality, and his political style
had on presidential rhetoric in the twentieth century.
For this purpose, the critical insights of Kenneth
Burke are utilized not only to uncover what rhetoric Johnson
used during this period but also what it meant to the
American people and how it served the President's purposes.
According to Burke, man views everything through a "fog of
symbols."

His dramatic critique of symbols, what is

sometimes referred to as "logology," attempts to get men to
realize that they have to look through this "fog" at nature,
that men tend to make themselves and nature over in the
image of their own symbols, and that their efforts often end
v
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in disaster.
The first part of this study analyzes the symbols
Johnson used to describe the Vietnam conflict to the
American people.

A cluster analysis is used to break the

symbols down into equations in an attempt to discover "what
goes with what and why."

The equations are built around the

components of Burke's dramatistic pentad:
act, agency, and purpose.

scene, agent,

Formal speeches of the period are

studied as well as smaller rhetorical units from Johnson's
press conferences.
The second part of this study, accordingly, lifts the
"fog" off Johnson's symbols regarding Vietnam.

Once the

speeches are broken down into logological equations, a more
extensive criticism takes place using another aspect of
Burke's analysis of language as symbolic action.

Applying

what Burke calls the "grammar of rebirth," the symbolic
meaning of Johnson's Vietnam rhetoric is traced in three
representative speeches:

his remarks at Syracuse University

the day after the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of
Tonkin; "Peace Without Conquest," delivered at Johns Hopkins
University; and the opening statement from his news
conference of July 28, 1965.

vi
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INTRODUCTION
Lyndon Baines Johnson personified twentieth century
America.

Whether creating headlines or observing the events

which fomented them, no single individual represents the
expansiveness of the United States since 1900 better than
its thirty-sixth president.

Johnson's tenure as a public

official encompassed many of the great moments experienced
by American politics:

the Depression, the New Deal, World

War II, the Cold War, Korea, McCarthyism, civil rights, the
New Frontier, the Great Society, and, of course, Vietnam.
"He was an All-American president," his vice president,
Hubert Humphrey, once said.

"He was really the history of

this country, with all of the turmoil, the bombast, the
sentiments, the passions.

It was all there.

All in one

man."^
Indeed, beyond the great events of our century in which
Johnson was personally involved, the former president
represented much more.

In the ultimate American melting-pot

known as the District of Columbia, Johnson found the perfect
market place in which to peddle his skills.

It is a city

where lobbyists, special interests, and a full spectrum of
congressmen meet to form a mecca of representative
government.

Johnson could adapt to all of these.

With all

persons, on a one-to-one basis, Johnson could identify.

LBJ

could lunch with conservatives just as easily as he could
dine with liberals.

He could court a civil rights vote out
vii
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of liberal Senator Stuart Symington because the
"disadvantaged had been treated as second-class citizens
long enough."

In the next instant he could warn

conservative Senator John Stennis that an important vote on
that "nigger bill" was a p p r o a c h i n g . 2

Johnson embodied what

Karnow has called a "kaleidoscopic personality, forever
changing as he sought to dominate or persuade or placate or
frighten his friends and foes"— a huge man in stature who
"could be cruel and kind, violent and gentle, petty,
generous, cunning, naive, crude, candid, and frankly
dishonest."3
As a result of his consummate ability to accommodate
opposing viewpoints throughout his career, Johnson became
the ironic figure of American politics in the American
Century.

That Johnson never held a long standing, unpopular

ideology until the twilight of his public career underscores
the irony.

It was the refusal of the great moderator to

accommodate opposition to his Vietnam policies that directly
contributed to his fall.

In an address to a nationwide

television audience from Johns Hopkins University in April
of 1965, the President said that the conflict in Vietnam was
"filled with terrible irony."4

Through the course of this

study, the role irony played in Johnson's handling of
Vietnam escalation during 1964 and 1965 will receive close
attention.
Although Johnson represents twentieth century American
viii
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politics both because of his involvement and because of his
ideosyncratic ideological interests, the former president
held a most peculiar view of rhetoric.

His disdain for

public discussion and oratory approached that of Plato.
Public speaking for Johnson hindered the political process
of negotiation and compromise.

As a thorough pragmatist,

Johnson's style of political action was that of one-on-one
deliberation.

Speeches were tools used for explaining

decisions to the public and for garnering public support.
In the words of George Reedy, a speech for Johnson was "a
performance whose success was measured by the immediate
reaction of the audience . . .

a device to produce moods."5

For Johnson, the public speech was a limited tool for
establishing a short-term consensus and deflecting
criticism.
This attitude both influenced and was fed by Johnson's
constant ideological wavering.

Viewing the public speech

simply as a performance, the former president never had to
worry about mincing words in speeches after he had turned
his back or changed his mind on a specific program or
proposal.

In effect, Johnson refused to connect his public

words with reality.

When he barked "Do me a speech" to an

aide, he really meant "Give me a script so I can entertain
the audience."6
Because of the ironies present in Johnson's
representative stature as a twentieth century politician,
ix
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his peculiar political style, his ideological wavering, and
his apparent disdain for public statements, a study is
needed to discover what effect these variables had on
presidential rhetoric.

Since the aspects of Johnson's

presidency discussed above became painfully evident during
the Vietnam War, this study will focus on the rhetoric
regarding that conflict.

More specifically, the rhetoric of

the escalation period between November 1963 and July 1965
will be studied in an attempt to discover what
characteristics exist in such rhetoric while the public
remains uninformed.

Specific questions to be addressed are

as follows:
1.

What inventional strategies did President

Johnson use in his rhetoric to reveal the Vietnam
conflict and its escalation to the American
people?
2.

What kind of verbal patterns did Johnson form

in his rhetoric and what do these patterns
indicate?
3.

How did Johnson symbolically move the United

States toward a land war in Southeast Asia during
1964 and 1965?
4.

To what extent was the President's personality

and political style revealed in his rhetoric?
5.

On which arguments did Johnson rely the most

in his rhetoric and what was their effect?
x
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Because of their inadequate consideration in the corpus of
literature on Johnson's rhetoric, such questions need to be
addressed and answered in greater detail.
Review of Literature
Even though the corpus of historical literature on
Johnson and the United States's involvement in Vietnam is
vast, American foreign relations is one area scholars of
rhetoric have failed to criticize with the intensity of
their colleagues in the history and political science
fields.

The lack of research further prompted McGuire to

call for more frequent studies of the rhetoric of foreign
relations in that global concerns affect the average
citizen's life now more than ever.^
The recent publication of Lyndon Johnson's Dual War by
Kathleen J. Turner is the first book of rhetorical analysis
concerning LBJ and Vietnam.

Turner traces the influence of

Johnson's press relations on his statements regarding the
war and provides excellent insight.

Of the existing,

published literature on the Vietnam War in speech
communication journals, only three articles solely treat
Lyndon Johnson's involvement.8

Of the literature pertaining

to Johnson in those same journals, sixteen articles treat
Johnson's speaking in general, rhetorical strategies used
during the congressional years, or presidential rhetoric
involving domestic issues, while only five articles critique
xi
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Johnson's war rhetoric, two only marginally as part of genre
studies.

Even though David Zarefsky's research deals

exclusively with the Great Society and the "War on Poverty,"
his findings are important to Johnson's presidential
rhetoric as a whole.9

This study intends to draw from and

contribute to that same body of knowledge.
Further, the published material pertaining to Johnson's
Vietnam War rhetoric critiques only two of the speeches
intended for use in this study of the escalation period:
Richard Cherwitz's survey of Johnson's address following the
Tonkin Gulf crisis and Robert L. Ivie's use of perhaps the
President's best speech from this period, the Johns Hopkins
University Address, for his genre studies of presidential
justifications for war.19

An evaluation of Johnson's

information strategy for the war by Walter Bunge, et al.,
offers insight into the President's careful use of language,
a point which shall be argued in this study as indicative of
the time period.

F. Michael Smith focused his study on the

rhetoric of the Administration pertaining to escalation but
only traced its thesis of aggression on the part of North
Vietnam.11
While dealing specifically with the President's
decisive speech of March 31, 1968, John Patton's study
offers insights into Johnson's personality as a rhetor.
Other helpful studies pertaining to the subject matter of
this work include Robert Newman's studies in Cold War
xii

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

rhetoric.

These surveys of public discourse following the

conversion of China to Communism offer a great deal of
insight into Johnson's rhetoric of the Vietnam period.

For

presidential speech texts, the best sources are Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States;

Lyndon B.

Johnson, volumes 1-4, and The Johnson Presidential Press
Conferences.
In the period since Johnson left the White House,
Dissertation Abstracts notes thirteen Ph.D. dissertations
analyzing President Johnson's Vietnam War rhetoric.

Only

two, however, have utilized the critical insights of Kenneth
Burke to focus on the rhetoric of the period.

Robert V.

Seltzer attempted to draw a Truman-Johnson analog by
studying the rhetoric of limited war.

George Bradley

completed a more traditional pentadic analysis of Johnson's
war rhetoric focusing on the agent-agency ratio.

Unlike

this analysis, however, Bradley's study treated the United
States as the primary agent and American citizens as the
agency.

Not a single dissertation has attempted to dissect

Johnson's verbal arguments or analyze his symbolic acts in
the manner of this study.
A review of historical literature on Johnson is much
more a matter of finding key texts.

Such a voluminous body

of research requires one to utilize those sources most
helpful to the rhetorical critic.

As a comprehensive

narrative to the period of history in question and of the
xiii
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personality of Johnson, David Halberstam's The Best and the
Brightest is unsurpassed.

As a reporter in Saigon for the

New York Times during the early 1960s, a keen observer of
Washington politics throughout the decade, and a researcher
who, in the Burkean sense, uses "all that is there to
use,"12 Halberstam is unusually equipped to lend insight to
this topic.

Another correspondent in Vietnam during the

period, Stanley Karnow, offers additional critical
perceptivity on the historical context in his recent
publication, Vietnam;

A History.

One work which deals

exclusively with the escalation period is Larry Berman's
Planning a Tragedy:
Vietnam.

The Americanization of the War in

Strategists who took part in the policy planning

of the period have since written reflections on their
involvement which should prove helpful.

These writers

include George Ball, Clark Clifford, Daniel Ellsberg, Roger
Hilsman, Nicholas Katzenbach, Bill Moyers, and Walt Rostow.
Biographical works on Johnson are plentiful.

Again,

importance lies in the use of key texts by those closest to
the former president and/or those capable of lending
critical insight.

Perhaps no one outside the Johnson family

knew the former president as well nor was able to make
critical judgments on his personality better than Doris
Kearns.

After working in the Johnson Administration as a

White House Fellow from Harvard, Kearns spent most of her
holidays over the four years following the Johnson
xiv

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

presidency not at Cambridge, but on the LBJ Ranch helping
the former president write his memoirs.

Out of these visits

came two books, Johnson's The Vantage Point and Kearn's
Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream.

The former described

"the man Lyndon Johnson thought he should be," while the
latter attempts to describe Johnson as he was.13

It is from

this work that much biographical information will be
extracted.
Other biographical works of importance include one
published early in the Johnson presidency by Rowland Evans
and Robert Novak.

Lyndon B. Johnson;

The Exercise of Power

is a political biography tracing Johnson's rise to national
prominence.

George Reedy's Lyndon B. Johnson:

A Memoir

attempts to reveal what the former press secretary calls
"the two faces of Lyndon B. Johnson— one that of a
magnificent, inspiring leader; the other of an insufferable
bastard."1^

Merle Miller's Lyndon;

An Oral Biography is

not so important for the insights of the author as it is for
Miller's allowing those who knew Johnson best to tell the
story and for the comprehensiveness of the author's
interviewing.

Finally, Tom Wicker's JFK and LBJ:

The

Influence of Personality Upon Politics, analyzes how the
former president's demeanor lost his much cherished
consensus government.

xv
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Methodology
This study attempts to analyze Johnson's Vietnam War
rhetoric during the escalation period from a broad
perspective.

A traditional neo-Aristotelian approach

concentrates on the speaker and his response to specific
speaking situations by analyzing the speaker himself, his
speech, the occasion, audience composition and reaction,
etc.

While these considerations will be included in the

overall analysis, this criticism aims at a wider approach.
For this purpose, the critical insights of Kenneth Burke
will be utilized to uncover not only what rhetoric Johnson
used during this period but also what it meant to the
American people and how it served the President's purposes.
Although sometimes criticized for a lack of "method,"
Burke's approach to "language as symbolic action" offers an
extensive critical framework from which to approach
Johnson's rhetoric.

McGuire hints at the importance of

Burke's theories by insisting on research which focuses
primarily on the language of a speech.

From such a starting

point, McGuire argues, the ultimate importance of "meaning"
can slowly be extracted from the verbal symbols of a work.1^
Symbolic meaning is the single most important variable
that distinguishes Burke's perspective from a more
traditional approach.

Through the study of symbolic acts,

the critic is able to understand better the interaction of
rhetors with their social environment.

Between November of

xvi
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1963 and July 1965, the social environment of the United
States, as with any other period in American history,
changed dramatically.

A traditional analysis of one

speaker, giving one speech, to one audience, on a specific
occasion would confine the tracing of Johnson's interaction
with a society in process.

This would further be

complicated by the repetitive wording and structure of
Johnson's speeches.
In contrast to the traditional separation of form from
content, the Burkean perspective treats form as inseparable
from content.

As changes take place in the social

environment, symbolic responses to the environment also
change.

As symbols change, symbolic form changes as well in

interaction with the social environment.

The recursive

influence of symbols on reality and vice versa allows the
critic to view Johnson's rhetoric from a more holistic
perspective.

This approach not only provides an intricate

process of "unpacking" Johnson's symbols during the entirety
of the period but also utilizes a flexible framework which
takes into consideration traditional questions as well.16
According to Burke, man views everything through a "fog
of symbols."

His dramatistic critique of symbols, what

later came to be known as "logology," attempts to get men to
realize that they have to look through this "fog" at nature,
that men tend to make themselves and nature over in the
image of their own symbols, and that their effort often ends
xvii
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in disaster

The first part of this study will thus

attempt to study the symbols Johnson used to describe the
Vietnam conflict to the American people.

A cluster analysis

will be used to break the symbols down into equations in an
attempt to uncover "what goes with what and why."

The

equations will be built around the components of Burke's
dramatistic pentad:
purpose.^®

scene, agent, act, agency, and

This process of "unpacking" Johnson's symbols

will take place from a qualitative rather than a
quantitative perspective.

Statistical data will not be

utilized because of the nature of Burke's emphasis.

In an

effort to chart symbols according to both their repetitive
use and their emotional intensity, Johnson's public
statements will be examined for specific references to
scenes, agents, acts, agencies, and purposes.

These symbols

will then naturally cluster into the President's perceptions
of different scenes, agents, acts, etc. and be recorded in
equation form.
The second part of this study, accordingly, will
attempt to lift the "fog" off Johnson's symbols regarding
Vietnam.

Once the speeches are broken down into logological

equations, a more extensive criticism can take place using
another aspect of Burke's analysis of language as symbolic
action.

Applying what Burke calls the "grammar of rebirth,"

the symbolic meaning of Johnson's Vietnam rhetoric will be
traced, enlarging the perspective of this study to include
xviii
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both symbols and fog.19
Other Burkean concepts will be used as well.

By

viewing the patterns of Johnson’s symbols as "motives," the
expression of the President's personality and political
savvy in his rhetoric can be revealed.

Here the concepts of

secrecy, identification, division, and irony will prove most
useful.

Burke's use of Aristotle's "entelechy" will help in

viewing the entire symbolic process from the formation of
"god-terms" to Johnson's ultimate excessiveness as a
twentieth century president.

The entelechial motive will

also aid in understanding the importance of a g e n c y . 20
Accordingly, the structure of the dissertation will
follow the same critical pattern.

Chapter II will begin the

cluster analysis of Johnson's symbols, breaking down the
scenic and agent clusters into equations.

Formal speeches

of the period will be studied as well as smaller units from
Johnson's press conferences.

Chapter III will continue the

analysis, clustering the act, agency, and purposive aspects
of Johnson rhetoric into logological equations.

In chapter

IV, dominant patterns found in the clusters will be noted
and discussed as to their potential persuasiveness.
Part II of this study will analyze three representative
speeches from the escalation period.

In chapter V,

Johnson's speech delivered at Syracuse University one day
after the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin
will be scrutinized for its redemptive aspects.

The Johns

xix
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Hopkins speech, "Peace Without Conquest," will receive
similar treatment in chapter VI as will the President's
opening statement of his historic July 28, 1965 news
conference in chapter VII.
A final chapter of evaluation will chart a concordance
of symbols as they cluster around significant god-terms in
Johnson rhetoric.

Symbolic meanings will also be considered

in the index, the result being a "dictionary of war."

By

turning the assets of language on a rhetoric of escalation,
a few more steps toward Burke's "purification of war" can be
taken.

With the cry of "No more Vietnams" entering the

contemporary rhetorical situation with such frequency, such
assessments are not only appropriate but possibly vital to
the future of man himself.

xx

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

NOTES
1 See Stanley Karnow, Vietnam:

A History (New York:

Viking, 1983), 319.
2 Such a scenario is described by Doris Kearns in
Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York:

New

American Library, 1976), 157.
3 Karnow, p. 319.
4 Lyndon Baines Johnson, "Address at Johns Hopkins
University:

'Peace Without Conquest,"' Public Papers of the

Presidents of the United States:
(Washington, D.C.:

Lyndon B. Johnson, vol. 2

Government Printing Office, 1965), 396.

5 George Reedy, Lyndon B. Johnson:

A Memoir (New York:

Andrews and McMeel, 1982), 13.
^ Reedy, p. 13.

7 Michael McGuire, Remarks made as respondent to the
Debut Program of the Southern Speech Communication
Association Convention, Baton Rouge, La., April, 1984.
8 See Richard A. Cherwitz, "Lyndon Johnson and the
'Crisis' of Tonkin Gulf:

A President's Justification of

War," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 42 (Spring
1978), 93-104; Lee Sigelman and Lawrence W. Miller,
"Understanding Presidential Rhetoric:

Vietnam Statements of

Lyndon Johnson," Communication Research, 5, no. 1 (1978),
25-56; and F. Michael Smith, "Rhetorical Implications of the
'Aggression' Thesis in the Johnson Administration's Vietnam
Argumentation," Central States Speech Journal, 23 (Winter
xxi

T rr-m

.....

- ......

■...........................

-

-

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

1972), 217-224.
9 See David Zarefsky, "The Great Society as Rhetorical
Proposition," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (December
1979), 364-378 and "President Johnson's War on Poverty:

The

Rhetoric of Three 'Establishment' Movements," Communication
Monographs. 44 (November 1977), 352-373.

IQ See Cherwitz and Robert L. Ivie, "Presidential
Motives for War," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60 (October
1974), 337-345.

H

See Walter Bunge, Robert V. Hudson, and Chung Woo

Suh, "Johnson's Information Strategy for Vietnam:

An

Evaluation," Journalism Quarterly, 45 (Autumn 1968), 419-425
and Smith, "Rhetorical Implications."

12 Kenneth Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1941), 23.

13 Kearns, p. 15.
14 Reedy, p. 158.
15 Michael McGuire, "The Present State of Modern
Rhetorical Theory," Classroom Lecture, University of
Georgia, November, 1979.
16 For a more extensive comparison of the traditional
and Burkean perspectives, see Bernard L. Brock and Robert L.
Scott, Methods of Rhetorical Criticism:
Perspective, Second ed. (Detroit:

A Twentieth Century

Wayne State University

Press, 1980), 461-463.

17 William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of
xxii

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Human Relations. Second ed. (Berkeley:

University of

California Press, 1982), 161.
18 For a discussion of the cluster analysis, see
Rueckert, pp. 83-90 and 128-162.
19 Rueckert, pp. 96-111.
2° Most of Burke’s ideas will be taken from Kenneth
Burke, A Grammar of Motives, (1945; rpt. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969); A Rhetoric of
Motives, (1950; rpt. Berkeley:

University of California

Press, 1969); Permanence and Change:

An Anatomy of Purpose

Second ed. (1954; rpt. Indianapolis:

Bobbs, Merrill, 1965)

and The Philosophy of Literary Form, (1941; rpt. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1973).

xxiii

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

PART I:

A CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON’S
VIETNAM RHETORIC, 1964-1965

No slight critical ability is
as his deepest enemy a people
When criticism can do so much
us just to the point where we
better criticism.

required for one to hate
thousands of miles away.
for us, it may have got
greatly require still
— Kenneth Burke

"Rhetorical studies," writes Robert L. Ivie, "can and
should function as an instrument of life."l

While man

considers language a prime tool of living, even, perhaps, a
defining characteristic of himself, few have taken into
account the critical impact of this medium.

Because

language is the universal agency of communication, it is
vital to monitor how this tool works— or to talk about how
we talk.
Some critics, like Kenneth Burke, explain how this tool
has begun to work to the detriment of man, leaving him with
a "language-ridden view of himself, his products, and the
universe" in which "every aspect of non-verbal, sociopolitical, and extra-verbal reality is viewed by man through
a fog of symbols."2

The rhetorical study, therefore, acting

as an instrument of life, attempts to lift the fog off
reality through a study of the medium itself.

The result is

not only a clearer view of our world but also increased
understanding of how we view the world through language or
rhetoric.
Ivie continues, however, noting that rhetorical studies
function as instruments of life "especially through the
1
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critical analysis of war discourse."3

Agreeing with Ivie,

Burke goes further in his critique of language by attempting
to "purify" or teach man how to avoid war through criticism.
The world as we know it, the world in history,
cannot be described in its particularities by an
idiom of peace . . .

We are actually in a world at

war— a world at combat— and even a calculus must
be developed with the dialectics of participation
by "the enemy"— hence the representative anecdote
must contain militaristic ingredients.

It may not

be an anecdote of peace— but it may be an anecdote
giving us the purification of war.4
Viewing rhetoric as an attempt to "identify" separate
and competing entities in the world, be they individuals or
nations, Burke says "men are brought to that most tragically
ironic of all divisions, or conflicts, wherein millions of
cooperative acts go into the preparation for one single
destructive act."

Here, Burke refers to that "ultimate

disease of cooperation:

war."3

In the end, the writing of a critical analysis of
Lyndon Johnson's war rhetoric will help in the quest to
"purify" war, especially by revealing how nations may avoid
sliding into the quagmire of battle.

The next three

chapters will deal specifically with Johnson's rhetorical
units presented between the time of his ascension to the
presidency through the July 28, 1965 announcement to
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increase America's military commitment to South Vietnam.
The units will be examined collectively as a body of
literature by a single speaker.

A cluster analysis will act

as the magnifying glass through which Johnson's symbolic
action will be studied.

In subsequent chapters, the "fog"

surrounding these symbols will be dealt with in more detail.
The cluster analysis, as used by Kenneth Burke in the
study of poetry as symbolic action, has been chosen as a
critical framework in this chapter for two reasons.

First,

this method allows the critic to deal exclusively with the
symbols or language as a body of literature.
to find out "what goes with what and why."6

The object is
According to

William H. Rueckert, perhaps the single greatest authority
on Burke's writings outside Burke himself, the study is
achieved by making an index and/or concordance of a single
speech or body of speeches by a single speaker.
The index is necessarily selective; one is guided
by terms that are either of high intensity or high
frequency.

The former are terms which are

naturally charged, such as love, sex, society, or
are particularly significant in a given author,
such as the rose garden in Eliot; the latter are
frequently repeated terms or group of terms.7
The results of such an analysis provide more than a
directory of terms, however.

The main point of clustering

is to provide the equational structure of the literature and
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this is nothing less than a statement of form.®

The

revelation of formal principles in a work is important for
several reasons.

As certain patterns become prevalent in

the text, indications of the speaker's motives,
connotations, and world view are revealed as well as
implications of the situation and culture in which the words
were spoken.9

Form in literature is "an arousing and

fulfillment of desires," according to Burke.

"A work has

form in so far as one part of it leads the reader to
anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence."1°
Form, thus, not only exposes much about the speaker but also
the audience as well and the concordance provided by these
chapters will prove to be a valuable framework in the
subsequent analysis of the speeches as symbolic action.
Secondly, the cluster analysis will be applied due to
the nature of the discourse.

Clustering, to Burke, is an

act of "logologic," a set of intertwined terms which imply
each other.

Logologic reduces the substance of any act,

thing, or place to its equational cluster.11

Choosing to

call man's "language-ridden view of himself" and his
destructive tendencies "logomania," Burke has set out to
"find ways to save ourselves from ourselves and save the
rest of the world (non-verbal nature).

Logology thus is

an important medium in the purification of war and what
better application is there than to the discourse of warmaking?
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The analysis will first consider intensities and
repetitions as they cluster around the five terms of Burke's
pentad:

scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose.

In

addition, movement and progression will be studied within
the clusters from a chronological standpoint as well as the
opposition of terms or what Burke calls an "agon analysis."
In an attempt to focus this part of the study on
Johnson's language, Burke's pentad will not reveal a
rhetoric bound by time or place.

President Johnson will not

be seen as an agent speaking in a particular scene through
the agency of public speaking for a certain purpose.
Rather, this study will focus on the drama within Johnson's
rhetoric or the language the President chose to use in
portraying the Vietnam conflict to the American people.
This study is an analysis of "symbolic action."
place to begin is with the symbols themselves.
means choice.

The best
"Action"

The choices behind the symbols will be

studied in Part II.
The Scenic Cluster
By far, the most discussed scene in Lyndon Johnson's
war discourse was, of course, that of Vietnam.

His

references can be analyzed as those concerning the country
itself, the war situation in general, and scenic conditions
pertaining to the quality of life.
As for the country itself, Johnson described Vietnam as
"important to us" but a country which was "half a world
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away. "I-3

Indeed, most of the President's references to the

country of Vietnam took into account its geographical
location and clustered around "far away."

This aspect,

however, was not mentioned until August 10, 1964.

During

the spring of 1965, distance apparently became more of a
consideration to the President as references to the
country's remoteness became more frequent.

On April 7, he

said, "Vietnam is far away" and referred to it as a "corner
of the world."

The "corner" reference was made again on

June 1 and in the famous news conference of July 28, called
Vietnam a "remote and distant place."

The beginning, thus,

of a long and complex equation could read "Vietnam" equals
"far away," equals "corner," equals "remote and distant,"
but "important to us."
Most of Johnson's references to Vietnam as a scene for
his unfolding drama took into account the effects of war and
clustered around "conflict."

Early in his presidency, the

President referred to the scene as "a very dangerous
situation," and "that problem" as having "long standing
difficulties."

By the time of the attack on two United

States destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964,
the scene was "already serious" and with "a good many
problems."
there."

In the Spring of 1965, there was "great danger

It was "a very serious matter."

considered "dirty, brutal, and

The fighting was

difficult" in an area that

was "not a serene or peaceful place."

The war had a

"confused nature," and by June of 1965 had become a "clear
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and present danger," "very difficult," full of "death and
desolation."

Vietnam was not just a "corner," but a

"conflict-torn corner," "ripped by conflict," a "warstrained land."

In equation form, therefore, Vietnam also

equals "danger," "difficult," "serious," "problem," "dirty,
brutal," "confused," and ultimately, "death."
It was not until April of 1965 that President Johnson
introduced a human factor into his scenic descriptions of
Vietnam.

The country suddenly became the home "for millions

of impoverished people," "a hungry land."

The President

called Vietnam's villages "helpless," which "sustain
millions of people whose first desire is for food and
shelter and hope of progress."

In Vietnam, "medical care is

often impossible to find," "poverty and neglect take their
inevitable toll in human life," as do the ravages of
"unchecked disease."
President Johnson made far fewer references to the
scene of his own country but the intensity of these symbols
warrants mention.

At a news conference from the LBJ Ranch

in Texas, Johnson criticized the press for "involving" the
United Stated in wars while he could see for himself "the
serene atmosphere of the Pedernales."
It was not until the President made his crucial
commitment of July 28, 1965, however, that another scenic
reference to the homeland was made.

Stating his reluctance

to send Americans into battle, Johnson said they had been
"born into a land exultant with hope and with golden
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promise."

In this scene, therefore, the United States

equals "serene," "exultant with hope," and "golden promise."
A final and very important scene Johnson spoke of
repeatedly was that of "the great stage of the world."
Early in his presidency, Johnson described the planet as
becoming "small and turbulent" and tended to cluster the
rest of his comments around these terms.

He attributed "the

shrinking distances" to "the ready access of information
about other countries and other people."

The world was

"developing," a "cauldron of violence and hatred and
revolution without some assistance."

We lived, Johnson

said, in a "dangerous and difficult world."
world had become "troubled and perilous."

By 1965, the
Because of what

happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964, Johnson
said the "world is challenged," and identified the United
States with the fate of the world in his State of the Union
Address of January, 1965 by saying that "the state of the
Union depends, in large measure, upon the state of the
world."

The world, thus, equals "small and turbulent,"

"shrinking," "developing," "a cauldron of violence and
hatred and revolution," and, like Vietnam, "dangerous and
difficult."
To sum up, while making scenic references to the home
front, the world, and most of all to Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson
probably did not consider the scene to be a great factor in
his foreign policy planning regarding Southeast Asia or in
his war discourse.

Vietnam was "half a world away" but
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remained from the time Johnson became president until July
1965 "a situation that is . . . important to us."

That the

President made fewer comments regarding scene than of any
other component in the dramatic pentad points not only to
the disregard of scenic conditions in decision making but
also leads the critic to look elsewhere for the dramatic
element around which Johnson clustered his arguments.

To

use the language of Burke's logologic, the "materialistic
substance" of Johnson's rhetoric obviously did not weigh
heavily in the decision making because of a lack of scenic
clustering.14
What is available in the speeches for use in the first
stage of building a logological equation is as follows:
Vietnam equals "remote and distant," equals "danger," equals
"brutality," equals "impoverished," equals "death."

The

United States, meanwhile, equals "serene," equals "hope,"
equals "promise."

The world, which unified the two other

scenes, equals "shrinking," equals "small and turbulent,"
thus rendering distance or scene of little consequence in
Johnson's thought and/or rhetorical process.
The Agent Cluster
Far more numerous than references to scenic conditions
in Lyndon Johnson's war discourse is the clustering of
symbols around the agents involved in the drama.

Again,

there were three groups of people or agents appearing
frequently in the Vietnam rhetoric:

individuals and groups
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affiliated with the United States or its government, the
people of South Vietnam and their governmental
representatives, and the Vietcong/North Vietnamese who
Johnson spoke of as a single opposing group.
Surprisingly, and in contrast with scenic clustering
where more emphasis was given to symbols of the Vietnamese
situation, President Johnson devoted a vast majority of his
allusions to American agents including the people and their
leaders.

Not until the Gulf of Tonkin incident did the

President begin to elaborate on the nature of the
opposition, and then only marginally.

Even at the time of

commitment in July 1965, the North Vietnamese were still
described in the same ambiguous terms Johnson had been using
for months.
To begin with, there was a great discrepancy in the
manner in which Johnson "named" the agents involved.
Americans were always identified by their proper name and
usually their title.

Johnson referred to himself as "your

president" or "the present president."

Joining him

frequently throughout the period were several co-agents
within his administration:

"Secretary McNamara," [Robert

McNamara, Secretary of Defense], "General Taylor," [Maxwell
Taylor, Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964-1965], "Secretary
Rusk," [Dean Rusk, Secretary of State], "General Wheeler,"
[Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint.Chiefs of Staff, 19641970], "Ambassador Lodge," [Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to
South Vietnam, 1963-1964 and 1965-1967], "Ambassador
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Stevenson" or "Governor Stevenson," [Adlai Stevenson,
Ambassador to the United Nations], and "Mr. Bundy,"
[McGeorge Bundy, head of the National Security Council
staff].

Standing on the perimeter of this central cast of

characters were other specific individuals:

"General

Eisenhower" or "President Eisenhower" depending on the
context, "President Kennedy," "Senator Goldwater," [Barry
Goldwater, Republican presidential nominee, 1964], and
"General Westmoreland," [William Westmoreland, Commander of
U.S. Military forces in Vietnam, 1964-1968].
In stark contrast, only one South Vietnamese was named
in Johnson's discourse.

"General Khanh" or "Prime Minister

Khanh" [Nguyen Khanh, Prime Minister of South Vietnam in
1964] was alluded to constantly in a period of great
optimism early in 1964 following the fall of Diem's regime.
No other South Vietnamese individual was mentioned in
Johnson's discourse following Khanh's unsuccessful rule and
fall thirteen months later.

Other members of this group of

agents were referred to as "the people of South Vietnam," or
"the South Vietnamese people," "the South Vietnamese
Government," "the new Government of South Vietnam," "the
people and Government of South Vietnam," "the villagers of
South Vietnam," and the "simple farmers."
The most abstract group of agents by far were "the
Vietcong," "Vietcong guerrillas," or the "North Vietnamese."
Not a single North Vietnamese individual was mentioned in
Johnson's war discourse during the period prior to July
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1965.

Variations of titles given to this set of agents

include "Communist masters in the North," "the Government of
North Vietnam," "the Communist regime," "Communism,"
"Communist totalitarians," "the aggressors and their dupes,"
which included the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, and
the "willful aggressors."
Not only was there a marked difference in the manner in
which Johnson labelled the respective groups of agents, but
descriptions of the characters also revealed contrasts.
Officials of the United States Government mentioned above
tended to cluster around such adjectives as "cautious,"
"determined," "compassionate," and "patient."

In the early

months of 1964, these men were revealed as "most cautious,"
"extremely careful," and "helpful."

By the time of the

attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson introduced the
cluster of determination by labelling administration members
as men of "conviction," "actively concerned with threats to
the peace" of South Vietnam.

They were also men of "wisdom

and patience and restraint."
In January of 1965, the same group of agents had not
only "concern and interest," but had also become men of
"compassion and vigilance."

As the hostilities continued to

escalate in the spring of 1965, Johnson made many more
references to himself and those around him as having
"patience and determination."

They were "reasonable" men

having a president with great "responsibility."

Because

they were "reasonable," these agents remained "ready for
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unconditional discussions" from April through July.
Further, they were "ready to begin discussion next week,
tomorrow, or tonight."

Ultimately, they were "ready to talk

anytime, anywhere, with any government without conditions."
They would "go anywhere," "discuss any subject," "listen
courteously and patiently to any point of view that may
offer possibilities of a peaceful solution."

On top of

this, they were men that would "not weary in the search for
peace" and men that stayed in "constant consultation" with
one another.
References Johnson made regarding the government as a
whole clustered around the symbol of "unity."

From the time

of the hostilities in the Gulf of Tonkin through July of
1965, Johnson constantly pictured the US government, the
American people, and, surprisingly, the press as one.

In

August of 1964, Johnson said "our Government is united in
its determination" and was "pleased with the unanimity with
which the Congress and the people— and, if you will pardon
me, the press--supported" the retaliation of the Tonkin
attacks.

The "unanimity of the Congress," according to the

President, also "reflects the unanimity of the country."
By April of 1965, Johnson turned to the use of the
negative by saying that there was "no division in the
American government."

There was, instead, "strengthened

unity of American purpose . . .
press."

in the Congress and in the

In July, the President assured the American people

that the "distinguished chairman of the committees and the
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members of both parties" all had "met as Americans, united
and determined to stand as one" in the deliberations leading
up to the 1965 build-up.
As a result, Johnson pictured the official
representatives of the United States government as broad
minded, all-encompassing men.

They were not only "helpful,"

"convicted," "concerned," and "determined," but, at the same
time, "careful," "wise," "patient," "restrained,” full of
"compassion," and "vigilant."

Above all, they stayed in

"constant consultation" with one another and were always
"united."
In many ways, the President depicted the governmental
representatives just as the Constitution would— as a
microcosm of American beliefs and attitudes.

These men,

according to Johnson's rhetoric, embodied many of the same
qualities the President attributed to the American nation in
general.

Johnson described the country as "a sentinel on

the frontiers of freedom," and a "watchtower seeking out the
horizons of peace."

Like the government, America was

depicted as "one nation united and indivisible" and "shall
remain" that way.

While individuals in the government were

ready to negotiate "anywhere, any time," America

was a

country that "keeps her word" and "shall honor our
commitments."

It was like her commander-in-chief, "the most

responsible of all nations," and like the other individuals
in the government, reflected "patience" and "determination"
by having "the firmness to defend freedom, the strength to
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support that firmness, and a constant, patient effort to
move the world toward peace instead of war."
In the spring of 1965, following a mounting campaign of
terrorism by the Vietcong, the country, like the government,
not only had "compassion," but also "outrage" and
"indignation."

Like the principle characters, Johnson said

the country now faced the problems in Vietnam with both
"firmness" and "moderation," a "readiness for peace" but
"with a refusal to retreat."

By May, this alertness became

an "unhesitative readiness of the United States of America."
Above all and more frequently mentioned, was the
overriding quality, again, of "unity."

Following the Gulf

of Tonkin attacks, Johnson referred to the "unity and
determination of the United States in supporting freedom and
in protecting peace in Southeast Asia."

In April 1965, the

country remained "united on the need to resist aggression"
and by the summer, a nation of "general unanimity and a
willingness to provide."
One quality the President attributed to America
frequently will have more bearing in the clustering of
agencies but bears mentioning at this time.

On several

occasions, Johnson referred to the physical "power"
possessed by the nation.

In April 1964, the President said

the United States was a "great, powerful, rich country" and
after the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, flexed the country's might
by saying "we are the most powerful of all nations" but also
"the most responsible of all nations."

Again, it is
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interesting to note how the active is tempered by the
passive.

America is everything— both "powerful" and

"responsible."

In the Johns Hopkins address, Johnson

attributed the United States' benevolent efforts in South
Vietnam to the fact that "we are rich and powerful" and
because "it is right in this world that the strong and the
wealthy should help the poor and the weak."
Very much like the country in general, Johnson saw the
American people as an expanded version of the same values
and qualities accredited to individuals in his
administration.

Early in his presidency, Johnson called the

country "a sentinel on the frontiers of freedom" and a
"watchtower seeking out the horizons of peace."

In the same

speech, he referred to Americans as the "servants and
guardians of these high causes."

Like their official

representatives, the citizenry was described as
"determined," full of "concern and sympathy," but facing
modern challenges "with courage" and "with strength."
Again, the facet of being a little bit of everything is
evident in Johnson's discussion of the U.S. population.
"American people," Johnson said in June of 1965, "want their
own Government to be not only strong but compassionate."
After saying that the U.S. was a "great, powerful, rich
country" early in his presidency, Johnson countered, saying
that "concern and sympathy . . . concern of equal for equal,
the concern of brother for brother" are often as important.
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The only unusual characteristics the President
attributed to Americans were found in two of the more
important speeches Johnson made during the first two years
of his presidency— upon signing the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and when committing ground forces to Vietnam in
July of 1965.

After the American response to the Tonkin

attacks, Johnson said "Americans of all parties and
philosophies can be justly proud— and justly grateful" for
the "understanding, accord, and unity" among the national
government.

This, however, was another disguised way of

clustering both the American people and Congress around the
symbol of "unity."

Being more sensitive to Americans as

individuals, Johnson inserted a "personal note" in his
address of July 28, 1965.

Referring to imminent draftees as

"the flower of our youth, our finest young men," the
President said he did not find sending them into battle easy
since they were "filled with hope and life."
To sum up briefly, those agents identified as cabinet
members, congressmen, or Americans at large contribute a
great deal to the equational cluster surrounding "the United
States of America."

Some of the more intense symbols in

this cluster include "your present president," equals
"responsibility," equals "Secretary Rusk," equals
"cautious," equals "cabinet members," equals "careful,"
equals "helpful," equals "conviction," equals "concerned,"
equals "wisdom and patience and restraint," equals
"discussion," equals "Congress," equals "interest," equals
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"compassion and vigilance," equals "readiness for peace,"
equals "Americans," equals "determination," equals "flower
of our youth," equals "United States," equals "keeps her
word," equals "firmness with moderation," equals "power,"
equals "sympathy," and all equals "unanimity."
The clustering of symbols around those agents
identified as "South Vietnamese" is closely allied with the
United States agent cluster just mentioned.

The

similarities are so striking in Johnson's rhetoric that the
physical "mixing" of U.S. ground troops with those of South
Vietnam in 1965 may have been predictable had the
President's speeches been monitored more closely.
While Johnson said that "peace must be our passion" in
the United States, the South Vietnamese also clustered with
symbols of "peace."

Johnson described them early in his

presidency as a "people who seek only to be left in peace"
and further as a "peaceful, liberty-loving, free people," or
just as "the peaceful people of South Vietnam."

Following

the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, the President referred to
"the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam."

This,

interestingly enough, was the only reference to the agents
of South Vietnam in the days following the alleged attacks _
thus rendering the matter of concern only to those
characters affiliated with the United States or North
Vietnam.

Not until February of 1965 were the "liberty-

loving people" of South Vietnam mentioned again.
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Johnson used the symbols of "courage" and "strength" to
describe the way in which Americans faced modern challenges.
Likewise, he identified the South Vietnamese not only with
"peace" but also with "bravery."

In March, as Vietcong

terrorism increased in South Vietnam, "the people and
government of South Vietnam" were described as "a brave and
independent people" and increasingly as "an independent
nation" or "independent South Vietnam."

Having what it

would take to stay "peaceful" and "independent," the
President said these men and women had "patience as well as
bravery, the will to endure as well as the will to resist,"
like the Americans.

As terrorism escalated in 1965 without

substantial American ground involvement, Johnson called the
South Vietnamese "brave and enduring people."
Unlike the Americans who were strong, however, Johnson
described Vietnam as a "small and brave nation" full of
"simple farmers" who were "loyal to their government."

Upon

committing ground forces to Vietnam, the President described
the land as a "small and valiant nation . . . crippled and
scarred by war," thus necessitating the "power" and
"compassion" of the United States.
Until it became painfully evident to the American
principals in the summer of 1964 that General Khanh's
attempt to consolidate power in South Vietnam was failing,
President Johnson made several specific references to the
South Vietnamese leader and his government.

In the first

official statement made by Johnson dealing solely with the
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situation in Vietnam, the President said General Khanh and
his government were "basically sound" and that the General's
leadership was "vigorous."

On May 18, 1964, Johnson said

Prime Minister Khanh provided South Vietnam with "new energy
and leadership and new hope" while the government made
"vigorous decisions."
The cluster of symbols around South Vietnamese agents,
then, focuses on the key terms of "peace," "independence,"
and "bravery"— all words that could easily fit into the
United States cluster.
"peace" and "patience."

Both logological equations involve
The Americans have "courage"

whereas the South Vietnamese are "brave."

Americans are

"determined" and the South Vietnamese are "vigorous."
equation for this group of agents is as follows:

The

"South

Vietnamese" equals "peaceful," equals "liberty-loving,"
equals "free," equals "brave," equals "independent," equals
"simple," equals "farmers," equals "South Vietnam," equals
"small," equals "crippled and scarred," equals "loyal,"
equals "patience," equals "enduring," equals "General
khanh," equals "sound," equals the "Government," equals
"vigorous."
The last group of agents to be considered in this
section are those identified by Johnson as "North
Vietnamese" or the "Vietcong."

Judging from the way the

President treated these two groups, he apparently perceived
little difference in them.

Aggression against the South
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Vietnamese was attributed alternately to both groups in the
speeches.
Only on two occasions did President Johnson refer to
the two groups jointly.

In May of 1964, the President spoke

of the "Vietcong guerrillas, under orders from their
Communist masters in the North."

In March 1965, Johnson

called the enemy "the aggressors and their dupes" but
confined the rest of his comments regarding the opposition
to discussions of the North Vietnamese Communist alone.
All of Johnson's references to the North Vietnamese
deal with the government or Communism in general.

The

symbols which cluster around these titles are similar to the
point of interchangeability.

At the same time of the Gulf

of Tonkin attacks, the "vessels of the Government of North
Vietnam" are referred to as "hostile."

The same day,

Johnson called the North Vietnamese regime "threatening,"
part of the "aggressive Communist nations," and said they
had "violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam."
As far as peace was concerned, Johnson said in the
spring of 1965 that there was "no indication and no evidence
that they are ready and willing to negotiate under
conditions that would be productive."

The North Vietnamese

were people with a "violent and ruthless disregard for life,
happiness, and security" seeking only "domination and
empire, conquest and aggression."

If South Vietnam were to

fall to these people, Johnson said, the country would be
delivered into "terror and repression."
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Johnson's "violence/aggression" thesis took other forms
as well.

North Vietnam was a "source of brutality"

displaying "arrogance and adventure" in Southeast Asia.

The

North Vietnamese were the "enemies of freedom," "willful
aggressors" who were examples of "the violence and weakness
of man at his worst."

By the time of Johnson's decision to

deploy ground troops to Southeast Asia, the North Vietnamese
had become simply "men who hate and destroy."
"Communism" in general to Johnson "wears a more
aggressive face" but was an empire whose "unity . . . has
begun to crumble."

The President labelled the communists of

North Vietnam "totalitarians" who were "spurred on by
Communist China."

Further, the North Vietnamese were an

integral part of "the growing might and the grasping
ambition of Asian communism."
When compared to other peoples of the world, Johnson
spoke of the North Vietnamese from two completely different
perspectives.

In the Johns Hopkins address, the President

empathized with the North Vietnamese seeing them as members
of a region united by common struggles.

"The people of

North Vietnam want . . . what their neighbors also desire:
food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to
learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage
of material misery."

In the same speech, Johnson expanded

this united group of agents to also include Americans.

"The

ordinary men and women of North Vietnam and South Vietnam—
of China and India— of Russia and America— are brave
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people," Johnson said, "filled with the same proportions of
hate and fear, of love and hope."

The Vietnamese "want the

same things for themselves and their families."

They "do

not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their
homes, or the homes of others, destroyed."
Such a view of the North Vietnamese contrasts markedly
with Johnson's "violence/aggression" cluster which he
emphasized in other comparisons with peoples of the world.
Johnson tried to isolate North Vietnam from the rest of
civilization by predicting in June of 1965 that these
"enemies of freedom shall become the inheritors of man's
world-wide revolt against injustice and misery."

Later that

month, the President said the North Vietnamese were "willful
aggressors contemptuous of the opinion and the will of
mankind" and a people who placed "their ambitions and their
dogmas or their prestige above the peace of all the world."
In summary, Johnson pictured this last group of agents
with inconsistent symbols.

For the most part, the North

Vietnamese/Vietcong agents clustered around the term
"aggression" except in the Johns Hopkins speech when the
President spoke of all agents united by common necessities.
The logological equation for this group, then, is as
follows:

"Vietcong" equals "dupes," equals North

Vietnamese," equals "aggressors," equals "hostile," equals
Communist," equals "domination and empire," but equals
"crumbling unity," equals "unwilling to negotiate," equals
"violent and ruthless," equals "terror and repression," but
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equals "weakness," equals "source of brutality," but equals
"does not want to see their sons die," equals "enemies of
freedom," but equals "desire for food, learning, and
progress," equals "men who hate and destroy," but equals "do
not want to see their homes destroyed," equals "hate and
fear," but equals "love and hope."
In contrast to the scenic cluster, President Johnson
made many more references to agents in his speeches than to
the scenery.

In addition, the President devoted a majority

of his arguments to American agents living on American soil
whereas most of his comments regarding scene depicted the
situation in Vietnam.

As a result, one must conclude that

Johnson concerned himself more with persuading his audience
of his administration's "concern" and "compassion" than with
the Vietcong's "brutality" and "ruthlessness."
As the clusters begin to take equational form, an
entire series of events or terms suddenly collapse into, in
Burke's words, "a single chord" that "must be strung out in
arpeggio.As

the clusters collapse, the similarity of

terminology leads to the obvious identification among agents
or actions as with the "mixing" of Americans with South
Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese with the Vietcong.
Within the chords or equations, however, inconsistencies
appear that, in musical terms, would be considered atonal
notes and by literary standards, logical incongruities.
When these inconsistencies appear, the audience is prepared,
by the nature of form, to expect persuasive change.
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Within the agent clusters, logical incongruities exist
in both the American and North Vietnamese equations.
Johnson described members of his administration and the
country as "determined" or "powerful" and "restrained."

The

North Vietnamese, on the other hand, represented both
"aggression" and "love and hope."

In order to follow what

change these seeds of inconsistency may have initiated, a
look into the progressions these terms may have taken will
follow the cluster of "purpose."
A final observation at this point deals with the sceneagent relationship.

In light of clustering developments

around agent, the recursive nature of the pentad allows one
to view the scenic cluster in a new perspective.

While

Johnson made a majority of his scenic references about
Vietnam, the most important scene to the President probably
was the world.

Since the President was preoccupied with

American agents and, subsequently, their actions, the
smallness and turbulence of the world became a vital link in
the drama between the players and their scene of concern-Vietnam.

Not only was international opinion of America's

image at stake but the "shrinking" state of the planet due
to "the ready access of information" allowed the principal
agents to "act" in a scene thousands of miles away.
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STANDING FIRM, POWER, AND PEACE:
THE ACT, AGENCY, AND PURPOSE CLUSTERS
In many respects, the clustering of terms around the
actions of the characters in Johnson's drama is most
pivotal.

It is at this point that the critic must go beyond

the symbols used to describe actions, agents, or scenery
alone.

When cataloguing actions, one must also take into

account what agents are doing the acting.

Thus, an

important step takes place in the building of a final
equational cluster in that the agent cluster must be
considered when forming the act cluster.
The Act Cluster
Just as President Lyndon Johnson discussed American
agents much more than any other group of characters, United
States actions comprised a vast majority of the President's
comments as well.

Ironically, while U.S. agents were

pictured with "concerned restraint" a majority of the time,
an overwhelming number of their actions clustered around the
imagery of "standing firm" in Vietnam.

Not surprisingly,

this more aggressive posture did not appear frequently in
Johnson's statements until after the Gulf of Tonkin attacks.
Only on one occasion in May of 1964 did the President say
that "we are pledged before all the world to stand" in
Vietnam.1
Following the alleged hostilities in the Gulf of
28
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Tonkin, however, the United States took a much more active
involvement in Johnson's speeches.

The President said the

nation "acted at once" with a "positive reply"— but only in
reply to the actions of others.

Further, the action taken

by the U.S. was "air action" so as to not give the
impression of involvement in a ground war.

A week later,

this reply became a "prompt and unmistakable reply" and the
country would "stand firm against the present aggressions."
In the spring of 1965 as America took a much more
"active" role in defending South Vietnam from escalating
terrorism, President Johnson tempered his rhetoric of
firmness with a "but/only" approach.

While the United

States was "increasing our response" and making "attacks by
air" with a "much more massive effort," Johnson said, "We
will do everything to reach that objective" but "we will do
only what is absolutely necessary" to reach the objective of
defending South Vietnam.

On May 4, the President used the

same strategy in saying that, "We will do, though, what must
be done and we will do only what must be done."
Another strategy Johnson used to temper America's more
active role in 1965 was to use the negative— describing
actions the United States would not take.

"We will not grow

tired," Johnson said in the Johns Hopkins address and "we
will not withdraw."

The following month the President

reiterated that "we will not and we must not withdraw or be
defeated."

By saying what the country would not do, Johnson
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could reinforce his commitment to "stand firm" without
actually saying it.
The greatest number of aggressive actions on the part
of the United States can be found in the last speech under
consideration in this study:
to a ground war in Vietnam.

Johnson's July 28 commitment
Americans were said to "toil

and suffer and sometimes die."
freedom."

They also "fight for

Johnson said he found it necessary "to increase

our active fighting forces" and that, as a country, "we are
going to continue to persist."
By July 28, 1965, President Johnson was no longer
tempering his statements regarding America's active role in
defending South Vietnam.

"America," the President said,

"will stand united behind her men" and that "Americans will
do whatever is necessary"— without doing "only" what was
necessary.

Further, "this Government is going to do all it

can to see it continue."

In Johnson's final sentence of the

speech, he reemphasized America's firm actions saying, "We
will stand in Vietnam."
Another group of actions the United States was involved
in clustered around the single action of "discussion."
Second only to the country's determination to stand firm in
Vietnam was the administrations never-ending "discussions,"
"consultations," "examinations," "decisions," etc.

All of

these actions were taken by agents within the administration
with representatives of Congress, the Defense Department,
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the South Vietnamese Government or Military establishment,
and sometimes the North Vietnamese.
The most common act taking place in this group was that
of simple "discussion."

Early in his presidency, Johnson

said Vietnam presented "new difficulties demanding
discussion and consultation and decision."

The President

said he liked "to reflect on these moves before I make
them," and that he liked "to consider everyone's judgment."
Further, military representatives in Vietnam were
"constantly examining" operations there to keep the
discussion process as up to date as possible.
Following the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, Johnson praised
the "free and serious debate" in Congress as to the passing
of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

In March of 1965, the

President said he thought "debate is healthy" and that "I
think we have had debate."

That same month, Johnson noted

that the United States had been in "rather active and
continuous consultation" with other governments regarding a
settlement with North Vietnam and that "we have discussed it
directly through diplomatic channels."
By late April, President Johnson intensified American
attempts to carry on discussions with the North Vietnamese.
"I will talk to any government," Johnson said, "any time,
without any conditions," and that "we will discuss any
subject and any point of view with any government
concerned."

A week later, the President claimed to "have

listened to every voice" but that he had "searched high and
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wide" for someone to negotiate with without success.

"I

can't even rope anybody and bring him in that is willing to
talk and reason and settle this thing by negotiation,"
Johnson said.
All the while, the President said "we have had
discussions" and that he had "reviewed the situation in
Vietnam."

Even as he sent ground troops into South Vietnam

in July, Johnson assured America that the administration had
"communicated with most of the friendly nations" and that he
personally had "to ask Congress for their judgments,"
because "one of the principal duties of the Office of
President is to maintain constant consultation."
Another prominent group of actions by Americans cluster
around the act of "helping."

At first, the President

justified American assistance as "not only one of the most
Christian acts," but also "an act of necessity."

In

addition to the United States "following the Golden Rule not
only at home but abroad," Johnson said, "we must help
developing countries because our own welfare demands it."
For these reasons, advisors were sent to Vietnam, "providing
leadership and judgment, and making decisions."
As the United States became more involved in the
defense of South Vietnam, however, helpful actions were
based solely on a religious motive.

Following the attacks

in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson said America was "working
against poverty and disease and ignorance" and upon
accepting his party's nomination for President said, "our
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nation will continue to extend the hand of compassion and
the hand of affection and love to the old and the sick and
the hungry."

In his State of the Union address in January

of 1965, Johnson claimed "our Nation was created to help
strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny."
Help came from a variety of sources as well.

Since the

Geneva accords in 1954, Johnson said, "every American
president has offered support," and to do his part, Lyndon
Johnson proposed a massive economic development program of
New Deal proportions.

"A billion dollar American

investment" could extend this country's helping hand so that
"the wonders of modern medicine can be spread through
villages."

"We will build clinics and provide doctors," the

President said, "to help heal the wounds of war."

Further,

Johnson proposed a program "to assist in feeding and
clothing the needy in Asia" with American surpluses.

"We

will help South Vietnam import materials for their homes and
their factories" and so that "schools can be established."
Even as the President announced plans to build a ground war
in Southeast Asia, he said the United States would continue
to "enrich the condition of their life, to feed the hungry
and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the
homeless, and to help the farmer to increase his crops, and
the worker to find a job."
A fourth group of American actions President Johnson
described in his speeches were acts mentioned above as those
intended to temper the predominant acts of firmness.

In
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addition to Johnson's "but/only" strategy of hiding firm
military actions, the President used a varied vocabulary to
describe acts of "restraint."

Following the Gulf of Tonkin

incident, our nation's response was said to be "limited and
fitting."

The armed action America took in the form of air

raids was "appropriate."

Regarding future responses,

Johnson said such actions "should be careful and should be
measured."
By the spring of 1965, acts of restraint had become
official U.S. policy.

"We have our policy," the President

said, "of responding appropriately, fittingly, and
measured."

Regarding his July 1965 decision to give General

Westmoreland what was needed to expand the war, Johnson said
the United States "would not bluster, bully, or flaunt our
power" and "like our actions in the past, [present ones] are
carefully measured to do what must be done."
The last group of actions Johnson attributed to
American agents cluster around the terms of "peace" and
"freedom."

Ironically, such acts appear less frequently in

the speeches than any other of the actions discussed above.
It is even more unusual when considering the fact that
American agents clustered around such terms as "careful,"
"compassionate," "helpful," "united," and "ready for peace,"
are at the same time accredited most recurrently with making
"firm stands" in Vietnam.

Nonetheless, the "peace/freedom"

motif plays in important role in the American agent-act
equation.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

35

In all of Johnson's references to "peace" and
"freedom," the United States is seen as doing all it can in
pursuit of those goals.

Early in 1964, Johnson claimed

Americans "do all that strengthens the hope of peace."

In

the 1965 State of the Union address, the President said "we
have taken more steps toward peace" and that "we shall help
men defend their freedom."

A month later, Johnson called

for the U.S. to "continue to be more effective and efficient
in aiding the people of Vietnam to preserve their freedom"
and tied this effort in with the fight against the Vietcong:
"We are there to be as effective and efficient as we can in
helping the people of South Vietnam resist aggression and
preserve their freedom."
In summary, the building of a logological equation
which represents the actions in Johnson's speeches
attributed to Americans would represent a varied and
sometimes conflicting pattern.

Based upon the five act

groupings discussed above, a primary equation follows:

the

"United States" equals "stand firm," equals "air action,"
equals "do everything," equals "do only what is necessary,"
equals "will not withdraw," equals "toil and suffer and
sometimes die," equals "discussion," equals "reflect on
these moves," equals "debate," equals "willing to talk and
reason," equals "helping," equals "Christian acts," equals
"billion dollar American investment,". equals "restraint,"
equals "limited and fitting," equals "peace," equals
"freedom," equals "effective and efficient."
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Although President Johnson discussed American actions
much more frequently than the acts of any other group of
agents, those of the South Vietnamese were mentioned as
well.

Early in 1964, when confidence in General Khanh as a

leader of the South Vietnamese people was high in
Washington, Johnson cited and praised his acts often.

In

March, Khanh was said to be "acting vigorously and
effectively" on a new program designed "to clear and to
hold, step by step and province by province."

In May, the

President claimed Khanh had "declared his intention to
mobilize his nation"— an industrious undertaking which
included all the following acts:

"Expanding the Vietnamese

army...and integrating their operations with political,
economic and social measures...Greatly expanding and
upgrading the Vietnamese civil administrative corps...and
manifold expansion of training programs."
Following such acclamations, Johnson did not mention
the acts of Khanh or of any other South Vietnamese agent
until, in a telling statement of his Johns Hopkins address
of April 7, 1965, said "some of the people of South Vietnam
are participating in attack on their own government."

Other

actions Johnson credited to the South Vietnamese on two more
occasions later that summer included "fighting and dying" on
the part of their soldiers and that the country, as one of
the "non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and
alone, resist the growing might and grasping ambition of
Communist aggression."
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An equation, then, for this group of actions, albeit a
short one, would include "the South Vietnamese," equals
"General Khanh," equals "vigorously and effectively," equals
"mobilize," equals "expanding," equals "upgrading," equals
"integrating," equals "participating in attack," equals
"fighting and dying," equals "unable to resist."
As the United States gradually "Americanized" the war
in Vietnam during 1964 and 1965, President Johnson came to
pit American actions against North Vietnamese or Vietcong
actions in his speeches.

As a result, the acts of the

opposition appeared much more often than those of agents to
the South.

From the time of his third month in office when

the North Vietnamese were "attempting to envelop South
Vietnam," until the final speech of the period on July 28,
1965 when "the leaders of men create division," President
Johnson's perception of Vietcong/North Vietnamese actions
never wavered from the single guiding theme of "aggression."
Johnson clustered a variety of symbols around the act
of "aggression" during the twenty month period.
"Aggression," the President told the audience at UCLA's
charter day ceremonies, "is a deeply dangerous game."

The

commander in chief called the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin
a "new act of aggression," "open aggression," "deliberate,
willful, and systematic aggression," "aggression
unchallenged," which became to Johnson, "aggression
unleashed," "an act of aggression on the high seas," and
"deliberate and unprovoked acts of aggression."

At other
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times, the President referred to "aggression by Communists,"
and aggression that "has been rising," or "has increased."
Instead of treating North Vietnamese actions abstractly
as he had in describing the agents who committed them,
President Johnson elaborated on types of aggression.

Such

detail, however, did not appear in his speeches until after
the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Other verbal forms that

Johnson used to describe aggression included "intensified
terrorist actions," "renewed hostile actions," or "hostile
operations," and "repeated acts of violence."

The attacks

were said to be "deliberate," and "unprovoked."

"The North

Vietnamese," Johnson said, "has conducted a campaign of
subversion" and "carried out combat operations."
As "terrorist actions" intensified during the spring of
1965, the President became more graphic.

In the wake of

attacks on the U.S. bases at Dong Hoa and Pleiku, Johnson
referred to the North Vietnamese "hitting our compounds at 2
o'clock in the morning," to "women and children" who are
"strangled in the night," to "helpless villages" that are
"ravaged by sneak attacks," and said they "attacked these
aircraft."

The President continued in the Johns Hopkins

speech saying that "raids are conducted on towns, and terror
strikes in the heart of cities."

There were "those who

explode their bombs in cities and villages."

Further, there

was "no indication" that Hanoi was "prepared or willing to
stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors."

Johnson
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concluded, finally, that such "armed hostility" was
"futile."
President Johnson described the North Vietnamese
aggressive acts in yet another form by implying what results
such actions would lead to.

"Urged on by Peking," Johnson

claimed Hanoi was following a regime that had "destroyed
freedom in Tibet," "attacked India," had supported
"aggression in Korea," and were "helping the forces of
violence in almost every continent," thus leaving no doubt
as to the enemy's intentions.

The aggressors, the President

said, were "attempting to envelop South Vietnam" and
intended "to envelop peaceful, liberty-loving people."
Among the other results were that Americans were "struck
down in the cruel course of battle," that "men must still
die and families still be left homeless."

"Men and women

and children," the President continued, "are killed and
crippled by the Vietcong everyday in South Vietnam."

In

addition, "soldiers and civilians, men and women, were
murdered and crippled."

What the aggressors sought, Johnson

said, was "conquest by force" and "plunder."
One important act the North Vietnamese were unwilling
to do, according to Johnson, was negotiate or recognize
negotiated settlements.

The President referred to "those

who are ignoring the agreements" of 1954 and 1962 and who
are in the process of "willfully and systematically
violating those agreements."

As for present discussions,

Johnson said, "They want no talk with us, no talk with a
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distinguished Briton, no talk with the UN.
talk at all."

They want no

In the end, however, the President concluded

that "those who seek conquest by force will learn to seek
settlement by unconditional discussions."
In summary, the logological equation for the actions of
the North Vietnamese/Vietcong agents is as follows:

"The

North Vietnamese" equal "aggression," equals "deeply
dangerous game," equals "deliberate, willful, systematic,
unprovoked," equals "terrorist actions," equals "combat
operations," equals "hitting our compounds at 2 o' clock in
the morning," equals "strangled in the night," equals
"unwilling to stop," equals "urged on by Peking," equals
"violating those agreements," equals "no talk at all,"
equals "futile."
In many ways, Johnson's descriptions of North
Vietnamese actions were less ambiguous than those of
American actions.

With much greater consistency, the enemy

was said to "aggress," "attack," "strangle," and "ignore."
U.S. actions, on the other hand, reflected the confusing
aspects of limited war.

Not only did the Americans waver

between "compassionate help" and "determined, firm stands,"
but while the help came in unlimited quantities, the
military stands were constantly restrained by their
administrators.

Here, again, was another logical

incongruity or atonal note in the equation that could
initiate change to a more helpful or more militaristic
American agent.
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Secondly, not only is the act cluster pivotal in the
formation of an overall equation, but in light of subsequent
historical developments, is the cluster most revealing of
Johnson's personality and motives.

The acts of the agents

involved in Johnson's drama dominate his speeches and for
every cluster of actions, like "helping" or "standing firm,"
corresponding terms can be found in all of the other
elements of the pentad except scene.

With the centrality of

act in the drama, the importance Johnson placed on "action"
is clear and the frequency of "standing firm" reveals the
President's intentions and motives more accurately than the
dominance of "caution" and "concern" in the agent cluster.
The Agency Cluster
The formation of equational clusters continues with a
consideration of the "means" by which the agents committed
certain acts.

Obviously, important cross-overs between

clusters, mentioned at the beginning of the act discussion,
occur once again when studying the logologic of the agency.
For one cannot study "means" without consideration of the
act requiring a means or the purpose for which the means is
used.
In many ways, the agencies used to perform actions will
directly reflect the acts themselves.

When considering

President Johnson's most frequently stated purpose, that of
"resisting aggression and preserving freedom" in South
Vietnam, all of the acts which clustered around "standing
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firm," "discussion," and "helping," must be taken by the
critic as means of achieving that purpose.

In addition,

however, the actions which contributed toward reaching that
goal, also required agencies of their own.
Regarding the agencies needed to perform the United
States' basic mission in Vietnam, that of "resisting
aggression and preserving freedom," President Johnson
identified America's ability or its "power" as a means of
achieving the end.

"For the first time in our history," the

President said in reference to aiding Vietnam, "man has the
real power to overcome poverty."

When the use of this power

came to include military armaments in 1965, Johnson claimed
"our resources are equal to any challenge" but said that "we
will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom
that we can command."

To stop "aggression," the President

said, America will "use what power we must, but no more than
we need."

The United States' basic act or course,

"resistance to aggression" according to Johnson, required
"moderation in the use of power" which was synonymous, the
President said, with "a constant search for peace."

Just as

Johnson had tempered his comments regarding the act of
"standing firm" in Vietnam, the agency of sheer "power"
received a similar rhetorical treatment.

It was "power

alone," however, that "in the final test can stand between
expanding communism and independent Asian nations."
President Johnson identified the source of America's
power as an agency which pervaded his entire discussion of
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acts and means throughout the two year period.

Americans

have proved, Johnson said, that "real power" is the result
of the "wise application of modern technology."

The

President elaborated on this technological dependence before
the United Nations in June of 1965.

"The promise of the

future," said Johnson, "lies in what science, the ever more
productive industrial machine, the ever more productive
fertile and usable land, the computer, the miracle drug, and
the man in space all spread before us."
As a means of "resisting aggression and preserving
freedom," Johnson said the United States would use this
technology to "take all necessary action," to do "whatever
must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from
aggression."

The United States Government, further, was

"united in its determination to take all necessary
measures."

Even as the President committed the country to a

ground war in Vietnam on July 28, 1965, with confidence he
said, "Americans will do whatever is necessary."
More important to Johnson than the "anything and
everything" manner in which technology was to be used,
however, was that American efforts be as "effective and
efficient" as possible.

All agencies used in achieving the

overall goal, proclaimed Johnson, whether they were American
"operations" in Vietnam, the "effort" in general, the use of
specific pieces of equipment, or agents themselves, were to
be as "effective and efficient as possible."
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The channels through which the United States used its
"effective and efficient technological power," were voiced
by President Johnson to a group of editors and broadcasters
attending a conference on foreign policy in April of 1964.
"We are asking to distribute in the form of help, aid, and
military assistance to all the nations who want to have
freedom," said Johnson.

Quoting President Kennedy upon

another occasion, Johnson said the U.S. would give less
developed nations "any help, economic as well as military."
Judging from the frequency of comments in Johnson's
speeches, however, the flow of the agency cluster reflected
that of the act cluster in that America's technological
assistance took the form of military agencies more often
than either economic assistance or humanitarian help.

At

first, military assistance took the form of abstract,
general necessities.

"Limited but significant additional

equipment" was needed in March of 1964.

By May, "equipment,

ammunition, training, and supplies" were agencies needed by
South Vietnam in the form of "additional aircraft, pilot
training for the Vietnamese and airfield improvements."
When the quality of these technological agencies was
questioned a month later, President Johnson said that "in
the best of equipment you will find flaws from time to time,
in the helicopter, in the plane, that is true in every
engagement that any people have ever been faced with."

The

President went on to voice his faith in American technology,
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saying, "we are furnishing good equipment" and "I don't
share any concern about the quality of it."
Following the gunboat attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin,
Johnson relied heavily on technological agencies for an
effective reply.

"Throughout last night and within the last

12 hours," the President asserted, "air units of the United
States Seventh Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and
certain of their supporting facilities."

Not only is

Johnson's reliance on technology evident, but American
agencies were said to be better than the scientific agencies
of the North Vietnamese as well.

"I had therefore directed

air action," said the President, "against gun boats and
supporting facilities used in these operations."
Johnson's belief in machinery continued in his State of
the Union message in January of 1965.

Boasting that "we

have built a military power strong enough to meet any threat
and destroy any adversary," Johnson said "that superiority
will continue to grow so long as this office is mine."

In

the Johns Hopkins address of April, the President said the
"bombs and bullets" of "force must often precede reason, and
the waste of war, the works of peace."

Further, the air

attacks begun in February were termed "a necessary part of
the surest road to peace."
The flow of military agencies continued into the summer
of that year.

In May, Johnson claimed "American boys have

not only the best but the most modern supplies and equipment
in adequate quantities" including an "abundant inventory of
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ammunition and other expendables."

Upon signing a

resolution authorizing additional funds for the Vietnam
effort, the President said the "money will be spent for
arms, for weapons of war, for helicopters, for ammunition,
for planes."

The greatest buildup of military agencies

occurred in July of 1965, however, when Johnson sent "the
Air Mobile Division" to Vietnam along with an additional
75,000 soldiers and an increase in the draft of 18,000 men
per month.
During his election campaign and into the spring of
1965, Johnson gradually softened his commitment to
technological, war-making agencies just as he had in
discussing those actions which clustered around "standing
firm" and the agency of "power."

In the same month that

"air action" made such a positive reply in the Gulf of
Tonkin, Johnson said upon his nomination, "Weapons do not
make peace.

Men make peace."

In March of 1965 as criticism

began to mount against operation "Rolling Thunder," an
escalating series of bombings against North Vietnam, Johnson
said "military actions of the United States will be such,
and only such, as serve that purpose— at the lowest possible
cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our
adversaries, too."
The President lamented in April that he wished it were
possible "to convince others with words of what we now find
it necessary to say with guns and planes" and that
"independence will never be won . . .

by arms alone."
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Johnson went out of his way on many occasions to stress the
fact that the American agency in the form of the B-52
bomber, was only directed at "radar stations, bridges, and
ammunition dumps, not at population centers . . .

at

concrete and steel, and not human life."
In addition to these attempts to soften or justify the
use of military force in South Vietnam, President Johnson
devoted a good deal of his speeches to the agencies through
which the United States provided humanitarian aid to that
country.

In his first public request for additional funds

for Vietnam as president, Johnson said the money would be
used for "more fertilizer, medical supplies and services,
repair parts and replacements for war-damaged railway
rolling stock, school supplies and building materials, welldrilling equipment and teams to bring fresh water to the
villages, and enlarged advisory staffs in the provinces."
Indeed, the President said he looked forward to the day when
the people of southeast Asia "will need not military
support" or agencies, "but only economic and social
cooperation for progress in peace."
Late in March of 1965, Johnson predicted that "major
programs of development . . . wider and bolder programs can
be expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian
councils— and in such programs we would want to help."
Johnson went on to say that "this is the proper business of
our future cooperation."

It was the United States, however,

that proposed massive agencies of "helping" two weeks later
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in the Johns Hopkins address.

The President called for "a

greatly expanded cooperative effort for development" and
listed all the agencies that would be put to use as a part
of "a billion dollar American investment":

"the wonders of

modern medicine can be spread through villages . . . schools
can be established to train people . . .

a program to make

available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and
clothing the needy."

Contradicting the trend set by other

speeches, President Johnson said that he did not find
"power" impressive at all.

"Guns and bombs, the rockets and

the warships," said the President, "are all symbols of human
failure."

In this speech, Johnson claimed only humanitarian

agencies to be impressive:
river is impressive."

"A dam build across a great

Recalling how electricity was brought

into his childhood "along the humming wires of the REA," the
President said "electrification of the countryside— yes,
that, too, is impressive."

Among other humanitarian

agencies listed by Johnson were "food," "medicine," and
"education":

"A rich harvest in a hungry land . . . the

sight of healthy children in the classroom is impressive."
All of these, "not mighty arms," said Johnson, are the
achievements which the American Nation believes to be
impressive."

If Johnson had viewed both military "power"

and humanitarian implements as agencies in the act of
"resisting aggression and preserving freedom," however, a
common denominator may have been discovered:

technology.
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One particular agency which was a central means for
achieving not only America's primary goal in Vietnam, that
of "resisting aggression and preserving freedom," but also a
medium by which other agencies discussed above could be used
was "money."

On May 18, 1964, Johnson made his first

monetary request of the Congress for Vietnam funding asking
for "$125 million in addition to the $3.4 billion already
proposed for foreign assistance."

At that time, forty-four

percent of the monies would be used for economic assistance
and fifty-six percent for military funding.

Upon accepting

his party's nomination for president, Johnson boasted that
"we have spent $30 billion more on preparing this Nation in
the 4 years of the Kennedy administration than would have
been spent if we had followed the appropriations of the last
year of the previous administration."

In expressing his

disappointment over the rejection of his "billion dollar
investment" plan by the North Vietnamese, Johnson was
careful to point out that the United States had "spent more
than $2 billion for economic progress in the area" while
"the necessities of war have compelled us to bomb North
Vietnam."
Two weeks later, the President approached Congress once
again for an additional 700 million dollars "to meet
mounting military requirements in Vietnam."

None of this

money was intended for economic or humanitarian assistance.
On June 1, however, an additional appropriation was
requested from the Congress of 89 million dollars "to help
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in the peaceful economic and social development of southeast
Asia."

This amount equaled only thirteen percent of the

amount spent on military machinery a month earlier.

Of the

additional monies called for publicly by the President
during the period, humanitarian agencies received sixteen
percent while eighty-four percent was spent on military
technology.
President Johnson considered one final agency to be of
vital importance in fulfilling the end of "preserving
freedom" in Vietnam.

This agency clustered around the

symbol of the "conference table" and corresponded with the
act cluster of "discussion."

Referring to the Geneva

accords of 1954, Johnson said in July of 1964 that "we had
already had one conference, and that we would carry out
agreements reached at that conference table."

Following the

Gulf of Tonkin attacks, the President said the carrying out
of "existing agreements in the area" was equal to "peace."
In the Johns Hopkins address, Johnson said "discussion
or negotiation with the governments involved" as well as
"the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening
with new ones" were among the many ways to "peace."
Lamenting the fact that the North Vietnamese had not been
willing to negotiate, the President said he knew "how
difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to
master hate."

Reflecting this sentiment two months later,

the President said, "I wish it were possible to convince
others with words of what we now find it necessary to say
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with guns and planes" and that "the only path for reasonable
men is the path of peaceful settlement*"

On other

occasions, Johnson said the United States "has been in
rather active and continuous consultation" since the Geneva
conference of 1962 and in "direct discussions with almost
every signatory."

Such a "readiness to exchange views," the

President said, was a "civilized solution."
In addition to the use of discussion with the North
Vietnamese as an agency in "preserving freedom," Johnson
said the same medium was used in the act of "standing firm"
in Vietnam.

"Now we have difficulties from day to day and

sometimes they increase with the hours," Johnson noted in
February of 1965.

"We have Mr. Bundy out in Viet-nam now on

a regular exchange of views with our spokesmen and our
representatives in that area.

Normally," the President

continued, "about every 6 weeks or 2 months we ask our
Ambassador and our military advisers to bring us a full
exchange of views."

Discussion, then, was used as both an

agency for both peaceful and aggressive actions.

In perhaps

a revealing statement made during the last speech of the
period, President Johnson placed the "conference table" on
the same plane with American military action in saying that
"we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the
battlefield."
A summary at this point calls for. an equation of
agencies used by Americans to carry out either the overall
acts of "resisting aggression and preserving freedom" or the
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more specific actions needed to fulfill the basic action.
When all of these means are pieced together in a logological
equation, an abundance of contrasting connotations occurs
unlike any other equation to this point.

American agency

equals "power," equals "modern technology," equals
"restraint and wisdom," equals "all necessary measures,"
equals "effective and efficient," equals "bombs and
bullets," equals "surest road to peace," equals "fighting
strength of 125,000," equals "men make peace," equals "wider
and bolder programs," equals "billion dollar American
investment," equals "power," equals "dam" and
"electrification of the countryside," equals "destroying
concrete and steel, and not human life," equals
"technology," equals "impressive," equals "$914 million in
assistance," equals "peace," equals "the conference table,"
equals "the only path for reasonable men," equals "civilized
solution," equals "how difficult it is for reason to guide
passion," equals "ask our military advisors to bring us a
full exchange of views."
Predictably, President Johnson barely mentioned
agencies used to commit South Vietnamese actions.

Such a

rhetorical strategy was appropriate due to not only the
limited number of South Vietnamese actions but also helped
justify the need for American economic and military
assistance.

According to Johnson's speeches, South Vietnam

had only those agencies surrounding American hope for the
leadership of General Khanh during the first five months of
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1964.

In this brief period of confidence in Khanh when he

was "acting vigorously and effectively," his government was
said to have a "National Mobilization Plan" which would
better utilize "parliamentary forces" and create a "highly
trained guerrilla force that can beat the Vietcong on its
own ground."

By using agencies sent from the United States,

Johnson continued, increased efficiency could be expected
from "the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile
forces."

Two

months later, the President announced that

this same "National Mobilization Plan" would expand the
"Vietnamese Army, Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps, and
police forces," and integrate "their operations with
political, economic and social measures in a systematic
clear-and-hold campaign."
What few agencies Johnson attributed to South
Vietnamese acts create a short, limited equation.

South

Vietnamese agencies equal "General Khanh," equals "National
Mobilization Plan," equals "air, river, mobile, and
guerrilla forces," equals Vietnamese Army," equals Civil
Guard," equals "Self Defense Corps," equals "systematic
clear-and-hold campaign."

What is perhaps most important

about this equation was not mentioned by President Johnson.
As George Ball points out, every South Vietnamese leader
understood how much American leaders wanted to "save face"
in Vietnam and could therefore write his own prescription
for what that goal required.2

Any of the American agencies

could have easily been considered a part of the South
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Vietnamese arsenal.

Finally, one could even consider the

"United States" itself as an agency in the hip pocket of
South Vietnam.
In the attempts of North Vietnam to "envelope South
Vietnam," Johnson labelled "aggressive means" as the primary
agency.

This took the form of "aggression by Communists" or

"aggression from the North."

The various acts of aggression

discussed in the above section such as "terror and violence"
or "hitting our compounds at 2 o'clock in the morning,"
qualify as means toward the end of "envelopment of South
Vietnam."

In addition, the more specific acts of aggression

must also be considered agencies used to attain the overall
goal.
Agencies which frequented Johnson's discussion of the
North Vietnamese assault were those of a military nature.
Early in 1964, the President noted that "the supply of arms
and cadres from the north has continued."

Statements

following the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin were full of
references to agencies used by the North.

The entire

incident was labelled "aggression by means of armed attack."
"A number of hostile vessels" attacked two U.S. destroyers
with "torpedoes."

The American reply was made against

"gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North VietNam."

At issue, however, was a much larger problem

according to Johnson.

For some time, the North Vietnamese

had "systematically conducted a campaign of subversion,
which includes the direction, training, and supply of
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personnel and arras for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in
South Vietnamese territory."
By April of 1965, the North Vietnamese had intensified
their assault on the South and at Johns Hopkins University,
Johnson specified more clearly the type of agencies used by
the "aggressors."

As before, "trained men and supplies,

orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to
south."

In addition, however, "assassination and

kidnapping," "sneak attacks," "large-scale raids" and
"terror" were used to show "the new face of an old enemy."
After the North Vietnamese rejected Johnson's "billion
dollar investment" plan and related peace offerings, his
descriptions of the enemy's ruthless tactics continued.
They utilized "the most outrageous and brutal provocation
against Vietnamese and against Americans alike."

"Constant

attacks of terror" took place including "bombs exploded in
helpless villages, in downtown movie theaters, even at
sports fields where the children played."

The reply to

Johnson's call for negotiation was "attack, and explosions,
and indiscriminate murder."
In his appeal to the Congress for additional aid to
Vietnam, the President reminded representatives of the
unusual nature of the war.

"Instead of the sweep of

invading armies," he said, "there is the steady and the
deadly attack in the night by guerrilla bands that come
without warning, that kill people while they sleep."

Saying

that America's "patience had been transformed from a virtue
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into a blunder," the President enumerated several agencies
of aggression.
"There was, last November, an attack on the Dong
Hoi airfield.

There was the Christmas Eve bombing

of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon.

There was the

February attack at 2 o'clock in the morning, while
our American soldiers slept, at Pleiku, where 14
Americans were killed and 269 seriously wounded."
Claiming that the enemy passed this militaristic attitude on
to their children, finally, the President said "we must stop
preaching hatred, we must stop bringing up entire new
generations to preserve and to carry out the lethal
fantasies of the old generation, stop believing that the gun
or the bomb can solve all problems."
Just as important to Johnson as the agencies the North
Vietnamese utilized to achieve their ends, were the means
the enemy did not use to further the American cause.

These

grouped once again around the agency of "discussion," or in
the case of the North Vietnamese, "a refusal to talk."

In

April of 1965, the President said there was "no indication
and no evidence that they are ready and willing to
negotiate."

Further, he knew of "no information we have

received that would indicate that any conference at this
time would be productive or would hold out hopes of
achieving what we all desire so much— peace in the world."
When the North Vietnamese did talk in their reply to
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Johnson's peace offer of April 1965, the President said he
was met "with tired names and slogans— and a refusal to
talk."

The President went on to say that "peace is too

important, the stakes are far too high, to permit anyone to
indulge in slander and invective."
The addition to the logologic of Johnson's speeches by
these agencies is, as expected, reflective of North
Vietnamese actions.

North Vietnamese agencies equal

"aggressive means," equals "campaign of subversion," equals
"supply of arms and cadres," equals "armed attack," equals
"hostile vessels," equals "guerrilla warfare," equals
"outrageous and brutal provocations," equals "assassination
and kidnapping," equals "Christmas Eve bombing," equals "a
refusal to talk," equals "preaching hatred," equals "slander
and invective," equals "lethal fantasies," equals "the gun
or the bomb."
The most interesting aspect of the agency cluster is
the pervasiveness of modern technology throughout the
cluster.

The reliance of all the agents on machinery causes

several inconsistencies to appear.

Both the Americans and

the North Vietnamese, opponents in every other cluster, use
the same agencies due to their technological nature.
Technology also caused Johnson to associate "peace" with
several contrasting agencies.

While the President said

"power" in the form of aggressive "bombing" was "the surest
road to peace," he also claimed that "restraint" or
"moderation in the use of power" was synonymous with a
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"constant search for peace."

Further, technology played a

role in the agency of "discussion" or the "full exchange of
views" due to the need for instantaneous communication with
Southeast Asia.
The agency of "discussion" also added to the ironic or
confused nature of limited war.

Even though Johnson

constantly plead for negotiations as a means of achieving
peace, a "full exchange of views" helped the U.S. to "stand
firm" in South Vietnam thus intermingling the two scenes of
the "conference room" and the "battlefield."

Further,

Johnson many times used the agency of "armed attack" as a
means of forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate.
The Purpose Cluster
While this discussion of purposes in Johnson's speeches
lies at the end of the pentadic clusters, it must be
considered a starting point in the recursive nature of the
pentad.

Just as the nature of certain agents influence the

type of actions they commit or as specific actions call for
particular agencies to be used, one's purposes many times
identify the actions and agencies utilized to attain the
stated end.

As President Johnson himself said in reference

to the 1954 agreements:

"Its purposes still guide our

actions."
Regarding the United States' purposes in Vietnam,
Johnson stressed the importance of ends as they influenced
American actions.

"There can be," the President said,
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"there must be no doubt about the policy and no doubt about
the purpose."

If there was any doubt during 1964, Johnson

attempted to lay to rest the uncertainty in his State of the
Union speech in January 1965.

Johnson said "the United

States has reemerged into the fullness of its selfconfidence and purpose."
As 1965 progressed, American purposes in Vietnam took
on a two-fold mission.

One, according to Johnson, was to

"prevail over the enemies within man," and the other was to
prevail "over the natural enemies of all mankind."

Such

ends, said the President, required the United States to
"fight for values and . . . for principles, rather than
territory and colonies."
In attempting to achieve the general purpose of
prevailing "over the enemies within man," President Johnson
focused on several more specific purposes that aided the
overall end.

Among these, the most frequently stated

clustered around the terms of "peace" and "freedom."

At

U.C.L.A. in February 1964, Johnson said, "Our constant aim,
our steadfast purpose, our undeviating policy, is to do all
that strengthens the hope of peace."

One month later, the

President said "the crucial role of economic and social, as
well as military action [is] to ensure that areas cleared of
the Vietcong survive and prosper in freedom."

Following the

attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson told the American
people that he intended "to take all necessary measures in
support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast
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Asia."

Leaving no doubt as to America's purpose in Vietnam,

Johnson emphatically told the Congress the next day that
"Our purpose is peace."
Lyndon Johnson stated the United States purpose of
"peace" in southeast Asia in various ways.

As an end,

Johnson associated "peace" with other advantages.

America

fought in South Vietnam so that "peace and security of the
area will be preserved."

Peace was also linked with

American security in that "to reach our goals in our own
land," said Johnson, "we must work for peace among all
lands."

As the President's "billion dollar investment"

proposal gained popularity in the spring of 1965, Johnson
associated peace with progress in Vietnam.

"Peace must not

simply be an end to conflict," the President said.

"It must

be the beginning of progress and hope of the elimination of
material misery."

Reiterating this theme in a news

conference, Johnson said the "conditions of hope and
progress" were "really the only lasting guarantees of peace
and stability."
One asset the President tied to peace most frequently
was self-determination.

"Our one desire," announced

Johnson, "is that the people of southeast Asia be left in
peace to work out their own destinies in their own way."
The President also associated the freedom cluster with the
South Vietnamese ability to govern themselves.

Not only did

Johnson frequently announce that the purpose of U.S.
involvement was "to help the people of Vietnam preserve
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their freedom," but that America "must fight if we are to
live in a world where every country can shape its own
destiny," "free to shape its relations and associations with
all other nations," or simply, "the right to choose their
own way of life."

The President elaborated on this purpose

when requesting additional appropriations for Vietnam in May
of 1965.

"We believe that Asia should be directed by

Asians," said Johnson, "but that means that each Asian
people must have the right to find its own way, not that one
group or one nation should overrun all the others."

The

President tied this principle to the initiating of
democratic rule in saying on another occasion that America's
purpose was "to have the people of South Vietnam exercise
their choice and establish a government of their choosing."
The cluster of purposes around "peace" and "freedom"
also included references to acts of "discussion" or
enforcement of past negotiations.

Following the attacks in

the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson said one purpose was to "seek
the full and effective restoration of the international
agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South
Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos."
The President varied this theme one day later saying the
purpose was to "defend freedom and preserve peace in
southeast Asia in accordance with obligations of the United
States under the southeast Asia Treaty."

Johnson reiterated

this same purpose throughout the spring of 1965 and upon
sending troops into a ground war on July 28, announced that
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the purposes of the 1954 agreements "still guide our
actions."
A related American purpose to both the preservation of
peace and freedom and to the upholding of negotiated
agreements, was that of saving face in Vietnam.

All

Americans, according to Johnson, were determined "to carry
out our full commitment to the people and the government of
South Vietnam" in order to "preserve our image in the world
and our leadership in the world."

In the Johns Hopkins

address, Johnson said American forces were in Vietnam
because "we have a promise to keep," and "we have made a
national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its
independence."

On another occasion, the President said we

were in Vietnam "because of our commitments, because of our
principles."
Interestingly, President Johnson used the face saving
purpose more than any other during the tense months of the
summer of 1965 and upon announcing the country's commitment
to a ground war on July 28.

"Our national honor is at

stake," Johnson said on July 13.

"Our word is at stake."

Acknowledging the probable response of both the enemy and
the allies, Johnson claimed "our goals in that war-strained
land" were "to convince the Communist that we cannot be
defeated by force of arms or by superior power.

. . . If we

are driven from the field in Vietnam," continued Johnson,
"then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in
American promise, or in American protection."

Elaborating,
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the President said "we just cannot now dishonor our word, or
abandon our commitments, or leave those who believed us and
who trusted our word."
Another purpose justifying American presence in Vietnam
clustered around "resisting aggression."

Second only to the

peace/freedom theme, Johnson uttered this goal more
frequently than any other.

In 1964, the U.S. was said to be

in southeast Asia in order to "bring Communist aggression
and terrorism under control" or "to bring about the end of
Communist subversion and aggression in the area."
Most of the time, President Johnson coupled "resisting
aggression" with another purpose.

In the wake of the Gulf

of Tonkin incidents, Johnson said America fought for the
"purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and
[to] strengthen their independence."

Associating

"resistance" to "support," the President said "we should be
resolute in our reply to aggression and steadfast in support
of our friends."

More often, though, the President related

"resistance" to "peace."

"America has not changed her

essential position, and that purpose is peaceful
settlement," Johnson said.
aggression.

"That purpose is to resist

That purpose is to avoid wider war."

Further,

Johnson said upon sending 75,000 additional troops to
Vietnam that America's purpose was "to bring an end to
aggression and a peaceful settlement."
Elaborating on the American goal of "resisting
aggression," Johnson many times visualized a future Vietnam.
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The President said America would continue its efforts until
"the people and governments of all southeast Asia may be
free from terror, subversion, and assassination— when they
will need not military support and assistance against
aggression, but only economic and social cooperation for
progress in peace."

In short, Johnson said at Johns Hopkins

University, "We dream of an end to war."
Johnson addressed a third group of purposes dealing
more with the "natural enemies of all mankind" and clustered
them around a correlative from the equation of American
actions:

"helping."

In the State of the Union address on

January 4, 1965, Johnson said America1s purpose was "to help
strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny
wherever they keep man less than God means him to be."
Narrowing this end specifically to Vietnamese, the President
said on February 4 that the U.S. goal was "in helping the
people of South Vietnam help themselves," and in the Johns
Hopkins speech on April 7, "to replace despair with hope,
and terror with progress," "to enrich the hopes and the
existence of more than a hundred million people," and to
"manage the process of development."

On a different

occasion, Johnson personally enlisted the North Vietnamese
in the purpose of helping the people of South Vietnam.
President Johnson said, in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf
incident, he personally still sought a goal by which the
North Vietnamese would "devote their talents to bettering
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the lives of their peoples by working against poverty and
disease and ignorance."
In another vision of the Vietnam yet to come, the
President restated this purpose, saying, "We dream of a
world where all are fed and charged with hope."

In his July

28 announcement, finally, the President claimed this end
could be in jeopardy if America did not act.

"I do not want

to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many
people for so many years," Johnson said, "now drowned in the
wasteful ravages of cruel wars."
There were times that President Johnson used the United
States itself as a purpose for fighting in Vietnam.

The

safety of our country represented the final domino in
Johnson's speeches but was not used as a justification until
the winter of 1965.

Speaking before Congress, the President

claimed that "our first aim remains the safety and the well
being of our own country" and that "our own security is tied
to peace in southeast Asia."

At Johns Hopkins, Johnson

reiterated this idea saying that "we must fight if we are to
live in a world where every country can shape its own
destiny.

And only in such a world will our own freedom be

finally secure."

This reasoning continued throughout 1965

including statements like, "Our own welfare, our own freedom
would be in great danger" and "our national interests demand
it."

In the July 28 commitment, finally, the President

identified "communism" as the greatest danger saying that
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"communist domination would certainly imperil the security
of the United States itself."
In addition to discussing the purposes America sought
in Vietnam, President Johnson utilized the negative
repeatedly in revealing what the country's purposes were
not.

The President told Congress that "we have no military,

political, or territorial ambitions in the area" and that
"the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider
war" following the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin in August
1964.

No less than seven more times during the period did

Johnson deny seeking an expanded conflict and America's
covetous nature.

"We threaten no regime and covet no

territory."
To sum up, Johnson stated a variety of purposes for
American presence in Vietnam.

These goals clustered around

the familiar terms of "peace" and "freedom," "resisting
aggression," and "helping," as well as purposes new to the
logologic file like "our own welfare, our own freedom" and
"we seek no wider war."

The equation for American purposes

thus would include such terms and phrases as "all that
strengthens the hope of peace," equals "beginning of
progress," equals "right to choose their own way of life,"
equals "full and. effective restoration of the international
agreements," equals "we have a promise to keep," equals
"preserve our image in the world," equals "do all we can to
resist aggression," equals "seeks no wider war," equals "no
military, political, or territorial ambitions," equals "the
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safety and well-being of our own country," equals "peaceful
settlement," equals "help strike away the chains of
ignorance and misery and tyranny," equals "we dream of an
end to war."
While President Johnson never ascribed purposes to the
South Vietnamese or their government, the goals of the enemy
or North Vietnamese were not explained to the American
people until April of 1965.

The object of that country,

said Johnson at Johns Hopkins, was "total conquest."
Stating that "independent South Vietnam has been attacked by
North Vietnam" twenty days later, Johnson claimed "the
object of that attack is total conquest."
A week later on May 4, however, the President began to
elaborate.

"The aim in Vietnam is not simply the conquest

of the south," Johnson said, "It is to show that American
commitment is worthless and they would like very much to do
that, and once they succeed in doing that, the gates are
down and the road is open to expansion and to endless
conquest."

In other words, the enemy was out to make the

Americans look weak thus necessitating the U.S. purpose of
saving face.

Without such a goal, the dominoes would begin

to fall and "our own freedom would be in great danger."
Reemphasizing the North Vietnamese objective in the July 28
commitment speech, the President said, "Its goal is to
conquer the South, to defeat American, power, and to extend
the Asiatic dominion of communism."
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What few purposes Johnson discussed in his speeches add
only limited information to the building of logologic
equations.

A short summary of terms for North Vietnamese

purposes includes "the conquest of the South," equals "to
show that American commitment is worthless," equals "to
extend the Asiatic dominion of communism," equals "total
conquest."
The inconsistencies prevalent in other clusters appear
again in the purpose equations.

The overall American

purpose of "preserving freedom and resisting aggression" is
contradictory especially considering that in the defense of
freedom and peace, Johnson used forms of aggression.

In

addition, whereas aggressive actions and agencies dominated
those respective clusters, the President mentioned "peace"
and "freedom" more frequently as purposes for American
presence in Vietnam than goals having a militaristic
association.
Perhaps the most unusual additions to the logologic of
the speeches was the purpose of "saving face."

If the U.S.

had been in Vietnam "to preserve our image in the world,"
the inconsistencies between the use of aggressive and
peaceful agencies for seemingly conflicting purposes would
have been eliminated.

In other words, negotiation and B-52

bombers could be considered equally effective in the
preservation of America's image of trustworthy protector.
With the completion of the purpose cluster analysis,
clear patterns in Johnson's rhetoric have become apparent in
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not only his verbal associations but also in the logical
incongruities.

To merely list the President's clusters,

though, is not enough.

In the next step of this logological

analysis, a closer look will reveal more important aspects
of the clusters:

progressive and agonistic form.
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PROGRESSIVE AND AGONISTIC FORM WITHIN THE CLUSTERS
Kenneth Burke calls his study of literature "logology."
Rueckert describes this approach as "the science of
unpacking words and symbol systems."1

Part I of this study

has compiled inductively the "equations" inherent in
Johnson's rhetoric during the escalation period.

Part II

will view representative speeches from the period as
symbolic acts within a larger perspective.

With the

speeches thus "unpacked," at this point though, this study
will take a further step in the logological method by
uncovering the progressive movements within the clusters and
how Johnson set certain images and clusters against one
another in opposing forms.
Progressive Form in the Clusters
"Since literature is in a progressive form," writes
Burke, "the matter of equations always verges on the matter
of the a r r o w . "2

By "literature," the author means all

language, written or spoken.3

"The matter of the arrow"

implies movement within the clusters and the speeches
themselves from one point to another.

In studies such as

this where structural relationships are charted, the main
symbols, according to Burke, "would be the sign for 'equals'
and some such sign as the arrow ('from

to

____ ')."4

In this section, therefore, the progressive movement within
71
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the clusters will be examined for increases and decreases in
intensity as they occurred chronologically.

In addition,

progressions will also be monitored for persuasive
tendencies in the wake of logical incongruities found in the
above clusters.
All of the movement in Johnson's speeches depicts a
subtle type of progressive form or what Burke calls
"qualitative progression."5

By "form," Burke means a writer

or speaker placing a desire before an audience and then
satisfying that desire.

"If, in a work of art," he writes,

"the poet says something, let us say, about a meeting,
writes in such a way that we desire to observe that meeting,
and then, if he places that meeting before us— that is
form."®

In instances of qualitative progression, however,

the presence of a certain quality rather than an incident
prepares the audience for the introduction of another
quality.

"We are prepared less to demand a certain

qualitative progression than to recognize its rightness
after the event," claims Burke.

"We are put into a state of

mind which another state of mind can appropriately follow.
The progressive movement within the clusters, therefore, can
be seen as the rhetorical equivalent of Halberstam's
quagmire theory in which the United States took very small
steps toward becoming involved in the Vietnamese conflict
rather than moving in with ground troops all at once.
Scenic progressions took place in Johnson's speeches
but only to a slight degree.

The situation in southeast
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Asia, the President said, increased in quality from "an
already serious situation" to "a very serious matter."**

On

other occasions, Johnson described the scene as worsening
from "dirty and brutal and difficult" to one of
"unparalleled brutality" and "very difficult."

Also, the

President's reference to the world as "shrinking" defines a
progression from big to small, leading the audience toward
the conclusion that Vietnam was closer than they thought.
In his discussions of American agents, President
Johnson saw those around him and the general populace as
increasingly united, determined, and compassionate and the
country as progressively powerful.

Johnson spoke of the

"determination of all Americans" moving to America "united
in its determination" to a country "united and determined to
stand as one."

From "united in its determination," America

also progressed to "unending patience and determination."
As for the country's sympathy, Johnson said his
administration's "close concern" advanced to "actively
concerned" to "concern and sympathy" to, finally, "concern
and interest, compassion and vigilance."

Not surprisingly,

whenever the President spoke of American power, he balanced
the discussion with mention of United States compassion.
From "rich and powerful," the country became "the most
powerful of all nations," but then was tempered by its
quality of concern as "strong and compassionate."

Just as

"compassion" and "powerful" appeared as unequal terms in the
equations, the progressions involving each were just as
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confusing.

If anything, Johnson pictured American agents as

increasingly determined, whether they were determined to be
compassionate or powerful.
Qualitative progression can also be found in Johnson's
discussion of South Vietnamese agents.

Over time, the

President described the people of that nation in greater
detail and with more intensity.

"Peaceful, liberty-loving,

people" became "peaceful villagers."

Clustering most of his

comments around "bravery," Johnson changed the South
Vietnamese from "brave and independent people" to "small and
brave" to having "patience as well as bravery" to "brave and
enduring people" and from "small and brave" to "small and
valiant."
The progressiveness of North Vietnamese agents is
evident in Johnson's images of "growing might."

From merely

"threatening," the President increased their quality to
"aggressive Communists" to wearing "a more aggressive face"
to "violent and ruthless" to "domination and empire,
conquest and aggression" to "growing might and grasping
ambition."

Significantly, Johnson's last reference to the

North Vietnamese during the period left the impression of
growth, grasping, and ambitiousness.

Whatever doubt his

references of "love and hope" at Johns Hopkins left in the
minds of his audience, the North Vietnamese progression
toward "aggressiveness" and "brutality" extinguished.
Since Lyndon Johnson made more comments regarding
American actions than any other cluster, it is not

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

75

surprising that more progressive movement can be found among
these acts.

Forming around familiar terms like "peace,"

"discussion," "stand firm," etc., changes within the
clusters are of a variety of types.

Acts toward peace

reflect geographical movement within the chronology of the
period.

The imagery pictures Americans walking toward peace

from doing all that "strengthens the hope of peace" to
"building the citadels of peace" to having "taken more steps
toward peace" to actions having "brought us much closer to
peace."
A numerical progression characterizes the American act
of discussion.

The quality of discussion is intense and

becomes more intense.

The agents of the United States move

from "constantly examining" to "free and serious debate" to
"rather active and continuous consultation."

When

mentioning a more specific type of discussion,
"negotiation," Johnson went from general "discussion and
consultation" to "I will talk to any government, anywhere,
anytime, without conditions" to "I have searched high and
wide . . .

I can't even rope anybody and bring him in that

is willing to talk and reason and settle this thing by
negotiation" to "I have listened to every voice."

These

statements leave the impression that the avenue of
negotiation had been exhausted.
American actions clustering around the act of "helping"
reflect a tonal progression or one of intensity.

In

Johnson's words, the United States went from committing "an
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act of necessity" to "a Christian act" to "working against
poverty and disease and ignorance" to extending "the hand of
compassion and the hand of affection and love to the old and
the sick and the hungry" to, finally, enriching "the
condition of their life, to feed the hungry and to tend the
sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homeless, and to
help the farmer to increase his crops, and the worker to
find a job."

In other words, the help America could provide

for South Vietnam was limitless.
Regarding the acts of "standing firm" and actions of
"restraint," very little movement takes place within the
clusters.

Here, the President diverged from the progressive

form typical of many other clusters and utilized repetitive
form or, in Burke's words, "the consistent maintaining of a
principle under new guises."9

"We are pledged before all

the world to stand," Johnson said just prior to the attacks
in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Without contrast, his last public

statement of the period reiterated the same attitude in tone
and quality:

"We will stand in Vietnam."

Actions of "restraint" following the Tonkin Gulf
incidents were said to be "limited and fitting" whereas,
months later, while the same acts had become part of
official policy, Johnson said they were made "appropriately,
fittingly, and measured."

The acts of limited war, thus,

were limited actions from the beginning of the period to the
end.

The inequality of "standing firm" and "restraint"

remained constant but Johnson led his audience to expect
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more and more humanitarian aid and efforts to negotiate
instead of military arms in light of the movement from "an
act of necessity" to the promises of the Johns Hopkins
speech.
Due to President Johnson's infrequent comments
regarding South Vietnamese actions, a sense of progressive
movement never pans out in arpeggio.

However, two brief

statements bear mentioning in that the acts of South
Vietnamese move from "vigorously and effectively" to "clear
and hold, step by step and province by province" suddenly to
"participating in attack on their own government."

Such a

catastrophic shift not only points out a change in South
Vietnamese behavior and Johnson's corresponding willingness
to acknowledge such action but also leads the critic to
question why the President remained silent on the issue of
South Vietnamese actions for many months.
Progressions within the cluster of North Vietnamese
actions are, for the most part, tonal and increase in
intensity while surrounding the act of "aggression."

From

"attempting to envelop South Vietnam," President Johnson
said the North Vietnamese moved on to "intensified terrorist
actions" to "repeated acts of violence" to "a campaign of
subversion" to "deliberate and unprovoked acts of
aggression" to "hitting our compounds at 2

o'clock in the

morning" to "women and children are strangled in the night."
Johnson depicted the aggressive acts of the North
Vietnamese, therefore, as more personal and individualistic
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as time progressed and the Vietcong attacks became more
frequent.
A chart of progressions in clusters of U.S. agencies
provide a most interesting view of Johnson's and America's
thought processes.

Such movements are not only tonal

progressions but can also be considered ideological
progressions as well.

In reference to general means,

Johnson promised Vietnam "real power" to the "application of
modern technology" to "help, aid, and military assistance"
to taking "all necessary measures" to "firmness in the
right."

With such a progression of ideas present in the

President's public statements over a period of eighteen
months, a military conflict seems now to have been
inevitable.
As for President Johnson's willingness to provide the
American forces in Vietnam what equipment they needed to
"resist aggression," the progression of terms indicates an
eagerness to use the U.S.'s abundant technology.

From

"limited but significant additional equipment," the
President promised "equipment, ammunition, training and
supplies" to "additional aircraft, pilot training for the
Vietnamese and airfield improvements" to "air units of the
United States Seventh Fleet" to "the best but the most
modern supplies and equipment in adequate quantities."

With

time, thus, Johnson called for more and more and better and
better military instruments.
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In much the same fashion, humanitarian forms of
"helping" grew in intensity and size during the spring and
summer of 1965.

From "more fertilizer, medical supplies and

services, repair parts and replacements for war-damaged
railway tolling stock, school supplies and building
materials" in 1964 to "wider and bolder programs" to "a
greatly expanded cooperative effort for development" to "a
massive new effort to improve the lives of the people," the
President extended the theme of more massive and expansive
help.
In many ways, the progression of U.S. agencies
represents the overall movement of Johnson's speeches from
February 1964 to July 1965.

The incongruities caused by the

use of technology for both hostile and humanitarian agencies
continues throughout their respective progressions.

As more

and more technological machines became available, more bombs
and bullets as well as humanitarian supplies were sent to
Vietnam thus reflecting the increasing compassion and firm
stands made by American agents.
Very much like its action cluster counterpart, the
progressiveness of Johnson's comments regarding North
Vietnamese agencies increased with detail and intensity as
the decision to commit the United States to a ground war
neared.

From the "aggressive means" used by the enemy in

February of 1964, the President advanced its definition to
"terror and violence" to "supply of arms and cadres from the
north" to "gunboats and certain facilities of North Vietnam"
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to "assassination and kidnapping" to "blood and men" and
finally to "bombs exploded in helpless villages, in downtown
movie theaters, even at sports fields where children
played."

With time, then, the Vietcong/North Vietnamese

used increasingly brutal tactics in their attempt to
"envelop" the South.
Very little progression exists in Johnson's stated
purposes for fighting in Vietnam.

From beginning to end,

goals clustering around "peace" remained very much the same
representing "repetitive form" rather than "qualitative
progression."10

Early in 1964, the President declared that

the U.S. would "do all that strengthens the hope of peace."
By 1965, America's purpose was "peace in Southeast Asia" or
"to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement."
While repetitive form also characterizes purposes
clustering around "freedom," subtle differences are found in
Johnson's statements pertaining to the goal of "standing
firm" in Vietnam.

From "to bring Communist aggression and

terrorism under control," the President modified this
purpose to "repel aggression" to "slow down aggression" and
finally to "bring an end to aggression."
In summary, the charting of progressive movement in the
clusters offers some predictable conclusions.

Within a

scene that became increasingly serious and brutal, several
concurrent changes took place among the agents, their
actions, and the manner in which they acted.

As the

situation became more serious in Vietnam, American agents
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were increasingly united, determined, powerful, and
compassionate, discussed the matter until "every voice" had
been listened to, took steps that led the world closer to
peace by using all the military equipment, American dollars,
and humanitarian help that the U.S. industrial machine could
crank out in order to "end aggression" once and for all in
Southeast Asia.

In addition, the "small and valiant" South

Vietnamese became more courageous and, as time passed, more
enduring even though they never took any action to support
these claims.

If anything, they "attacked their own

government."
On the other side of the coin, agents from the North
appeared to have been the cause of the increasingly serious
and brutal scene.

They became more and more aggressive and

ambitious and enhanced the violence of their actions by
using increasingly brutal agencies like bombs and
strangulation.
Agonistic Form in the Clusters
Before building the final equational clusters inherent
in Johnson's rhetoric, one more aspect of form must be taken
into account.

Throughout the clustering process, certain

qualities, actions, agencies, and purposes tended to cluster
around specific terms and agents.

This clustering was due

to the persuasive nature of the speeches which, according to
Burke, implied "the presence or threat of an adversary,"
thereby creating an "agonistic" or competitive stress.H

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

82

When compared side by side, conflicting or "agonistic" terms
appear and, "can be said to 'cooperate' in the building of
over-all form."12

while the dramatic elements of the agon

will be discussed in chapters five, six, and seven, this
section will recognize the basic conflicting terms in the
clusters or "what vs. what."
Even though President Johnson made few remarks
regarding the domestic scene prior to July of 1965, several
comments bear mentioning in relation to his perception of
the over-all situation.

In a November 1964 news conference

from the LBJ Ranch in Texas, Johnson related his "sitting
here in this serene atmosphere of the Pedernales" and a year
later spoke of young Americans who were "born into a land
exultant with hope and with golden promise."

In opposition

to this, the President revealed Vietnam as a country which
was "not a serene or peaceful place" whose villages were
"wracked by disease" and "plagued with hunger."

Agonistic

equations within the scenic cluster, thus, include "serene
atmosphere" vs. "not a serene or peaceful place" and
"exultant hope with golden promise" vs. "wracked by disease"
and "plagued with hunger."
Surrounded by such contrasting scenery, an agonistic
chord played out in arpeggio throughout the clusters.
Regarding the agents involved, Johnson created typical
protagonistic and antagonistic characters.

Most of the

time, the protagonists were American and the antagonists
were either Vietcong or North Vietnamese.

The President
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referred to America as being a "sentinel on the frontiers of
freedom" and "in supporting freedom and in protecting peace"
and the North Vietnamese as "foes of freedom" and the
"enemies of freedom."
On the central issues of "peace" and "freedom," these
two characters could not have been farther apart.

Johnson

said the United States had "the firmness to defend freedom"
and that there was "no place in today's world for weakness."
The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, represented "the
violence and weakness of man at his worst."

Further, the

U.S. had the patience to "move the world toward peace
instead of war" while the enemy represented those who placed
"their ambitions or their dogmas or their prestige above the
peace of all the world."
Behavior displayed by the characters concerning
"peace" and "freedom" also revealed agonistic qualities.
According to Johnson, the Americans set out to "do all that
strengthens the hope of peace" while the North Vietnamese
pressed "against the lives and the liberties of a people who
seek only to be left in peace."

Paradoxically, each

utilized the same type of instruments in these seemingly
different acts.

The President said the Vietcong used such

tactics as "assassination and kidnapping," "sneak attacks,"
"large scale raids," and "terror" while the American used
"air attacks," an implement, he said,, that was "a necessary
part of the surest road to peace."
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The most frequently mentioned and perhaps the most
polarized issue splitting the United States and North
Vietnam, according to Johnson, concerned the act of
"discussion" or negotiation.

In reference to previous

agreements, the President declared, "America keeps her word"
and "shall honor our commitments."

The Communist regime,

however, had "violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam" and
were still "willfully and systematically violating those
agreements."
Regarding future negotiations, Johnson stated many
times America's willingness to talk.

"We are ready to talk

anytime, anywhere, with any government without conditions,"
he said.

"We will go anywhere.

We will discuss any

subject.

We will listen courteously and patiently."

In

strict opposition to this, the President said there was "no
indication and no evidence that [Hanoi was] ready and
willing to negotiate under conditions that would be
productive."

Reiterating this unwillingness in the Summer

of 1965, Johnson claimed, "They want no talk with us, no
talk with a distinguished Briton, no talk with the UN.
want no talk at all."

They

The President even went as far as to

embellish the split with a personal metaphor:

"I have

searched high and wide" and "I can't even rope anybody and
bring him in that is willing to talk and reason and settle
this thing by negotiation."
In response to American pleas for "a civilized solution
and a readiness to exchange views across the conference
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table," Johnson concluded the North Vietnamese answer to be
"attack, and explosions, and indiscriminate murder."

The

response to the President's proposed "regular exchange of
views" and the "billion dollar investment" program at Johns
Hopkins, was, according to Johnson, "tired names and
slogans" and "slander and invective."
Among a host of other opposing attributes ascribed to
the characters by Johnson were "caution" vs. "recklessness."
Of Dean Rusk, the President stated that he was "most
cautious" and "extremely careful."

In much the same manner,

the U.S. reply to the Gulf of Tonkin attacks was "limited
and fitting" or "carefully measured."

Likewise, the

peacemakers of the world, according to the President, were
men of "wisdom and patience and restraint."

On the other

hand, when commenting on the guerrilla warfare of the
Vietcong, Johnson said there was "no place in today's world
for recklessness."
On the issue of "unity," the President pointed out that
America was "one nation united and indivisible" while "the
unity of the Communist empire has begun to crumble."

The

United States, furthermore, was "prepared to live as good
neighbors with all" and even "small" South Vietnam was "a
friendly nation."

Communism, on the other hand, "wears a

more aggressive face."

Finally, Johnson's rhetoric made a

clear demarcation between the young men actually fighting
the battles."

America's troops were "the flower of our

youth, our finest young men . . . working and laughing and
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building, and filled with hope and life."

Their North

Vietnamese counterparts, however, were young men who "hate
and destroy."
The actions taken by these distinctly different groups
of agents also diverged from one another markedly.

The most

prominent action taken by the North Vietnamese, of course,
was "aggression— deliberate, willful, and systematic
aggression."

The Americans, on the other hand, were in

Vietnam to "stand firm against the present aggressions" or
to "resist aggression and preserve [South Vietnamese]
freedom."

In related acts, the enemy was composed of men

who have "hated and killed," "strangled in the night," and
"ravaged by sneak attacks" while the Americans continued to
"extend the hand of compassion and the hand of affection."
In no other cluster are terms less agonistic but still
used by Johnson in a conflicting context than in discussion
of agencies.

For example, following the attacks in the Gulf

of Tonkin, the President contrasted the "hostile vessels of
the Government of North Vietnam" with the "air units of the
United States Seventh Fleet" and the "renewed hostile
actions" of the enemy with the "air action" committed by
Americans.
By the spring of 1965, President Johnson decided to
lend more contradistinction to the agencies by focusing on
the targets of "hostile actions" and

air action."

"Soldiers and civilians, men and women, were murdered and
crippled" by the North Vietnamese, according to Johnson.
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"Bombs exploded in helpless villages, in downtown movie
theaters, even at sports fields where the children played."
Opposing these acts of "brutality," the President said, "We
have no desire to destroy human life."

Instead, the

Americans destroyed "concrete and steel."

The U.S. bombs

were "aimed at radar stations, bridges, and ammunition
dumps, not at population centers."
The agonistic chord also affected the goals each of the
opposing agents aspired to.

"The aggressors," according to

the President, displayed "arrogance and adventure" and
sought "conquest and plunder" or "conquest by force" or, in
his final speech of the period, "total conquest."

On the

other hand, the President said the U.S. did not "seek the
destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any
territory."
Another goal separating the characters of Johnson's
drama dealt with the American act of "saving face."

"Our

national honor is at stake . . . our word is as stake," said
the President time and time again.

"If we are driven from

the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the
same confidence in American promise, or in American
protection."

In opposition to this, Johnson said the aim of

the North Vietnamese was "to show that American commitment
is worthless and they would like very much to do that."
Aside from the obvious conflict between the Americans
and the North Vietnamese, stress is apparent in other
relationships as well.
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South Vietnamese affiliation with the North Vietnamese—
Vietcong alliance, Johnson used similar terms again with
different intentions.

The President referred to the enemy

as "the aggressors and their dupes," to the Vietcong as
being "under orders from their communist masters in the
north" or their "cadres from the north."

Further, the North

Vietnamese supervised the "careful and sophisticated control
of Vietcong operations."

In contrast, though, America was

"providing leadership and judgment, and making decisions"
for the South Vietnamese or helping to "provide advice,
assistance and counsel."

The point being, the United States

surely maintained "careful and sophisticated control" of
military operations in South Vietnam and the North
Vietnamese provided "leadership and judgment," and made
"decisions" for the Vietcong.
When President Johnson specifically mentioned the kinds
of help each patron provided for the "dupes" and "helpless
villagers," identical terms appeared.

The "cadres from the

north" provided the "direction, training, and supply of
personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla training in
South Vietnamese territory."

To the South, the United

States sent "equipment, ammunition, training, and supplies."
In addition, the U.S. provided "additional aircraft, pilot
training for the Vietnamese and airfield improvements."
Once again, these acts of patronage are nearly identical.
On many occasions, Johnson pitted the South Vietnamese
against the North Vietnamese.

The President painted South

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

89

Vietnam in the image of a "small and valiant nation" while
the north represented the "growing might and the grasping
ambition of Asian communism."

Southerners were seen as

"brave and independent people" while Johnson termed their
counterparts, "Communist totalitarians."

The populace of

South Vietnam was composed of "peaceful-liberty loving free
people" while their neighbors were "violent and ruthless,"
with a "disregard for life, happiness, and security."
On only one occasion during the period in question did
Lyndon Johnson identify South Vietnam with North Vietnam.
During the Johns Hopkins address, the President claimed that
the communists wanted "what their neighbors also desire:
food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to
learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage
of material misery."

This identification between the two

adversaries Johnson called a "terrible irony."
A final agonistic element in Johnson's rhetoric bears
mentioning.

On many occasions, the President criticized the

press for second guessing or speculating on the military
strategy of the United States.

While his own military

advisors were said to be "very cautions and wise, and
intelligent" and "extremely careful," Johnson said "no good
purpose would be served by speculating on the military
strategy" and that those press members who did had "a good
hat but not a very solid judgment on their shoulders or on
their head."
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President Johnson's rhetoric was rife with agonistic
elements during the period prior to the American build-up of
July 28, 1965.

As with other speeches belonging to the

genre of war rhetoric, a "we vs. them" form emerged as the
hostilities between the protagonist and the antagonist
intensified.13

Because form is created by the expectancies

of the audience, their collaboration in the form of the agon
is necessary and, as Burke notes, could have led many to
support the President unwittingly.
Imagine a passage built about a set of oppositions
("we do this, but they, on the other hand, do
that; we stay here, but they go there; we look up,
but they look down," etc.).

Once you grasp the

trend of the form, it invites participation
regardless of the subject matter.

Formally, you

will find yourself swinging along with the
succession of antitheses, even though you may not
agree with the proposition that is being presented
in this form.14
On the impulse of Burke's simplification of agon form,
a summary of the conflicting terms in Johnson's rhetoric
produces the same "collaborative expectancy":

We live in a

"serene atmosphere," but they, on the other hand, live in a
place that is "not serene or peaceful"; we are a "sentinel
on the frontiers of freedom," but they are "foes of
freedom"; we "stand firm" and "do all that strengthens," but
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they display "weakness"; we launch "air attacks," but they
spring "sneak attacks"; we "honor agreements," but they
"violate agreements"; we are "ready to talk," but they "want
no talk"; we offer a "civilized solution," but they offer
only "attack, explosions, and indiscriminate murder"; we
propose a "full exchange of views," but they answer with
"slander and invective"; our responses are "careful and
measured," but their attacks are "reckless"; we are "united
and indivisible," but their unity is "crumbling"; we are
"friendly," they are "aggressive"; we "extend the hand of
compassion," but they "hate"; we "build," they "destroy"; we
seek the "day of peace," but they "strangle in the night";
we take "air action," they take "hostile action"; we target
"concrete and steel," but they target "blood and men"; "our
purpose is peace," but "their object is total conquest."
As a result of clustering Johnson's rhetoric into the
equations in the first three chapters, several conclusions
can be drawn regarding the material in Part I for futher use
in the continuation of this study:
1.

While President Johnson devoted a majority of his
comments regarding scene to Vietnam, the
"shrinking world" loomed larger and larger as the
President revealed the importance of American
agents and especially actions.

2.

The aspects of a "limited war" became apparent as
Johnson presented both American and North
Vietnamese agents with inconsistent qualities.
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The President pictured the Americans as both
"determined" or "powerful" and "restrained" or
"cautious" while the North Vietnamese represented
both "aggression" and "love and hope."
3.

As Johnson made more references to "action" in his
drama, the frequency of "standing firm" reflected
more accurately the President's motives and
intentions than the "compassion" or "caution"
attributed to American agents.

In addition, the

ambiguity brought about by Americans "standing
firm" for "peace" could have only created
confusion among the audience in a limited war
setting.
4.

The pervasiveness of and reliance on technology as
an agency by both the Americans and North
Vietnamese not only identified otherwise agonistic
clusters, but caused a further confusion among
"means" and "ends."

Did Johnson intend to "stand

firm" in order to "negotiate" or did he intend to
have a "full exchange of views" in order to "stand
firm?"
5.

Johnson's overall stated purpose of "preserving
freedom and resisting aggression" further reflects
the confusion of limited war by equating unequal
terms.

6.

The "matter of the arrow" or progressions
throughout the clusters generally reflects
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tendencies found in the equations except that
Americans tend to become more helpful over time
rather than more aggressive.
7.

Johnson succeeded in rhetorically constructing an
agonistic form separating the Americans from the
North Vietnamese/Vietcong.

This dichotomy broke

down only with the reliance on technology by both
sides and in Johnson's analysis of the
relationships among the U.S. and South Vietnam and
that of North Vietnam and the Vietcong.
The first step in the analysis of Johnson's speeches as
symbolic action is thus complete.

Given the form of the

clusters, Johnson generated certain expectancies in his
audience and gave an indication of his own and the country's
motives during the period.

Using these equations as a

foundation, the analysis of symbolic meaning in Johnson's
rhetoric will follow in a much more pluralistic analysis.
The clusters reveal the Vietnam drama Johnson presented to
the American people.

The "action" which produced this

rhetorical drama, its conflict and choices, will now be
uncovered.
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Part II:

LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE DRAMA OF HUMAN RELATIONS

"Government is, in the last analysis," notes Cornwell,
"communication."1

The equational clusters uncovered in

President Lyndon Johnson's rhetoric and presented in the
preceding chapters reveal the images with which the United
States government and the Johnson administration in
particular presented the impending Vietnam conflict to the
American people.

To this point, the analysis has only been

concerned with the symbols Johnson chose to make certain war
issues salient for the American people.

In order to fully

comprehend the public actions of the administration in 1964
and 1965, this study must go further to encompass the entire
realm of communication.

For this, not only must the

President's symbols be taken into consideration but his
symbolic acts as well.

In layman's terms, now that we know

what Johnson said, what did his words mean?
To initiate this type of criticism, one must start from
the premise that "man does not live in a vacuum."

Specific

symbols are chosen by rhetors in order to have an intended
effect upon others.

To understand the entire "realm of

communication," the critic must decide why certain symbols
were chosen by a speaker, what effect the rhetor intended to
have, and judge the success or failure of these choices.
This requires the critic to consider myriad situational,
sociological, political, and psychological influences which
contribute to the relations among human beings.
96
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In order to take these influences into consideration
and to extend the logological format of this analysis,
another aspect of Kenneth Burke's literary/rhetorical
criticism will be utilized.

On different occasions, Burke

has termed this approach "the dialectic of the Upward Way,"
"the Mystic Way," "the search for the self," "the dialectic
of the Platonic dialogue," "the grammar of rebirth" or the
"sin-guilt-expiation-redemption pattern."

Rueckert has

consolidated all these ideas, though, into the "drama of
human relations."2

it is an ethical drama in which all men

participate due to its origins in language and its
implications for the entire realm of communication.
Language introduces the negative into human experience,
as opposed to man's natural, positive state of being.
Communication linked with the negative dictates "rules" by
which human behavior is judged acceptable or unacceptable.
With the tool of language, man, in turn, constructs various
kinds of hierarchies by which social order is maintained.
The cement holding all hierarchies together is the hundreds
of "thou-shall-nots" made possible by the negative.

In

order for each hierarchy to work, man must take part in a
"covenant" to maintain the status of the social ladder, but
no human is ever capable of meeting all the terms of the
agreement and in some way fails or disobeys.

Failure or

"the fall" causes guilt which encumbers man and makes
necessary a means of catharsis or purification.

The two

most common vehicles of unburdening are mortification and
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victimage, the end result of both being redemption or the
alleviation of guilt.3
Given President Johnson's rhetoric, the initial
requirement for the drama to unfold is present--language.
Rather than studying all of his public statements during the
period in question, three of his most important speeches
will be examined:

the Syracuse University speech following

the Tonkin Gulf incident, the Johns Hopkins University
speech in April of 1965, and the opening statement of his
July 28, 1965 presidential news conference announcing his
escalation decisions.
The Syracuse University speech was Lyndon Johnson's
first definitive statement on U.S.-Vietnam policy since
becoming president.

Much speculation had taken place in

1964 on whether or not the new president would continue the
policies of his fallen predecessor.

The American mission in

South Vietnam had failed by the summer of 1964 and the
political b a s e o f the South Vietnamese government gradually
disintegrated.

Johnson desperately needed to clarify his

position regarding the Vietnam conflict with a presidential
election approaching and Tonkin gave him that opportunity.
In April of 1965, President Johnson responded to an
entirely different set of circumstances with his speech at
Johns Hopkins University.

Following his landslide victory

and his promises to keep American troops out of Vietnam the
preceding November, the President faced a growing tide of
dissent due to the initiation of a continuous bombing
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campaign in February.

In what National Security Adviser

McGeorge Bundy called "the most important foreign policy
speech" to that time,4 Johnson signaled a shift in the
emphasis of his Vietnam policy at Johns Hopkins that haunted
him throughout the rest of his presidency.
Finally, the President’s opening statement of his news
conference on July 28, 1965 is representative of the period
due to its ultimate articulation of commitment.

After

Johnson responded in a "limited and fitting" manner to the
attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin and offered a "billion dollar
American investment" to Southeast Asia at Johns Hopkins, the
commitment of ground troops to Vietnam was still in doubt.
In announcing the escalation decisions, Johnson revealed not
only his policy intentions but also a part of himself
central to the understanding of his rhetoric.
The manner in which the drama of escalation unfolds in
these speeches at key moments— negative, hierarchy, guilt,
mortification, victimage, catharsis, and redemption— will be
analyzed.

In addition, the way each speech represents

certain aspects of the drama more than others will also be
noted.

By viewing the speeches from the perspective of the

"drama of human relations," an expanded critique involving
more aspects of the communication process can be conducted.
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EXPLAINING TONKIN:
SECRECY, VICTIMAGE, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER
The incidents which occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin on
August 2 and 4, 1964 marked watershed moments in Lyndon
Johnson's involvement with the Vietnam War.

Upon assuming

the presidency in November of 1963, Johnson continued the
Vietnam policies that President Eisenhower originated in
1954 and President Kennedy expanded during his White House
years.

In his wish to provide as much continuity as

possible in the wake of Kennedy's assassination, Johnson
relied almost solely on the judgments of the same advisers
Kennedy listened to.

At the same time, these advisers

participated in the "cult of continuity" by providing
Johnson with the information they thought he wanted and
perhaps needed to hear.

After all, Johnson had told all of

Kennedy's aides and advisers following the assassination
that "I need you more than he did."1

In addition, President

Johnson hoped to postpone any major decisions on Vietnam
until after the November 1964 elections, a political
maneuver John Kennedy had also planned on.

However, the

incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin changed everything.
On the evening of August 2, 1964, three North
Vietnamese PT boats opened machine-gun fire and launched
torpedoes at the U.S.S. Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin.

In

the ensuing engagement, aircraft from the carrier
Ticonderoqa damaged two of the boats while the Maddox's
101
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five-inch guns sunk a third.2

Americans woke the next

morning to hear Secretary of State Dean Rusk say that, "The
other side got a sting out of this.

If they do it again . .

. they'll get another sting."3
That they did.

At forty minutes past seven o'clock

(Tonkin Gulf time) on the evening of August 4, the Maddox,
now joined by the U.S.S. Turner Joy, radioed CINCPAC
headquarters that an intercepted message indicated a second
attack was imminent.^

The communique created a flurry of

activity in Washington.

Having ordered the navy to "wipe

out" any attackers in the area. President Johnson went about
developing an American assertion of power.

Two meetings

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all-day conferences with
close advisers and cabinet members produced a decision late
on the afternoon of August 4.

After conferring with

congressional leaders at 6:45 p.m., Johnson eventually
revealed his plans to a national television audience at
11:36 p.m. as aircraft screamed off the decks of the
carriers Ticonderoqa and Constellation to attack ports and
support facilities of the PT boats.
The following day, August 5, President Johnson
delivered an expanded version of his late-night address at
the dedication of the Newhouse Communications Center at
Syracuse University.

Although crisis was in the air, large

crowds and brass bands welcomed the President to a campaign
atmosphere.

Placards in downtown Syracuse proclaimed that,

"Syracuse Loves Lady Bird and Lyndon," "Up This Way We Like
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and "All The Way With L.B.J."®

The public of this

university town was indeed behind their President.
Johnson began his speech in a manner typical for the
period by trying to identify all peoples of the world or, at
least, opposing forces.

"On this occasion," the President

said, "it is fitting, I think, that we are meeting here to
dedicate this new center to better understanding among all
men."®

Further, Johnson said this was his "purpose in

speaking" to the audience.

According to Burke, such an

appeal for understanding is not uncommon under modern global
conditions which require greater identification.
Division and conflict were very much on the President's
mind.

After addressing "all the people of all nations,"

Johnson recounted the events of the previous three days.
"On August 2 the United States destroyer Maddox was attacked
on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of
the Government of North Vietnam.

On August 4 that attack

was repeated in those same waters against two United States
destroyers."

Inherent in such division and conflict was

Burke's concept of the negative.

Johnson's audience easily

associated "thou-shall-not" with such words as "attacked,"
"hostile," and "attack was repeated."
This same passage is significant not only for aspects
of the negative but also for the roots of a hierarchic
structure.

Given the history of America's involvement in

the Cold War, the association of North Vietnam with
communism among audience members immediately placed the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

104

United States above that country on a hierarchy.

To Burke,

all such socio-political hierarchies are products of
language and President Johnson went far to reinforce its
viability.^
By using what Burke calls "god-terms" and "devilterras," Johnson associated the United States closely with
such god-terms as "peace" and "freedom" and North Vietnam
with such devil-terms as "hostile" and "aggression."

In

doing so, the President placed the U.S. above that communist
country on a hierarchy which reaches upward to "peace" and
"freedom" as perfection.8

Johnson said that "peace is the

only purpose of the course that America pursues" and not
only associated North Vietnam with "attack" and "hostile"
but also with "aggression."

"Deliberate, willful, and

systematic aggression," the President said, "has unmasked
its face to the entire world."

He went on to say that

"aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed."
Along with the formation of hierarchies, man assumes a
"hierarchic motive," defined by Rueckert as "the desire to
mount the hierarchy, either through action or possession."
From Johnson's perspective, the North Vietnamese attack
would have constituted such action.

Rueckert goes on to

say, however, that "people are goaded by the threat of
descending the hierarchy, again either by action or
possession, but also by failure to act or inability to
possess certain things."9
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LBJ:

The Pragmatic President
The threat of descending the hierarchy away from

"freedom" was very much present but no one in the United
States, or Vietnam for that matter, could have accused
Lyndon Johnson for failing to act on August 4, 1964.
According to the President, "we have answered this
aggression with action."

While Johnson did not emphasize

"action" as much as "freedom" or "peace" in his speeches, it
was another god-term Johnson used to evaluate personal
attributes.

High on this particular hierarchy was the

pragmatic man, a man of action who "got things done," the
"can-do" man.

Much farther down this ladder of personal

evaluation were the "thinkers," men who formulated great
thoughts, who argued for principles.

"It is the

politician's task to pass legislation," Johnson told Doris
Kearns, "not to sit around saying principled things."1°

The

difference in the two men the President often described as
"work horses" and "show horses."11
To reply to "aggression," a low hierarchy devil-term,
then, Lyndon Johnson, the pragmatic man who did not have
time to waste talking, turned to the highest personal
attribute at his disposal:

"action."

When he sought advice

from others, the conclusions were the same for they too were
men of "action."

There were those can-do men from the

Kennedy team which he "needed more than Kennedy did."

There

was Bob McNamara, who Halberstam described as "a man of
force, moving, pushing, getting things done, Bob got things
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done, the can-do man in the can-do society, in the can-do
era."1^

^om Wicker said President Johnson was surrounded by

men whose pragmatism insisted on a reply of "action."

"He

would look around him and see in Bob McNamara that it was
technologically feasible, in McGeorge Bundy that it was
intellectually respectable, and in Dean Rusk that it was
historically necessary"— the can-do team.13
For the Johnson administration, Tonkin Gulf was no time
for reflection or the questioning of basic assumptions
regarding Vietnam.

The U.S. had been "attacked" by "hostile

vessels" and they deserved a "sting," the practical reply,
"action."

Writing thirty years earlier, Burke prophesied

the many aspects of the can-do men, of the can-do
administration, in the can-do decade, in our can-do society,
particularly regarding American policy in Vietnam.

On the

side of the practical, Burke said, is "efficiency,
prosperity, material acquisitions, increased consumption,
'new needs,' expansion, higher standards of living,
progressive rather than regressive evolution, in short,
ubiquitous optimism."1^

As if writing a biography of

Johnson himself, Burke further noted that pragmatism would
lead to "enthusiasm, faith, evangelizing, Christian
soldiering, power, energy, sales drives, undeviating
certainties, confidence, co-operation, in short, flags and
all the jungle vigor that goes with flags."

In summary,

"patriotism."13
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To sum up, President Johnson announced that the United
States, whose purpose was "peace," had encountered the
"hostile vessels" of North Vietnam who "attacked."

Clearly,

the North Vietnamese, suffering from "hierarchic psychosis"
or an "uneasiness stemming from the social order," rejected
the existing hierarchy.16

With world hierarchy thus

threatened, the pragmatic president took "action" to
maintain order within the hierarchy.
The Entelechial Motive: American Power
in the American Century
Order and its justification was the purpose of
Johnson's address.

In the terminology of the preceding

cluster analysis, "to survive and prosper in freedom," "our
own security," "the safety and well being of our own
country," "peace and security," and "to bring communist
aggression under control" all equal order.

Johnson went on

in the Syracuse address to justify "action" by envisioning
order and the tools that would bring it about.
Typically, President Johnson invoked the negative as a
requirement for the maintenance of order in the hierarchy.
The President went on to list three "thou-shall-nots" as
objectives sought by the U.S.:

"That the governments of

southeast Asia honor the international agreements which
apply in the area; That those governments leave each other
alone; That they resolve their differences peacefully."

In

other words, "thou-shall-not break agreements, thou-shallnot harass other governments, and thou-shall-not make war."
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Human experience is guided by sets of customary
hierarchies which are located in our view of the past.
Personal motives are thus driven by our individual views of
the past and national motives by our national past.

As a

result, Johnson envisioned the order that several
international agreements in the past were supposed to
maintain.

"In 1954 we made our position clear toward

Vietnam," Johnson said.

"In June of that year we stated we

'would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of
the 1954 agreements with grave concern and as seriously
threatening international peace and security.'"

In

addition, September of 1954 was the month "the United States
signed the Manila pact on which our participation in SEATO
is based."

The pact recognized that "armed attack on South

Vietnam would endanger the peace and the safety of the
nations signing that solemn agreement."

Johnson thus

invoked the negative and a sense of the hierarchic past to
justify "action" taken to maintain order.
The kind of "action" President Johnson took, though,
was extremely specialized and typically American.

This

action involved force and it involved technology.
"Throughout last night and within the last 12 hours," the
President said, "air units of the United States Seventh
Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and certain of
their supporting facilities."

In addition, the action was

"armed" and "appropriate."

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

109

With the lessons of the Cold War fresh in Lyndon
Johnson's memory, that his "action" should involve force is
not surprising.

"One thing is clear," Johnson told the

House of Representatives in 1947.

"Whether communist or

fascist or simply a pistol-packing racketeer, the one thing
a bully understands is force and one thing he fears is
courage."

As he told his Syracuse audience in more formal

rhetoric nearly twenty years later, Johnson's purpose was
"peace" and "aggression unchallenged is aggression
unleashed."

"I want peace," the Texan told the House.

"But

human experience teaches me that if I let a bully of my
community make me travel the back streets to avoid a fight,
I merely postpone the evil day.

Soon he will chase me out

of my house."17
On most occasions, Johnson called this the lesson of
Munich where British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
negotiated a peace with Hitler only to have the Furher
occupy the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia.

Historian Eric

Goldman, who worked within the Johnson Administration for
several years, claims the President's determination not to
appease aggression was coupled with another lesson of
history— Truman's decision to intervene in Korea— to produce
an unwavering belief in the use of force to "halt the
bully."18

Thus, "No more Munichs!" became the essence of

the Johnson foreign policy.
Being the man of pragmatism and action that Johnson
was, Burke again predicted that any reply utilizing "action
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of an external sort" would "eventually lead to combat in one
form or another."

Such action, Burke says, "involves

patterns of striving, competition, and conquest which reach
their ultimate conclusion in war."!-9
Not only was the use of force historically legitimate
for Johnson but the hierarchic motive in the twentieth
century had produced a means of preserving world
hierarchies.

To understand the workings of the motive,

Burke borrowed the concept "entelechy" from Aristotle in
which the individual in any hierarchy constantly strives to
define itself in terms of a perfected self, god-head, or
god-term.20

Thus, Johnson used an entelechial motive to

define the United States as peace-loving— striving for
perfection in the peace-aggression hierarchy— rather than
aggressive.

In the words of the President, "Peace is the

only purpose of the course that America pursues."
Burke concluded that man constantly attempts to refine
his original, natural self toward perfection or a second
nature through the use of language.

For thousands of years,

language remained the primary agency of this redefinition
process.

With the constant refinement of the tool and the

coming of the Industrial Revolution, however, Burke says man
began to reshape himself in terms of machinery.

"In

contemporary America," Burke observes, "the distinguishing
emergent factor is obviously mechanization, industrialism,
as it affects our political institutions, as it alters our
way of living, as it makes earlier emphases malapropos or
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even dangerous."21

Man thus sees machinery, and more recent

technological advances as extensions and perfections of
himself.

"We have tended to consider machinery an absolute

good," concludes Burke, "as witness the frequent
identification between mechanization and progress."22

The

hierarchic motive is thus an entelechial motive and the
"hierarchic psychosis" has turned into a "technological
psychosis."

"It is the one psychosis which is, perhaps, in

its basic patterns, contributing a new principle to the
world," says Burke.

"It is at the center of our glories and

our distress."23
Technology or the entelechial motive was indeed at the
center of Johnson's glories on August 5, 1964.

The

pragmatic president had taken "action" with "air units of
the Unites States Seventh Fleet."

It was technology that

had allowed LBJ reach out to the Tonkin Gulf and give the
enemy a "sting," allowed him to "touch Ho up a little bit,"
as he said frequently.
Perhaps more than any other president, Lyndon Johnson
was a twentieth century president, a president of modern
America, and above all, a technological president.

He had

grown up and matured politically in periods of unprecedented
industrial growth in the U.S.

The "technological psychosis"

prevailed in many quarters of American society, according to
Halberstam, "a belief in American industrial power and
technological genius which had emerged during World War
I I .

"24

Johnson was there from beginning to end.
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As a teacher in South Texas during the 1930s, one of
Johnson's favorite history lessons surrounded Charles
Lindbergh's historic trans-atlantic flight.

Not only did

Johnson revel in the hierarchies of the past by picturing
Lindy as though he were a reborn pioneer of the frontier,
but Kearns relates that the former school teacher found
something more important in the lesson of Lindbergh.

"Side

by side with this nostalgia there was also the more ominous
fact that Lindbergh's exploit was a window to the future; a
victory for the machine, a triumph for the plane as well as
for the

m a n .

"25

Later, on the eve of World War II, Johnson, the
Representative from Texas, spoke infrequently on the House
floor.

When he did speak, however, Johnson became a

spokesman for the New Deal and the "technological psychosis"
which pervaded the social engineering of its many programs.
Congressman Johnson promised to help President Roosevelt,
advocated modernizing the rural farms of his home state with
electricity, milking machines for the farmer, washing
machines for his wife, light to intrude upon the night, and
heat to warm the cold farmhouse.26
Technology perhaps did not become an intrinsic aspect
of Johnson's political outlook until it threatened the world
hierarchy in America's consciousness on October 4, 1957.
Johnson later described it to Doris Kearns, he was at his
ranch when the news of Sputnik came across still another
technological innovation of his lifetime, the television.
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That night, he took a walk along the Pedernales, "with eyes
lifted skyward, straining to catch a glimpse of that alien
object which had been thrust into the outer reaches of our
world."

He remembered, as did most Americans, "the profound

shock of realizing that it might be possible for another
nation to achieve technological superiority over this great
country of ours."27

Johnson's response was very much the

same in 1957 as it was following the attacks in the Gulf of
Tonkin.

Something had to be done.

What the situation

required was "action" and "action" in the form of
"technology."

The Space Race had begun and with the imagery

of climbing the hierarchy higher and higher toward
perfection on the moon, no one, benefited and suffered from
the extending and redefining characteristics of technology
more than Lyndon Baines Johnson.
With more power at his disposal than any other
individual in the free world, President Johnson manipulated
technology "with the unqualified excitement of an elevenyear-old."28

Electronic technology was his constant

companion and his link to the outside world and, perhaps,
reality.

Push-button telephones were installed in every

conceivable place that Lyndon might frequent— in his
bathroom, in his bedroom, in his sitting room, in his dining
room, in his theater, in his cars, on his motorboats, and in
his planes.

The swimming pools at the White House and the

LBJ Ranch sported special rafts for floating phones.

A
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short-wave radio allowed Johnson to reach any guest to the
Ranch in an LBJ car within twenty miles of the house.39
Enamored with the technology of communication, the
President had the famous triple console televisions
installed in the oval office.

Here, partially fueled by his

"technological psychosis" and partially by his frantic need
for consensus "identification" (which will be discussed
later), he could watch the nightly news on all three
networks simultaneously.

A remote control allowed Johnson

to manipulate the volume on the sets so he could "tune in"
whatever station was covering a story on administration
policy.30
Control, usually remote control (which equals the
maintenance of order), was the impetus behind Johnson's
psychosis.

Sometimes, however, the machines became such

close extensions of Johnson himself, they took the form of
companionship.

To the left of the triple console in the

oval office, stood three wire tickers from AP, UPI, and
Reuters.

"Those tickers," he later told Kearns, "were like

friends tapping at my door for attention.
them around."

The tickers could also perform the dual

function of control.
outside world.

I loved having

"They kept me in touch with the

They made me feel that I was truly in the

center of things.

I could stand beside the tickers for

hours on end and never get lonely."31
As Burke mentions above, technology is at the center of
our glories and our distress.

Johnson's suffering began
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when he began to reach too far, to extend himself
technologically into Vietnam at Tonkin Gulf.

Everything in

the war had the Lyndon Johnson seal of approval.

Every

piece of equipment appeared to be an extension of the
Johnson persona.

"This is your helicopter, sir," said a

young corporal showing Johnson to his presidential craft.
"They're all my helicopters, son," said the President.32
While this did not denote possession in the usual sense,
Johnson's words reveal

an extension of himself at the time

through the technology

of war.

"My boys in Vietnam," "my

planes," and "my ships" were all machines that Lyndon
Johnson was going to use to "slip his hand up Ho Chi Minh's
leg before Ho even knew about it."33
The use of such technology was found in the cluster
analysis above to have been a common agency mentioned by
Johnson in his Vietnam rhetoric.

According to Tom Wicker,

the assumption of seemingly unlimited, personalized
resources goes far toward
Vietnam.

With what J.

explaining U.S. failure in

W. Fulbright would later call "the

arrogance of power," Johnson following Tonkin reflected the
"ubiquitous optimism" and "undeviating certainties" Burke
ascribed to the practical man:
How could Lyndon Johnson, in his moment of
triumph, with his sense of the golden touch, doubt
that his superbly equipped forces, representing
all the technological and industrial genius of
America . . . could deal with a few ill-clad
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guerrillas, if necessary with the old-fashioned
Chinese-style infantry divisions of Vo Nguyen
Giap, with an enemy who had to steal his weapons,
bring in supplies on bicycles and the backs of old
women, and whose soldiers were regimented
Communist slaves without the incentives of freedom
and democracy to make them fight well?3^

Perched high atop the hierarchy and recreated in the image
of their own technology, the main characters in the
administration thought failure of American policy in Vietnam
to be inconceivable.

When George Ball predicted almost to

the man where U.S. policy in Vietnam would lead as early as
1961, a prophesy he continued to articulate until its actual
occurrence, President Kennedy uttered a representative
response to such pessimism:
than hell!

"George, you're just crazier

That just isn't going to happen."

By 1966, evidence suggesting that Lyndon Johnson had
extended himself too far began to mount.

While American

technology had "touched Ho up" and provided a political
victory for Johnson at Tonkin Gulf, the escalated bombing
campaign initiated in February of 1965 had not achieved the
predicted results.

The following year, Secretary McNamara's

"systems analysis" specialists began to uncover evidence
that our own machinery was working to the detriment of the
war effort.

The bombing was estimated to have caused some

600 million dollars worth of damage in the north in 1966 but
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at a cost in lost aircraft alone of six billion dollars.
Meanwhile, sixty-five percent of our bombs and artillery
rounds were aimed at unobserved targets killing about 100
North Vietnamese or Vietcong per year.

In the process,

however, sixty-five percent of our own ammunition provided
27,000 tons of dud bombs and shells which the enemy used to
make booby traps that killed over 1,000 Americans.35
By war's end, the United States had dropped more than
seven million tons of bombs in Indochina.

This figure

represented more than the total tonnage of bombs dropped in
Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific during World War II.
It equaled three hundred of the atomic bombs that fell on
Japan in 1945.

The bombs that Johnson said could not be

dropped on "the smallest outhouse north of the 17th parallel
without checking with me,"35 had left twenty million
craters.3^
The bombing had devastated the natural forests which
played a critical part in the formation of the Mekong Delta.
It depleted the organic layer of soil and disturbed the
chain of life in the animal world.

Defoliants such as Agent

Orange never discriminated between jungle and crops and with
the foliage stripped away, rainwater runoff crested into
massive floods.35

At this point, according to Rueckert, the

entelechial process had reached its extreme manifestations
in the "systematic destruction and desecration of nature and
the natural by the engines of industry in the exalted name
of 'Progress,' with the very idea of progress as well as the
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engines of industry being products of ’reason'

(or as Burke

would have it, 'symbol using')."39
All of this brings us back nearly ten years to the
symbols themselves— "air units of the United States Seventh
Fleet"— the initial step in the entelechial climb to
disaster.

In many ways, the "technological psychosis" is

symbolic to this point in the Tonkin "drama of human
relations."

In the cluster analysis above, "the wise

application of modern technology" was found to be a
principal agency in both acts of "standing firm" and acts of
"peace."

The meaning of those symbols is now uncovered in

the rhetoric of rebirth.

"Air units of the United States

Seventh Fleet" represent the negative (thou-shall-not be
hostile to Americans on the high seas), the peace-aggression
hierarchy, and the maintenance of order.
Guilt and the Secrecy Motive:

Operation 34A

According to Burke, order "makes for a tangle of guilt,
mystery, ambition ('adventure') and vindication."40

The

North Vietnamese were goaded by the "mystery" of independent
nationalism thus giving way to their own ambition to
overturn the existing hierarchy of colonialism.

Johnson

himself once described the Communist regime as having
"arrogance and adventure."

Failure to maintain order in the

face of such ambition thus produces guilt.
In his study of poetry as symbolic action, Burke
concluded that all men have burdens or "sins" which produce
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guilt.

Indeed, burdens themselves are the very subject of

symbolic action and the drama of human r e l a t i o n s . F o r
Lyndon Johnson in August of 1964, his burden was the
maintenance of peace and order in Southeast Asia.

Speaking

to the Syracuse University audience, guilt was behind his
statements justifying the carrying of the peace burden.
Announcing that "America's course is not without long
provocation," the President justified the maintenance of
order on the guilt inherent in his failure to uphold the
"solemn pledge" of his predecessors.

"For 10 years three

American Presidents— President Eisenhower, President
Kennedy, and your present President— and the American
people," Johnson said, "have been actively concerned with
threats to the peace and security of the peoples of
southeast Asia from the Communist government of North
Vietnam."

The burden of peace also contributed to Johnson's

remarks regarding the 1954 SEATO pact.

The President said,

in the words of the treaty itself, that America "would view
any renewal of the aggression in violation of the 1954
agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening
international peace and security."
Guilt thus played a decisive role in Johnson's rhetoric
not because the President expressed remorse openly but
because of what a "fallen hierarchy" would mean to America,
the Johnson Administration, and to Lyndon Johnson himself.
The United States had to respond militarily in the Gulf of
Tonkin to avoid the guilt, or at least the recognition of
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guilt, in losing South Vietnam to a country far down the
peace-aggression world hierarchy.
One particular aspect of the entire Tonkin episode is
vitally important to the understanding of the role guilt
played in the drama.

President Johnson described the North

Vietnamese PT boat attacks as "deliberate" and "unprovoked."
Within days after the incident, the truth of these
statements started to come into question and suspicion
continued until Senator Fulbright's foreign aid hearings in
1966 and subsequently the Pentagon Papers revealed their
outright falsity.
The reason for the utterance of such statements,
according to Burke, is affiliated with the hierarchic
motive.

In order for any hierarchy to stay in order,

secrecy must be involved to discourage the lower elements
from any type of climbing or mounting.42

In Johnson's

situation, secrecy, or the secrecy motive, was necessary not
just to disincline the enemy from attacking but also to
dissuade potential critics from questioning his version of
the events in the Tonkin Gulf.

Here, though, Johnson's

comments involved a hierarchy of credibility with the
President at the top (or God) and possible critics at the
bottom.
What the President failed to reveal in his Syracuse
address, to a national television audience the night before,
and to congressional leaders the evening of the second
attack, was the existence of a covert war against the North
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Vietnamese and the Vietcong which had prompted both the
first and the second attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin.

On the

evening of July 30, 1964, South Vietnamese coastline patrol
forces made a midnight attack on the islands of Hon Me and
Hon Nieu, both coastal fortifications of the North
Vietnamese.4-* The attacks were part of what the Pentagon
Papers called "an elaborate program of covert military
operations against the state of North Vietnam" begun on
February 1, 1964 under the code name "Operation Plan 34A."44
Instigated at the request of Secretary of Defense McNamara
following a depressing visit to South Vietnam in December of
1963, the operation ranged from U-2 spy flights over the
North and kidnapping of its citizens for intelligence
information, to parachuting sabotage and psychological
warfare teams into enemy territory, to naval commando raids
to blow up bridges and coastal installations.4®
During the summer of 1964, the United States had also
initiated the "DeSoto Patrols."

While their purpose was

mainly to show force in the area, American destroyers
collected intelligence along the North Vietnamese coast that
might be useful to 34A raids.4®

In the wake of the island

raids on July 30, a fleet of North Vietnamese PT boats and
junks moved into the area to search for the attack force and
mistook the U .S .S . Maddox. on a DeSoto mission, for a South
Vietnamese escort vessel.4^
The following day, the Washington Post carried North
Vietnamese accusations that the U.S. had shelled the
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offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu thus confirming the
case of mistaken identity and revealing what Johnson would
hide by secrecy two days later.48

That night, two more

clandestine 34A attacks occurred as South Vietnamese crews
bombarded the Rhon River estuary and radar installations at
Vinhson.4®

All of the PT raids had been planned and

initiated by National Security adviser McGeorge Bundy and
General Paul Harkins in Saigon.

Both Secretaries McNamara

and Rusk had full knowledge of them.

"In a real sense,"

notes Halberstam, "these were American operations."50

On

August 4, as DeSoto missions resumed, the alleged second
attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy took place, later
prompting the Pentagon Papers to conclude that the presence
of the destroyers provided all the elements needed for both
clashes to have taken p l a c e . A c c o r d i n g to Johnson,
though, "the attacks were unprovoked."
The motive of secrecy, based on the need to maintain
order or control within a hierarchy, can also be seen in the
evolution of the Southeast Asia Resolution and ultimately
the crisis itself.

As the military situation continued to

deteriorate and pressure began to mount for a show of
strength in South Vietnam from both the South Vietnamese
leaders and from Capitol Hill in the summer of 1964, Johnson
carefully calculated the international and domestic
political climates before making any of his moves in public.
As early as February of that year, Walt Rostow, then head of
the State Department's policy planning staff, had suggested
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a legislative resolution to allow the President to freely
make military decisions to "maintain control" in Vietnam.52
By May, Johnson asked his closest advisers to start thinking
in terms of a resolution and Bill Bundy, McGeorge Bundy's
brother at the State Department, incorporated the idea in a
thirty-day scenario of escalated attacks aimed at
culminating in a full-scale bombing campaign against the
North Vietnamese.52

Drafting the first copy of the

resolution, Bundy emphasized "speed" as a vital ingredient
for the document to achieve the desired purpose:

to protect

Johnson from pressures on the right, to force the Republican
candidate in a presidential election year to support
whatever the President was doing in Vietnam, and to picture
Johnson as a moderate, practical president refraining from
the use of too much f o r c e . 5 ^
By early June, the resolution was ready.

Suddenly,

however, the entire scenario was postponed at a meeting on
June 15.

McGeorge Bundy informed Secretaries Rusk and

McNamara and other senior officials that the President
feared appearing like a warmonger to American voters.
"Better to wait until after the November election."55
Included with the resolution in Bundy's scenario, the
plan called for a full statement of the administration's
position on Vietnam policy.

Hoping to avoid criticism,

Johnson again chose to be secretive, fearing that a full
explanation would draw attention to Vietnam as one area of
concern, create a flurry of congressional debate, and
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plaster the issue all over the editorial pages with advice
from columnists.56
The resolution, the speech, and the rest of the thirtyday plan of action would thus have to wait.
to be molded to events.
— and it did.

It would have

Something would have to come along

In the terminology among White House

officials of the period, the "street car" arrived and the
administration with the Southeast Asia Resolution tucked
under its arm jumped aboard.

In the words of Karnow,

"Johnson and his staff, desperately seeking a pretext to act
vigorously, seized upon a fuzzy set of circumstances to
fulfill a contingency plan."5?
Not only did the secrecy motive encourage the President
to omit the covert war from his public explanations of the
Tonkin Gulf incident, but the very manner in which Johnson
portrayed the events to the American people was the result
of this same motive.

According to Halberstam, the entire

Tonkin episode reflected the power of the presidency and,
thus, the entelechial motive as well.

"In terms of

processes," he notes, "the presidential reach had become
longer and swifter than that of any competitor or
challenger" due to the "power" granted Johnson by modern
technology.

With technology came speed and with speed,

according to Bill Bundy, the successful passage of the
resolution.

"Speed was vital to his new power," says

Halberstam:
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Thrown into an instant international crisis, the
country and the Congress had no time to inquire,
no time to doubt, only time to accept.

The

American Air Force planes were already on the way
back from the Tonkin Gulf; the President had
already talked to the entire nation.58
Because of the pressing need to "catch the street-car" on
time, then, President Johnson did not have to explain the
covert war in Southeast Asia, Bill Bundy's thirty-day
scenario, or the confusion in the administration over
whether the second attack ever occurred at all.

The

incident left Johnson with a feeling of total control.

"The

President could in effect control events, or so it seemed,"
says Halberstam, "control the flow of information, and
virtually control how the events were reported."5^
The need for secrecy at the time of the Tonkin Gulf
clashes, thus, was but another manifestation of the
hierarchic motive and the accompanying need for order or
control, especially on the part of Lyndon Johnson.

At a

time when many of the accepted socio-political assumptions
of the previous decade were beginning to come into question,
Johnson, unlike his predecessor Kennedy, tried desperately
to hold on, maintain control, keep intact the hierarchic
patterns of thought prevalent among his own generation.
In a 1968 interview on the Johnson personality, Harold
Laswell said Johnson's childhood reaction to his mother's
strong desire for him to achieve placed the young man in a
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dilemma:

"On the one side there is the tendency to accept

domination and on the other hand a rebellious tendency to
reassert one's independence and masculinity and sense of
adequacy. . . . It is a reasonable inference," Laswell
continued, "that Johnson was very much concerned about
remaining independent of outside influence.

His subsequent

political career— with his demand to make his own decisions,
and his demand to control a situation [italics Laswell's]—
has these very deep roots."®®
In summary, President Johnson's burdens included not
just the burden of peace, for which he, the leader of the
free world, had to maintain control, but also the burden of
credibility in a society where the presidential "god" of the
trust-deceit hierarchy and the hierarchy of power was
expected to tell the truth.

"At the heart of the

relationship between the President and his fellow citizens
was trust," said Halberstam, "and Tonkin damaged that
trust."61
Mortification, Victimage, or "Ho made me do it."
Encumbered by the maintenance of peace and by
credibility, President Johnson, nearing the beginning of a
campaign in which he could be elected in his own right,
needed a vessel by which his guilt could be purged.
the President were two choices:

Open to

mortification and

victimage, both being modes of purification.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

127

Throughout his years in office, Johnson had limited
success with the use of mortification to justify the
fighting in Southeast Asia and thus cleanse his guilt.

As a

means of purgation, mortification is a victimage of the self
or suicide.

Not before his speech of March 31, 1968 in

which he announced his decision to withdraw from the
presidential race did he use mortification effectively.
Attempts were made before but the President always spoke of
a collective mortification, bringing others into the
sacrifice so he would not have to "die" alone.
In the speech at Syracuse University, Johnson utilized
mortification in only limited passages.

Johnson said

ambiguously, "there can be no doubt about the
responsibilities of men and the responsibilities of nations
that are devoted to peace."

The President implied in this

statement that America and her allies must be willing to
take "action," to die if need be, in order to relieve the
tension caused by North Vietnam's rejection of world
hierarchy.

In more concrete terms, Johnson stated that

"peace," the burden, "requires that we and all our friends
stand firm against the present aggressions of the government
of North Vietnam."
The use of mortification for peace was atypical of
Johnson's rhetoric during the period.

Basing his

assumptions on the domino theory, another manifestation of
the hierarchic principle, Johnson never clearly convinced
his audience that losing Vietnam would mean taking up our
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defenses in San Francisco.

Nor, ironically, did he try very

extensively, as the Syracuse speech exemplifies.

"To show

that a good is worth having," says Burke, "one shows that it
is worth sacrifice . . .

by the picture of heroic

sufferings, sacrifice, and death."62

The President usually

saved mortification to alleviate other burdens besides that
of "peace" and its effectiveness was apparent when he did
(see chapters 6-7).
Disdaining the use of mortification, President Johnson
used victimage of others, the counterpart of mortification,
much more extensively for the burden of peace.

"If you look

for a man's burden," says Burke, "you will find the
principle that reveals the structure of his unburdening; or,
in attenuated form, if you look for his problem, you will
find the lead that explains the structure of his
solution."63

Johnson's burden was the maintenance of peace

or order within the hierarchy.

The cause of the burden was

a rejection of the hierarchy by the North Vietnamese.
Therefore, the structure of the solution should inevitably
move to purge the source of the burden by forcing the agents
of hierarchic mounting to accept blame for their evil deed.
Near the beginning of the Syracuse speech, Johnson
reported that the Maddox "was attacked on the high seas in
the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of the Government of
North Vietnam."

Further, "that attack was repeated in those

same waters against two United States destroyers."

Any act

of purification through victimage, according to Rueckert,
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must be preceded by a transfer through identification of the
guilt or burden to the victim.

This transfer "is always

effected through the manipulation by oneself or others of
the negative and positive values within any given
hierarchy."64
Reexamining Lyndon Johnson's guilt, it must be recalled
that peace was a burden because of both America's failure to
maintain a peaceful, orderly hierarchy in the first place
and for the enforcement of order through superior
technology.

Since the North Vietnamese also used technology

in the form of "hostile vessels," the President could
identify with the enemy in order to transfer the burden of
peace.

While both sides fired bullets, torpedoes, dropped

bombs, etc., Johnson manipulated the positive and negative
values within the hierarchy by labelling American acts
simply as "appropriate armed action."

Meanwhile, he

associated the North Vietnamese acts with the devil term of
"aggression."
The transference of the burden complete, the North
Vietnamese were thus pictured as a scapegoat, "the chosen
vessel of iniquity, whereby one can have the experience of
punishing in an alienated form the evil which one would
otherwise be forced to recognize within."65

That Lyndon

Johnson in 1965, a keen student and believer in the great
lessons of Munich and the Cold War, would decide to invoke
armed force to restore peace in the Gulf of Tonkin and then
use the totalitarian communists as scapegoats is not
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surprising.

Interestingly, however, Johnson used the

scapegoat strategy for the purification of the burden of
credibility more extensively in the Syracuse speech than for
the burden of peace.
Needing to purge the burden of credibility, Johnson
focused a large portion of his speech on the international
agreements signed by both the United States and North
Vietnam, thus establishing the identification needed for the
transfer of guilt.
In June of that year [1954] we stated we "would
view any renewal of the aggression in violation of
the 1954 agreements with grave concern" . . .

In

September of that year the United States signed
the Manila pact on which our participation in
SEATO is based. . . . I n 1962 we made our position
clear toward Laos.

We signed the Declaration of

Neutrality of Laos. . . . The agreements of 1954
and 1962 were also signed by the government of
North Vietnam.
In establishing these grounds of identification, Johnson
prepared his audience not only for the transfer of his own
burden of credibility but also for America's failure to sign
the 1954 Geneva accords, closely associated with the burden
of peace.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had refused

to even look at Ho Chi Minh at Geneva in 1954 and eventually
walked out of the meetings.

Strongly criticized by Johnson
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for this move, Dulles returned to the U.S. to devise a
treaty of his own for Southeast Asia--SEATO.
Identified by their common pacts, President Johnson
went about transferring secrecy and deceit to the North
Vietnamese.

Recounting each treaty, Johnson pictured a

country that had said one thing and done another, not unlike
the American approach to Operation 34A.
In 1954 that government pledged that it would
respect the territory under the military control
of the other party and engage in no hostile act
against the other party.

In 1962 that government

pledged that it would "not introduce into the
Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military
personnel." . . . That government of North Vietnam
is now willfully and systematically violating
those agreements of both 1954 and 1962.
While Johnson failed to mention the United States' role
in planning and executing the covert war against the
communists or the elaborate plans of Bill Bundy's scenario
to escalate overt war, the President transferred both the
burdens of peace and credibility as he portrayed the
communists striking out in all directions in the name of
"aggression" and against their word.
To the south it is engaged in aggression against
the Republic of Vietnam.

To the west it is

engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.
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To the east it has now struck out on the high seas
in an act of aggression against the United States
of America.
Through the use of victimage, the scapegoat in particular,
President Johnson purged his guilt and transferred his
burdens onto the aggressive North Vietnamese communists.
Having done so, an expression of redemption in the rhetoric
of rebirth was all that was left for the peroration of the
Syracuse speech.
The Rebirth of Consensus Government
According to Burke, "the alienating of iniquities from
the self to the scapegoat amounts to a rebirth of the
self."®®

Through the vehicle of the scapegoat, President

Johnson justified American military action against North
Vietnam, paved the way for the passage of the Southeast Asia
Resolution, and successfully made a move toward escalation
while portraying himself as a "peace" candidate.
The moment of rebirth occurred in the speech with the
reaffirmation of U.S. foreign policy.

"A thorough job of

symbolic rebirth," says Burke, requires "the revision of
one's ancestral past."®7

Johnson's view of the conflict in

Vietnam was but a continuation of Cold War intervention
against the same enemy.

The communist scapegoat thus not

only redeemed the "air action" in the Gulf of Tonkin but
also the guilt of insurgency past.

"The challenge that we

face in southeast Asia today," said the President, "is the
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same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we
have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and
Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba."
The sense of redemption most important to Johnson,
though, dealt with the domestic political scene.

"Finally,

my fellow Americans," the President said— and he was talking
to all Americans— "I would like to say to ally and adversary
alike:

let no friend needlessly fear— and no foe vainly

hope--that this is a nation divided in this election year."
Always a man of some timidity and caution when big
decisions had to be made, Lyndon Johnson was not a man with
a sense of history, or the lone believer dissenting, going
against the grain.

He was a consensus president, in

Halberstam's words, "trying to get everyone on board in an
office where the best decisions were often the loneliest
ones."6®

Among his personal staff, Stroessinger points out

that Johnson did not have advisers to provide wisdom,
judgment, and advice, but rather "to elicit emotional
support for his personal support for his personal
beliefs."69

Consensus, unity, and loyalty branded the

Johnson style of government and decision-making.
want loyalty," the President once said.

"I don't

"I want loyalty.

want him to kiss my ass in Macy's window at high noon and
tell me it smells like roses.

I want his pecker in my

pocket."7°
Regarding foreign policy, Johnson conceptualized the
presidency as an omniscient institution that was above
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questioning and certainly criticism from the press.

As he

liked to tell potential critics, Lyndon Johnson was "the
only President you h a v e . "71

Fearing communist influence if

there were but a trace of dissent in the U.S. government,
Johnson once told Doris Kearns that he wanted "to make
absolutely sure that the Communists don't play one branch of
the government against the other, or one party against the
other as happened in the Korean

W a r .

"72

This consensus motive worked in tandem with the secrecy
motive throughout the day of August 4, 1964.

Using secrecy

and speed as a means, Johnson hastily met with sixteen
congressional leaders at 6:15 the night of the second
attack.73

He outlined the day's events, omitting any

mention of the 34A activities, informed them of his
intentions for a limited retaliation, and said he wanted a
congressional resolution.
their support.

Of course, he was assured of

"In the world of men," Tom Wicker was later

to write, "governments believe they cannot afford to show
anything less than resolution at such a time; even less can
legislators afford to impair the leadership of a President
or Prime Minister by rejecting his executive actions,
handicapping his responses as a commander, or embarrassing
him before the

w o r l d .

"74

Thus, the Southeast Asia Resolution passed through the
Congress with a minimum of debate and only two dissenting
votes.

Senator J. William Fulbright agreed to usher the

resolution through the Senate, a decision he regretted the
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rest of his life.

"All I can say is that I was deceived,"

Fulbright later said.

"The greatest mistake I made in my

life was to accept Lyndon's account of what happened and
those of his men.'1,75
According to Burke, the need for consensus and unity is
very much a part of the redemptive process.

Accompanying

rebirth is an evangelizing tendency, the need to tell others
what one has seen or believes to have seen, "the tendency to
justify one's change by obtaining the corroboration of
o t h e r s . "76

Universal agreement with what had occurred in

the Gulf of Tonkin and with Johnson's responses came not
just from the Congress but from a variety of sources.

At

the President's direction, allies and adversaries alike
swallowed his words.

From Joseph Alsop and the Chicago

Tribune on the right to Walter Lippmann and Harry Truman on
the left, everyone celebrated in LBJ's r e b i r t h . 77
Perhaps the most important aspect to Johnson's
redemption, however, was the consensus gained at the expense
of presidential opponent Barry Goldwater.

Almost

immediately after news of the first attack reached the
American public, Goldwater issued a press release saying,
"We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at anywhere on
earth if we are to retain our respect and prestige," a
statement no American could disagree w i t h . 78

By phoning

Goldwater in California for his consent prior to his
television announcement the night before, Johnson diffused
any possible criticism to the effect that he had not done
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enough to protect the flag or the world hierarchy.

The day

of Johnson's address at Syracuse, Goldwater was quoted in
the Washington Post, saying, "I am sure that every American
will subscribe to the action outlined in the President's
statement.

I believe it is the only thing that he can do

under the circumstances."^9

Indeed, Johnson's redemption

seemed complete as he ended the Syracuse speech with the
words:

"We are one nation united and indivisible.

And

united and indivisible we shall remain."
The unity of rebirth could be found in the general
public as well.

In the wake of the incident, a Lou Harris

public opinion poll found that eighty-five percent of the
American public supported Johnson's version of the attacks
and his military retaliation.

Before Tonkin, only fifty-

nine percent felt Johnson could handle Vietnam better than
Goldwater.

Afterward, though, Johnson's show of strength

redeemed him in the eyes of the public.

By seventy-one to

twenty-nine percent, Americans believed Johnson could handle
Vietnam policy better than Goldwater."
Conclusion
History generally looks upon the Gulf of Tonkin episode
as an abuse of power, both military and presidential.

The

above analysis corroborates this view from a dramatistic
perspective.

The major conclusions drawn in this chapter

are as follows.
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1.

Steeped in the traditions and basic assumptions of

the Cold War, Lyndon Johnson viewed the conflict in
Vietnam not as a war of national liberation but as a
threat to the established world hierarchy of the post
World War II period.

Inherent in such a view was the

negative or certain "thou-shall-nots":

thou-shall-not

be aggressive, attack, be hostile, break agreements,
harass other governments, or make war.

The resulting

hierarchy placed "peace" or "freedom" at the top as the
essences of perfection or "god-terms" with "aggression"
at the bottom acting as a "devil-term."

Johnson

associated the United States with "peace" and North
Vietnam with "aggression."
2.

In order to avoid any further hierarchic "mounting"

or climbing by the communists, President Johnson turned
to what he felt to be his most admirable quality:
pragmatism.

The attacks were thus answered with

"action," specifically "air action."

At this point,

the entelechial motive in the form of technology
appeared as the most practical agency of maintaining
order and control within the hierarchy.
3.

The failure of the United States to keep peace in

the Gulf of Tonkin and order in the world hierarchy,
produced a sense of "categorical guilt" in American
policy-makers.

The United States had carried the

burden of peace since World War II, as Johnson noted in
his address.

Adding to the sense of guilt, Lyndon
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Johnson's personal burden of credibility made the need
for redemption or catharsis greater.
4.

Principally through the vehicle of the scapegoat,

Johnson transferred the American burdens of peace and
credibility onto the communist North Vietnamese.

It

was the communists who had attacked with hostility,
Johnson said.
unprovoked.

In addition, the attacks were
Regarding credibility, the President

enumerated three breaches of promise on the part of the
North Vietnamese.
5.

The redemption and rebirth of American policy in

Vietnam was beneficial more to Lyndon Johnson than to
the South Vietnamese.

Tonkin was a domestic political

victory for the President rather than a foreign
military success.

The overriding result was American

unity, just in time for a presidential reelection
campaign.
Now that the drama of human relations has proved its
usefulness in the critique of war rhetoric, this study will
move on to President Johnson's most intriguing address of
the period:

"Peace Without Conquest."
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"PEACE WITHOUT CONQUEST":
CRITICISM,
HIERARCHY, AND "ELECTRIFICATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE"
The reprisal air strikes in the Gulf of Tonkin marked
an important threshold in the war against Vietnam.

While

psychologically preparing to escalate the stakes against the
North Vietnamese, Tonkin rendered the administration much
less flexible in its decision-making ability.

In the words

of a Pentagon Papers analyst, "the number of unused measures
short of direct military action against the North had been
depleted."

Thus, when a decision to use technological force

against the North was faced again, "it was much easier to
take."1
With the intensification of Vietcong terrorist activity
in South Vietnam during the fall of 1964, President Johnson
had many chances to retaliate with force again.

On November

1, the Vietcong struck the American air base at Bienhoa,
killing four Americans, destroying five B-57 bombers, and
damaging eight.2

Because the attack occurred two days

before Johnson's landslide victory over Senator Barry
Goldwater, the President declined to retaliate.
The political and military considerations mentioned
above also changed the nature of the rhetorical situation as
well.

Pressure had been building on Johnson to make a

decision regarding Vietnam all during the presidential
campaign.

Continually portraying himself as the candidate

of reason and moderation, Johnson was perceived by many as
144
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the candidate opposed to deeper involvement.^

In addition,

the President was described as a healing man and he referred
to one of his main speeches as the one in which he was
"healing the wounds."4

Thus, while military factors

encouraged Johnson to retaliate, the presidential campaign
placed constraints on his rhetoric and his ability to seek
alternatives.

The only result of this rhetorical situation,

according to press secretary George Reedy, was "to produce a
record that would haunt him as the casualty lists piled in
from Vietnam" the next year.®
On Christmas Eve, 1964, Johnson had another chance to
retaliate but was still hesitant.

The Vietcong bombed the

Brinks Hotel, an American officer billet in downtown Saigon,
proving to the South Vietnamese that the Americans, with all
their technological firepower, were vulnerable and could not
be counted on for protection.®

Because Johnson wanted to

avoid bombing the North during the Christmas season, his
rhetorical alternatives were once again limited and the
United States resembled a "Paper Tiger" to foreign
observers.
With the coming of the new year, the pressure continued
to build on Lyndon Johnson.

South Vietnam was on the verge

of falling into communist hands, a prospect Johnson thought
would ruin his presidency.

With political chaos in Saigon,

apathy among the South Vietnamese populace, corruption
everywhere, an aggressive Vietcong pushing its way through
the countryside, tough North Vietnamese units and
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replacements arriving daily in the south, and the South
Vietnamese army led by an inept and politically divided
officer corps, a major defeat was at hand unless something
was done, and quickly, in Washington.7
In late January, McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of
Defense Bob McNamara decided it was time to move the
President in the direction of military escalation.

Their

idea was to have Bundy take a trip to Vietnam acting as the
eyes and ears of Johnson.8

While he was in Vietnam during

the first week of February, the Vietcong attacked the
American advisers' billets at Pleiku on February 7, leaving
eight dead and one hundred and eight wounded.

Striking at

two o'clock a.m. Vietnam time, the terrorists used grenades
wrapped in bamboo or placed in American beer cans.

The

television coverage was extensive and pressure to retaliate
with force would soon build among conservatives on Capitol
Hill.9
Joining Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and General William
Westmoreland at U.S. Military headquarters in Saigcn after
the attack, Bundy was clearly shaken, acting tense and
abrupt.

Westmoreland later said that Bundy exhibited a

"field marshall psychosis"— a typical behavior of civilians
once they have "smelled a little gun powder."10

Cabling the

President, Bundy said that he, the Ambassador, and the
commanding general in Southeast Asia, believed that "the
best available way of increasing our chance of success in
Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of
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sustained reprisal against North Vietnam— a policy in which
air and naval action against the North is justified by and
related to the whole Vietcong campaign of violence and
terror in the South."!1
Even though Johnson would later say that Bundy had
reacted like a "preacher's son in a w h o r e h o u s e , t h e
national security adviser's memo from Saigon had an effect
on the President.

Storming into an emergency National

Security meeting that February 7, Johnson was furious.

Even

though Pleiku was no different from any other attack over
the past four years, the Vietcong had attacked "his boys"
who were still assigned as military advisers for the South
Vietnamese, not as combat personnel.
this," he raged.

"I've had enough of

"This is just like the Alamo; someone damn

well needs to go to their aid; well, by God, I'm going to
Vietnam's aid."13

The military pressure to escalate the war

had been building ever since the raids in the Gulf of Tonkin
the previous August.

Finally, external events produced the

rhetorical climate Johnson was waiting for.
When the Vietcong staged another attack at Qui Nhon on
February 10, the President authorized Operation FLAMING DART
as an event-related bombing reprisal aimed at decreasing the
North's resolve to attack American forces.

Again, echoing

the rhetoric of Tonkin Gulf, the President ordered "air
operations" which were "appropriate and fitting."

When the

operation seemed to increase Vietcong willingness to attack,
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Johnson ordered Operation ROLLING THUNDER to embark on the
sustained reprisals that Bundy had suggested from Saigon.14
The Pentagon Papers report that Rolling Thunder was
intended to bring Hanoi to its knees, convincing the North
that it should agree to negotiate a settlement to the war in
the South.

After a month of bombing, however, no response

was forthcoming from the North Vietnamese.16

Instead, the

bombing brought about exactly what the Johnson
Administration feared most, the massive, gradual
introduction of North Vietnamese troops into the South.

As

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler
told McNamara, the strikes "had not reduced in any major
way" North Vietnam's ability to make war and Hanoi
"continues to maintain, at least publicly, stoical
determination."16

Rolling Thunder, in short, had failed.

Optimism within the Administration began to wane and public
outcry against the bombing intensified.
While Johnson had favored the air campaign over the
introduction of ground forces because it required fewer
military personnel and thus incurred fewer casualties, the
President was in dire need of an alternate course in late
March of 1965.

"Bomb, bomb, bomb.

That's all you know,"

Johnson complained to his Joint Chiefs.
there's nothing else.

"I want to know why

You generals have all been educated

at the taxpayer's expense, and you're not giving me any
ideas and any solutions for this damn little piss-ant
country."17

This statement reveals a different side of the
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President.

Instead of the "cold warrior" that evidence from

the period portrays, the Joint Chiefs saw a man who had
"painted himself into a corner" rhetorically.

His pleas for

a military alternative in Vietnam were also requests for a
rhetorical alternative at home.
At the time, Johnson appeared to outsiders a tormented
man, fearing that failure awaited him whichever way he
turned.

David Wise, a correspondent for the New York Herald

Tribune. recalled a conversation he had with the President
at the time.

Johnson described his predicament like that of

a man standing on a newspaper in the middle of the ocean.
"If I go this way," Johnson said, tilting his hand to the
right, "I'll topple over, and if I go this way," tilting his
hand to the left, "I'll topple over, and if I stay where I
am, the paper will be soaked up and I'll sink slowly to the
bottom of the sea."
to the floor.3-8

Saying this, he lowered his hand slowly

Feeling cornered by the failure of his own

military policies in Vietnam and facing a crescendo of
public criticism at home and abroad, Johnson decided it was
time for a thorough statement on American intentions in
Southeast Asia.
Public Dissent:

The New Negative

Because of a long-standing invitation from Dr. Milton
Eisenhower, President of Johns Hopkins University, Johnson
decided to use the campus as his forum on Monday, April 5.
On the preceding Friday, however, Prime Minister Lester
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Pearson of Canada advised Johnson to order a halt in the
bombing.

Thinking Hanoi was hesitant to negotiate for fear

of looking weak against American fire power, Pearson thought
a pause in the air campaign would give North Vietnam the
needed stimulus.

While Johnson did not reply to the

Canadian Prime Minister publicly, his private response to
such criticism was livid.

"Oh yes, a bombing halt," he

said.

"I'll tell you what happens when there's a bombing

halt:

I halt and then Ho Chi Minh shoves his trucks right

up my ass.

That's your bombing halt."19

Furious that as

close an ally as Pearson would make such a suggestion,
Johnson canceled Monday's delivery only to reconsider and
schedule the speech for Wednesday, April 7.20
At nine o'clock p.m., eastern standard time, President
Johnson addressed a nationwide television audience estimated
at over sixty million from Shriver Hall on the Johns Hopkins
campus.

In low, grave tones, Johnson began the speech with

a reference to a seventeen nation plea for peace in
Southeast Asia.

"We are joining those 17 countries," the

President said, "and stating our American policy tonight
which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area
of the w o r l d . "21

That Johnson opened the speech with a

reply to the peace initiative is significant in that it
marked a public shift away from the "peace-aggression"
hierarchy of world order that was of utmost concern at the
time of the Tonkin Gulf raids.

Instead, with his opening

statement, Johnson's ultimate concern by this time had come
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to be the hierarchy of credibility— unity, consensus
government, and above all, loyalty.

This shift revealed a

change in the rhetorical situation which manifested itself
not only in the President's growing concern for criticism
but also in Johnson's personal insecurity as president.

"If

a man takes great pains to obtain the approval of his
group," writes Burke, "does he not thereby give evidence
that he needs to be approved?"22
With more attention being paid to the hierarchy of
credibility in the spring of 1965, a new set of "thou-shallnots" came to the fore.

The overriding taboo within the

Administration at this point was "thou-shall-not criticize
the President or his policy."

Criticism represented a

rejection of the hierarchy of credibility and the President,
understandably, was concerned about his reputation as a
trustworthy president.

The fear of dissent and the

avoidance of confrontation had been a lifelong tendency of
Johnson.

According to George Reedy, the President "abhorred

dissent to a point where he sought to quell it long before
protagonists had talked themselves out."23
As President, Johnson systematically eliminated sources
of criticism left over from the Kennedy Administration,
especially if the dissent was directed at Vietnam policy.
By late 1964, those advocating a political solution in
Vietnam had been eased out of the decision-making posts.
Because of their approval for the coup which toppled South
Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Diem in November 1963,
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principally, President Johnson quickly made such men as
Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, William Trueheart, Michael
Forrestal, and Paul Kattenburg non-players.24

This left the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and those advocating a military
solution to advise the President.

That Johnson surrounded

himself with military men was no mistake for, in
Halberstam's words, "the public statement of the military
man allowed no dissent, it was built totally upon loyalty to
policy, to chief,"25 and

the

President wanted loyalty. "The

true army man fights when he is told," says Burke.

"It is

the "glamour" of caste [or hierarchy] alone that makes him
ready to subordinate hiswill to the will of the
institution."25

The two

men

most likely to influence

Johnson at the time were men who strictly adhered to the new
negative and supported a military solution:
Rusk and McNamara.

Secretaries

So as not to present Johnson with the

slightest trace of dissent, both believed they should try to
advise the President with a common view or, at least,
harmonize their opinions to save Johnson from difficult
choices.27
Just as Johnson attributed the god-value of
"pragmatism" to those "real men" whom he admired and agreed
with him, he credited dissenters with the devil-values of
"weakness" or "femininity."

Hearing that one member of his

Administration was favoring peaceful negotiations in 1965,
Johnson said, "Hell, he has to squat to piss," considering
doubt itself a

feminine

q u ality.

28

The doubters were not
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people to take "action" as the President had done at Tonkin.
Thus, when Vice President Hubert Humphrey opposed Operation
Flaming Dart in the wake of the Pleiku attack, he was
henceforth not invited to strategy meetings or informed of
general policy matters.29
From other sectors, criticism of Johnson's policy in
Vietnam was mounting as well.

The "peace bloc" in the

Congress had begun with the dissenting votes to the
Southeast Asia Resolution cast by Senators Wayne Morse of
Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska.

With the onset of

Rolling Thunder, the liberal wing of Johnson's own party
joined the ranks of dissent.

George McGovern, Frank Church,

Mike Mansfield, and Gale McGee gave "credibility" to a
movement that had once been looked upon as radical.30

In

late March of 1965, Senator William J. Fulbright, who had
ushered the Resolution through the Senate, warned the
President that a "massive ground and air war in Southeast
Asia" would be a "disaster."31

Such was the initial doubt

of a very important character in the credibility hierarchy.
April brought more bad news from the Congress.

The

week before the speech, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee rejected Johnson's request for a "blank check" of
funds that might be used for South Vietnamese aid.32
Perhaps even more damaging was a survey of constituent mail
on Capitol Hill.

Three days before the speech, the New York

Times reported that a majority of the mail supported
"negotiations that would permit the United States to
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extricate itself from the Vietnam war."

One letter to

Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, complained that "bad
means cannot accomplish a good end."

"When the United

States makes war on people who use poison arrows as part of
their weaponry, something is wrong," the author said.
"When, in addition, the United States employs a poison gas
upon these same people, everything is wrong."33
Perhaps the sector which produced the most vicious
rejection of the hierarchy was the media and it was this
particular "mounting" that drove Johnson to the point of
paranoia.

With the episode in the Gulf of Tonkin, the

President had proven that short of controlling events
themselves, he could at least control how events were
reported to the American people, thus maintaining his god
like control of the hierarchy.
was an enemy.

To Johnson, thus, the press

Halberstarn notes how this fear of dissent

developed into an imagined anti-Johnson conspiracy:
Critics of the war became his critics; since he
was patriotic, clearly they were not.

He had FBI

dossiers on war critics, congressmen and
journalists, and he would launch into long
irrational tirades against them:

he knew what was

behind their doubts, the Communists were behind
them— yes, the Communists, the Russians . . .34
Though not exclusive but representative of this
conspiracy was Walter Lippmann.

Throughout the spring of
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1965, the columnist's dissatisfaction with the bombing in
Vietnam grew as negotiations failed to materialize.
According to Turner, Lippmann became somewhat of an
ideologue for the peace bloc.35

Knowing this, the pragmatic

President sought Lippmann's approval of his eminent speech
at Johns Hopkins.

Inviting the columnist to the Oval Office

the day before, Johnson read Lippmann the entire speech.

At

the suggestion of McGeorge Bundy, the President deemphasized
the section regarding "unconditional discussions" so as to
not foster an overbearing image of "softness."36

The

strategy worked, Lippmann approved the speech, and the
secrecy motive was once again employed to appease war
critics.
That the President had been losing his battle with the
press that spring was evident.

Important segments of the

public including educational and religious representatives
favored a negotiated settlement as well.

While nearly

seventy percent of the respondents to a national poll after
the initiation of Flaming Dart supported the President,
discontent with foreign policy was growing by April.

On

March 24, students and faculty at the University of Michigan
held the first "teach-in" against the Vietnam war.37
Speakers for and against U.S. policy participated in a
twelve-hour marathon seminar with the intention to inform
the university community.

The seminar was so successful,

that organizers planned a second "teach-in" for Washington
to be held in May.

On April 2, twenty-three scholars
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attending the annual meeting of the Association for Asian
Studies in San Francisco signed a petition urging President
Johnson to negotiate a peace in Vietnam.38

Twenty-five

hundred ministers, priests, and rabbis of the Clergymen's
Committee for Vietnam took out a full-page advertisement in
the New York Times three days before the speech which said
in bold face type:
STOP IT!"

"Mr. President:

In the Name of God.

The Committee went on to urge Johnson to "admit

our mistakes and work for an immediate cease-fire."39
Finally, representatives of America's closest allies
condemned Johnson's credibility hierarchy as well.

In

addition to Prime Minister Pearson's call for a bombing
pause, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart of Great Britain
told the House of Commons on April 1 that there were "some
signs" the North Vietnamese would be willing to negotiate,40
thus placing the burden of peace squarely on Johnson's
shoulders.

At the same time, Prime Minister Harold Wilson

met with one of Johnson's most vicious critics of the
Vietnam war, President Charles de Gaulle of France.

After

the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, de Gaulle
repeatedly warned the U.S. against becoming involved
militarily in Vietnam thus bringing Johnson's policy into
serious question.

While Wilson and de Gaulle remained

divided over America's conduct of the war, both agreed that
"some sort of basis must be found for a peaceful
settlement."41
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With such a wave of dissent facing President Johnson in
early April of 1965, a new negative had truly taken priority
over the "thou-shall-not attack" dictum prevalent at the
time of Tonkin Gulf.

Johnson thus addressed dissent first

in the Johns Hopkins speech.

"There are those who say that

all our effort there will be futile— that China's power is
such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia,"
Johnson said.

In answer to this charge, the President

invoked the negative of the peace-aggression hierarchy, the
lesson of Munich, and holy scripture.
The central lesson of our time is that the
appetite of aggression is never satisfied.

To

withdraw from one battlefield means only to
prepare for the next.

We must say in southeast

Asia— as we did in Europe— in the words of the
Bible:

"Hitherto shalt thou come, but no

further."
As a result, "there is no end to that argument until all of
the nations of Asia are swallowed up."

Interestingly,

Johnson said, in effect, "thou-shall-not criticize the
president" because "thou-shall-not attack."

Both negatives

were at the center of hierarchies protecting Johnson and the
United States as "gods."
"There are those who wonder why we have a
responsibility there," Johnson continued in response to
critics.

"World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia,
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and when it ended we found ourselves with continued
responsibility for the defense of freedom."

Once again, in

enforcing the new negative, both the burdens of peace and
credibility were very much apparent.
With the rhetorical situation thus changed due to
criticism and failure in Vietnam, Johnson faced as many
rhetorical alternatives as he did military alternatives in
Southeast Asia.

Immediately after his landslide election

victory in November of 1964, Johnson appointed a commission,
headed by Bill Bundy, to study American alternatives in
Vietnam.

The group gave the President three choices, one

too soft (withdraw American troops from Vietnam), one too
hard (take the war to the North Vietnamese with massive
escalation), and one just right (continue the course the
U.S. was on but add something extra— graduated air strikes
against North Vietnamese infiltration routes).
In the face of mounting criticism, Johnson also faced
several rhetorical alternatives in April of 1965.

As a

model of successful reaction to dissent, Dr. Martin Luther
King's "Letter From Birmingham City Jail" provides a
framework from which Johnson's rhetorical choices can be
summarized.

Like his military options, Johnson could have

chosen a rhetorical course too soft, that of ignoring his
critics and reasserting the peace-aggression hierarchy.

The

President could have followed King's example and taken a
harder approach by attacking his critics' points one-by-one
and making the necessity of resisting aggression in Vietnam
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an accepted point of departure.

Like his choice of military

moves, though, Johnson took the one in the middle, the
moderate or centrist alternative.

The President decided to

refute his critics by reasserting the peace-aggression
hierarchy.

Rhetorically, he continued what he had done in

the past but added something extra by shifting to the
primacy of the new negative regarding credibility.
By taking this alternative, Johnson attempted to
transfer the burden of proof onto his critics by making
salient the threat of North Vietnamese aggression.
turn, would justify the American use of force.

This, in

King's

letter provides some rhetorical techniques Johnson could
have used.

Rather than redefining the peace-aggression

hierarchy, Johnson could have constructed a different
hierarchy to change American perceptions of the Vietnam
conflict.

If the President placed South Vietnam at the

bottom of a hierarchy depicting developing democracies,
Americans could sympathize with a small country struggling
upward toward peace and freedom.

Otherwise, they had to

identify with an industrial giant, unleashing its power to
maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia.
Secondly, Johnson needed to personalize the battle of
cold war doctrines in Vietnam.

The battle-cry of "No more

Munichs" was effective when there was an apparent threat to
American vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin but it was not enough
to sustain support for Operation Rolling Thunder.

In order

to enhance public support for a struggling South Vietnam,
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the President could have made effective use of the
atrocities committed against the South Vietnamese by the
communists.
These were President Johnson's alternatives at Johns
Hopkins.

Following is an analysis of the rhetorical

approach Johnson chose to take.
Redefining World Hierarchy
Immediately following his response to the seventeen
nation appeal, President Johnson spent a majority of the
first half of the speech reviewing "once again with my own
people the views of the American Government."

This summary

was a restatement of the peace-aggression hierarchy invoked
at the time of the Tonkin attacks but with a new vocabulary.
According to Rueckert, a hierarchy is "any kind of
order; but more accurately, it is any kind of graded, valuecharged structure in terms of which things, words, people,
acts, and ideas are ranked."42

Kenneth Burke's terms of

"identification" and "division" are also important in the
understanding of this complex web of intrigue that defines
social order and goads those within it to climb upward, as
in the case of the North Vietnamese, or to force others to
stay put, as with the United States.

If pure identification

existed, life would be devoid of strife or conflict.

Thus,

no hierarchies would exist, no attacks in the Gulf of
Tonkin, at Pleiku, etc., and no criticism of the President.
Likewise would be the case if absolute separateness,
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fragmentation, or division prevailed.

When identification

and division are brought ambiguously together verbally,
however, "you cannot know for certain," according to Burke,
"just where one ends and the other begins, and you have the
characteristic invitation to rhetoric."43
In defining the existing hierarchy in Vietnam,
identification and division were very much evident.
Describing the scene as a point of reference, Johnson said
"Vietnam is far away from this quiet campus."
is "dirty and brutal and difficult."

The war there

Some four hundred men,

"born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and
promise, have ended their lives on Vietnam's steaming soil."
Division is evident in the hierarchy in that Vietnam is "far
away," "dirty and brutal and difficult," and has "steaming
soil" while America is "quiet" and "bursting with
opportunity and promise."
While the scenery depicts division, Johnson identified
the agents involved in the hierarchy.

For the first time

since the early days of his administration, the South
Vietnamese are introduced into the world hierarchy.

At the

time of the Tonkin raids, the South Vietnamese were not even
a concern of the President's.

"Tonight Americans and Asians

are dying for a world where each people may choose its own
path to change," Johnson said.

Further, they are both

fighting for the principle "for which our ancestors fought
in the valleys of Pennsylvania" and "for which our sons
fight tonight in the jungles of Vietnam."

Thus, even though
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Vietnam is "far away," agents and principle identify them as
one near the top of the peace-aggression hierarchy.

Both

Asians and Americans fight side-by-side, according to
Johnson "because we must fight if we are to live in a world
where every country can shape its own destiny."

Not only

was "democracy," a related term associated with "peace,"
necessary, but America's own "freedom" was at stake also.
Johnson's identification of Americans with South
Vietnamese was the result of a twentieth century movement to
equate America's prosperity with the well being of the rest
of the world.

In the wake of the attack on Pleiku, Johnson

reflected his personal inheritance of, what Karnow calls,
the "mythology of the Alamo, where Texas boys had "fought
for freedom."

Writing in his college newspaper in 1927, the

young Lyndon Johnson said it was necessary for the United
States to "make the world safe for democracy."44
Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, Eric
Goldman says this paternalistic trend was accepted by both
Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives and
eventually, took on the case of a law of history.

"Human

beings everywhere, the law ran, sought peace and
democracy,"45 the same values Johnson said Americans and
Asians fought for on Vietnam's steaming soil.
With the crowning glory of a World War II victory under
its belt, America's pragmatic optimism reached an all time
high.

It was during this period that Johnson's unlimited

belief in action, pragmatism, the can-do man in the can-do
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country, had its genesis.

"We in America are the fortunate

children of fate," he said in 1946 and went on to infer that
the United States had the ability and the obligation to
share this fortune with the rest of the world.
From almost any viewpoint ours is the greatest
nation; the greatest in material wealth, in goods
and produce, in abundance of the things that make
life easier and more pleasant . . . Nearly every
other people are prostrate and helpless.

They

look to us for help— for that inherent courageous
leadership. . . . If we have excuse for being,
that excuse is that through our efforts the world
will be better when we depart than when we
entered.46
That this attitude would be applied to Vietnam was
inevitable.

First the French helped the Vietnamese to

become modern but that ended in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu.
Surely, the can-do Americans could succeed where the French
failed.

The law of history was on the American side.

In a

cable from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to McGeorge Bundy on
October 31, 1963, American paternalism was very much
evident.

The United States, Lodge said, was trying "to

bring this medieval country into the 20th Century and . . .
we have made considerable progress in military and economic
ways but to gain victory we must also bring them into the
20th Century politically.47

Three weeks later, Lodge told
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the new President that very difficult decisions would have
to be made regarding Vietnam and Johnson, the pragmatic
President during the American century, replied, "I am not
going to lose Vietnam.

I am not going to be the President

who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went."48
The bond thus complete, America and South Vietnam could
not be parted.

With the purging of political "doubters"

from the Johnson Administration (another act of
identification within a different hierarchy), the American
commitment would remain military and economic.

That

Americans and Asians would die together for "principles" in
the "jungles of Vietnam," was entirely predictable.
While identification takes place across the "mysteries"
of the hierarchy, division is also necessary.

At Johns

Hopkins, Johnson hinted at this in saying that "the
infirmities of man are such that force must often precede
reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace."

The

sources of "infirmities," "force," and "the waste of war"
were to be found in what Johnson called "the world as it
is."

The President defined hierarchic division at first

from a scenic perspective.

"The world as it is in Asia is

not a serene or peaceful place," said the President.
Regarding the agents involved, Johnson said, "The first
reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent
nation of South Vietnam," he said, and that "trained men and
supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from
north to south."

Such support, Johnson said, "is the
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heartbeat of the war . . . a war of unparalleled brutality."
Already obvious division existed between the "peace,"
"quiet," and "opportunity and promise" of America and the
"trained men and supplies, orders and arms," and
"unparalleled brutality" of the North Vietnamese in a place
%

that is not "serene or peaceful."
If the United States and South Vietnam are
"identified," though, there must be division between North
and South Vietnam.

In this demarcation, Johnson pitted the

quality of South Vietnamese agents against the acts of the
North Vietnamese.

Here, the information Johnson received

regarding Vietcong atrocities after the attack at Qui Nhon
is evident.4®
Simple farmers are the targets of assassination
and kidnapping.

Women and children are strangled

in the night because their men are loyal to their
government.

And helpless villages are ravaged by

sneak attacks.

Large-scale raids are conducted on

towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.
Johnson continued to draw clear lines of division
within the world hierarchy with the announcement of "another
reality."

North Vietnam, the President said, was the "new

face of an old enemy" and identified the North with "the
deepening shadow of Communist China" in much the same way he
associated South Vietnam with the United States.

"The

rulers in Hanoi," Johnson pointed out, "are urged on by
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Peking."

Peking, in turn, had "destroyed freedom in Tibet,"

"attacked India," "has been condemned by the United Nations
for aggression in Korea," and has helped "the forces of
violence in almost every continent."

"The contest in

Vietnam," the President concluded, "is part of a wider
pattern of aggressive purposes."
Other verbal cues Johnson gave to division within the
world hierarchy included the "small and brave nation" of
South Vietnam.

America, meanwhile, had the objective of

"independence" and "freedom."

We used "prayerful judgment"

and had "patience as well as bravery."

The United States

fought for "values and we fight for principles" which was
the "only path for reasonable men."

The North Vietnamese,

meanwhile, were "bound to dominate all Southeast Asia."
They fought for "territory and colonies" and were
"unreasonable."
To sum up, Johnson defined the world hierarchy with one
principal division between the identified entities of
America and South Vietnam and an identified enemy consisting
of North Vietnam and China.

No longer was this the limited

conflict of Tonkin between the U.S. and the North
Vietnamese.

Johnson placed the U.S./South Vietnamese

partnership high on the hierarchy near the god-term of
"peace" and its correlative "freedom."

The resulting bond

had "opportunity and promise," was "independent," "loyal,"
"brave," "prayerful," "reasonable," and at times, "small"
and "helpless."

The President placed the North
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Vietnamese/Chinese entity near the bottom of the hierarchy
in association with the devil-term of "aggression."

In

addition, these agents were "dirty and brutal and
difficult," who "attacked," "destroyed freedom," and helped
"the forces of violence" through "assassination and
kidnapping."

They "strangled," launched "sneak attacks,"

and "large-scale raids," with "terror."

Johnson further

contrasted the "forces of violence" with "simple farmers"
and "helpless villagers."
further symbolize the gap.

Light and dark were used to
"The deepening shadow of

Communist China" supported forces which "strangle in the
night" but the United States supported a "bright and
necessary day of peace."
Illusion vs. Reality:

Hierarchic Abstraction

President Johnson seemed to have drawn the lines of the
world hierarchy clearly at Johns Hopkins.

Yet, he said the

conflict had a "confused nature," a state of confusion that
Johnson quickly brought into focus as the "new face of an
old enemy."

Whatever confusion existed in the mind of

Lyndon Johnson or in American policy toward Vietnam, was
explained away with the use of this generalization or
abstraction.

Communists were communists whether they were

from Moscow or Peking.

If they further shared skin color

and eye shape, all the more reason to believe in the
communist monolith and a North Vietnamese/Chinese alliance.
If Johnson identified the United States with South Vietnam,
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finally, all the more reason to believe in a falling domino
hierarchy.
Whenever abstraction or generalization is put into use,
however, a danger exists.
according to Burke.

"Orientation can go wrong,"

"Consider, for instance, what conquest

over the environment we have attained through our powers of
abstraction, of generalization; and then consider the stupid
national or racial wars which have been fought precisely
because these abstractions were mistaken for r e a l i t i e s . "50
The "realities" Johnson utilized in the construction of
a world hierarchy in the speech were indeed abstractions
mistaken for reality.

As mentioned above, Johnson and the

contemporaries of his generation assumed a law of history to
be taking shape in the aftermath of World War II.

The

United States was the most powerful and most abundant nation
on the face of the earth and the law of history dictated
that the country should share its power and abundance with
nations less privileged— helping them to become more modern,
more democratic, more middle-class.
One particular repercussion of this orientation was the
tendency on the part of American policy-makers to over
abstract, over-generalize, to see the rest of the world
through red, white, and blue lenses, as potential Americas
with American values.

Such was the case with South Vietnam,

a paradigm of over-generalization.

President Johnson tried

to portray that "damn little piss-ant country" as American
as possible so as to justify the maintenance of the
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hierarchy.

However, the realities of South Vietnamese

society differed from Johnson's abstractions.

The rural

population simply was not as anti-communist as the Johnson
Administration was.

It came to resent the presence and

force unleashed by the American marines more than it feared
the enemy it was supposedly being saved from.51
The South Vietnamese government and armed forces, with
whom Americans had the most contact and who were allegedly
the "most Western," did not live up to Johnson's
identification either.

Their society, according to

Halberstam, who served as a New York Times correspondent in
Saigon, was a "corrupted, cynical society where the bribe,
the lie, the decadence had become a way of life, where
Vietnamese officers lied frequently and readily to their
American counterparts, thinking this was what the Americans
wanted, surprised later that the Americans should feel a
minor betrayal in this."52
That South Vietnamese officials behaved this way is not
surprising in that the Americans in Saigon differed from the
President's portrayal as well.

The good American official

was a solid anti-communist and, above all, a pragmatist.
They were told not to consider the opposition, not to think
of alternatives, but rather to get the job done, that was
what the Administration wanted.53

The South Vietnamese

bureaucrat thus followed the example of his American
counterpart.

Still, officials in Washington pictured them

both as perfected "freedom fighters," "defenders of
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democracy."

In the words of John Stroessinger, "they simply

superimposed their own misperceptions on Asian realities."54
Johnson's personal misperceptions had their root in the
Texas hill country where he grew up.

As a child, Johnson

spent long, summer evenings listening to his grandfather
tell stories of the cattle drives of the frontier days.
From such tales, says Kearns, Johnson formed his perceptions
of what constituted manhood and success— -models he would
carry with him the rest of his life.55
The conflict in South Vietnam thus presented Johnson
with a challenge that was not unlike the challenges of the
cattle drives on the Texas frontier.

Just as the cowboys

risked life and limb for the loved ones back home, Johnson
too would put himself on the line for the "simple farmers"
and "helpless villagers" in South Vietnam and protect the
freedom of those back home in the states.

According to

Stroessinger, this perception of a "personal challenge" made
Johnson's approach to Vietnam unique.

"He saw himself,

Western-style, locked in a shoot-out with Ho Chi Minh."5^
Once, the President went as far as to tell press secretary
Pierre Salinger to develop an image of himself as a tall,
tough Texan in the saddle, believing, according to
Halberstam, in all those old John Wayne movies.57
In addition, Johnson's perceptions of the North
Vietnamese fit very well into his experience with minorities
back home.

The President felt secure in dealing with people

like Ho Chi Minh.

He knew something about these kind of
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people, he told others.
Texas.

They were like the Mexicans back in

They were alright, "but if you didn't watch, they'll

come right into your yard and take it over if you let them.
And the next day they'll be right on your porch, barefoot
and weighing one hundred and thirty pounds, and they'll take
that too.

And the day after that, they'll be in your

bedroom raping your wife."

If one thing worked with these

people, though, it was force.

"If you say to 'em right at

the start, 'Hold on, just wait a minute,' they'll know
they're dealing with someone who'll stand up.
that you can get along fine."5**

And after

in other words, America had

to "stand firm" in Vietnam.
Because all these illusions and misperceptions found
their way into the American hierarchic concept of the
Vietnam conflict, the results in reality were unexpected.
Since the United States officials in Saigon and Washington
were more desperately anti-communist than either the
peasants or the South Vietnamese rulers, America was much
more willing to prop up illegitimate South Vietnamese
governments and hold the line against communism.

"Like a

heroine in an eighteenth-century novel who got her way by
fainting if anyone spoke crossly," wrote George Ball in
retrospect, each provisional government knew how to
manipulate the American trust in anyone who opposed
communism.

"If we demanded anything significant of it, it

would collapse; so we never made any serious demands."5®
other words, while American officials expected the South
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Vietnamese to act like the American of his word, they never
demanded that they do so.

As a result, the United States

was constantly in danger of becoming a "puppet of our
puppet."®0

For all the effort expended to maintain the

world hierarchy as it was, our own efforts habitually
threatened to place South Vietnam above the United States on
a hierarchy of decision-making.
The Dream of World Order:

Phase II

Another result of the Johnson Administration's tendency
to see the rest of the world through American lenses found
its way into the Johns Hopkins address as the much needed
alternative to bombing that Johnson had been looking for.
"This war, like most wars," Johnson admitted half-way
through the speech, "is filled with terrible irony."

That

the United States was in danger of becoming a "puppet of its
puppet" was indeed an irony existing in the United States'
relationship with South Vietnam.

A more complex irony,

however, prevailed in Johnson's relations with the North
Vietnamese.
When bombing failed to bring North Vietnam to the
conference table and maintain order and control in the world
hierarchy, Lyndon Johnson reached out through his
abstractions and illusions to "identify" with the enemy and
the enemy with the South Vietnamese.

"What do the people of

North Vietnam want?" asked the President.
their neighbors also desire:

"They want what

food for their hunger; health
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for their bodies; a chance to learn; progress for their
country; and an end to the bondage of material misery."

All

of this, Johnson said, the enemy could find in "peaceful
association with others" rather than "in the endless course
of battle."

In other words, if the North Vietnamese ceased

aggression and adhered to America's peaceful, hierarchic
view of the world, they could have anything the United
States had to offer.
This ironic identification with a communist nation was
still another manifestation of the law of history.

Johnson

once told Kearns that he was persuaded the people of the
world had no grievances against one another.

"The hopes and

desires of a man who tills the soil are about the same
whether he lives on the banks of the Colorado or on the
banks of the Danube."61

As far as Southeast Asia was

concerned, the President had always found it "greatly
appealing," probably because its impoverished, rural areas
reminded him of the Texas hill country.

"You can sense how

these people feel," he remarked following a visit to a
Vietnam village in 1961.
d0 ."62

"They want the same things we

These desires included "not a big debate on

fundamental issues; he wants a little medical care, a rug on
the floor, a picture on the wall, a little music in the
house, and a place to take Molly and the grandchildren when
he retires."63

Under the law of history, this translated

into the American duty to help feed the needy, educate them,
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convert them, in Goldman's words, "nudge them along toward
the middle-class life."64
"The American people have helped generously in times
past in these works," Johnson said at Johns Hopkins.

"Now

there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life
of man in that conflict-torn corner of the world."

The

first requirement of this effort, according to the
President, was "cooperation" or a proposed identification of
all members of the world hierarchy:
The first step is for the countries of southeast
Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded
cooperative effort for development.

We would hope

that North Vietnam would take its place in the
common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation
is possible.

. . . And I would hope tonight that

the Secretary General of the United Nations could
use the prestige of his great office, and his deep
knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as soon as
possible, with the countries of that area, a plan
for cooperation in increased development.
As far as the United States was concerned, Johnson announced
that heplanned to askCongress "to join in a

billion dollar

American investment in this effort as soon as it is
underway."

The President also said he intended "to expand

and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses
to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia."
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help facilitate this program, Johnson announced that he
would shortly "name a special team of outstanding,
patriotic, distinguished Americans . . .

headed by Mr.

Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World
Bank."

In addition, the President hoped "that all other

industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will
join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror
with progress."
The objective of this proposal, of course, was
hierarchic order or "peace."

Lamenting that the earth "will

be a disorderly planet for a long time," Johnson recognized
North Vietnam's rejection of the world hierarchy in saying
that "the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways
and uprooting ancient civilizations" and that "for centuries
nations have struggled among each other."
Against such a backdrop, Johnson candidly reveals his
intentions as those of an entire generation.

"Our

generation has a dream," said the President.

"It is a very

old dream.

But we have the power and now we have the

opportunity to make that dream come true."

The "dream"

Johnson spoke of was the dream of hierarchic order:
We dream of a world where disputes are settled by
law and

reason.

And we will try to make it so.

.

. . We dream of an end to war.

And we will try to

make it

so. . .. W e dream of a

world where all

are fed

and charged with hope.

And we will help
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to make it so.
When Operation Rolling Thunder failed to maintain order
in Southeast Asia, then, President Johnson reevaluated his
hierarchic perspective of the conflict.

Still viewing the

situation with abstractions, illusions, and misperceptions,
Johnson decided that by identifying all the divisive
elements with one common denominator (economic development),
the same ends could be achieved:

order or control of the

hierarchy.
Mortification and the Rebirth of World Peace
By identifying the North Vietnamese people with the
South Vietnamese and calling for all members of the world
hierarchy to join together in a cooperative effort, Johnson
sought the redemption of his policy toward Vietnam.

The use

of force had failed to maintain order and peace and the
President further rejected his own hierarchy by proposing
the international cooperative effort.
Johnson purged the guilt resulting from these actions
in much the same way as he had in the Syracuse University
speech following the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The

President transferred the burden of peace, which he said the
United States had "continued responsibility" for, to the
North Vietnamese scapegoats once again.

Acknowledging that

the "air attacks" will not accomplish all of America's
purposes and that "it is our best and prayerful judgment
that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace,"
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Johnson said a "swift" peace was "in the hands of others
besides ourselves."

The following day, a New York Times

editorial made the transferal of this burden legitimate in
saying neither the communist countries nor anyone else could
"dispute the fact that a serious offer for peace has been
made.

It is now clearly up to them to make a reasonable

response."65
As far as the burden of cooperation was concerned,
though, President Johnson turned to mortification as a means
of purging guilt.

Mortification, unlike victimage according

to Burke, "is a scrupulous and deliberate clamping of
limitation upon the self."66

At Johns Hopkins, the

President’s limitation took the form of total self sacrifice
for the goal of world cooperation and peace."Every night
before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this
question," the President said.
I can do to unite this country?

"Have I done
Have I done

everything that
everything I

can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope
to all the peoples of the world?

Have I done enough?"

Johnson encouraged his staff members as well to
sacrifice themselves for the cause in Vietnam.

As early as

November, 1963, the President spoke to the Vietnam policy
planners from the Department of State, many of whom he would
soon ignore under the dictums of the new negative.

"And

before you go to bed at night I want you to do one thing for
me," Johnson said, sending cold chills into a few of the
doubters working under Averell Harriman.

"Ask yourself one
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question . . . "

In Halberstann's depiction of the scene,

Johnson paused and then said slowly, each word a sentence:
"What have I done for Vietnam today?1167
Having sacrificed himself and his Administration, the
President sought a national rebirth by presenting the
country with a list of choices.

Here, Johnson returned to

the scapegoat as a means of purification by contrasting
American and North Vietnamese actions.

With the judgment of

the apocalypse seemingly awaiting America's decision,
Johnson said this generation "may well be living in the time
foretold many years ago when it was said:

'I call heaven

and earth to record this day against you, that I have set
before you life and death, blessing and cursing:

therefore

choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

His

generation of the world, Johnson said knowing how his
audience would respond, must choose between acts of
aggression and acts of peace:
aid, hate or understand."

"destroy or build, kill or

With only one logical option

among those listed, Johnson joined with the rest of the
nation by concluding in the rhetoric of rebirth, "Well, we
will choose life."

By taking this course, the President

said Americans would achieve universal identification within
the hierarchy by prevailing "over the enemies within man,
and over the natural enemies of all mankind."
Enthusiasm for the speech was evident in many quarters.
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who had begun to
question the Administration's bombing policy, found

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

179

Johnson's address a "profoundly moving and constructive
statement which reveals both the great strength of President
Johnson's resolve and his deep concern for the welfare of
all people."

Emphasizing South Vietnam's identification

with America and associated god-terms, Mansfield said
further that "the door is open to a bona fide settlement
which will permit the people of Vietnam to live in peace and
freedom."®®

Speaker of the House John McCormack responded

to the President's call for the cooperative development
program.

"All the free world can well be proud of President

Johnson's forthright speech, for he has offered to all the
brotherhood of man and the recognition of human dignity."69
The day following the speech, the New York Times voiced
approval of Johnson's offer for "unconditional discussions"
with an editorial entitled, "The President Opens the Door."
Saying that "President Johnson last night projected an
American policy on Vietnam in which the country can take
pride," the editors claimed Johnson "has accepted the
concept of ultimate American military withdrawal and of an
independent South Vietnam that would be neutral and yet free
to seek outside assistance if threatened."70
Indications of public approval poured into the White
House mail room as well.

In the four days prior to the

address, Johnson received two thousand letters, 304
telegrams, and 208 postcards running at an average of five
to one against the President's policies in Vietnam.

In the

five days after delivery at Johns Hopkins, the White House
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received approximately 789 letters and 559 telegrams with a
four to one ratio in favor of the Administration policy.^1
International opinion praised the President's
proposals.

The speech received a warm welcome from

America's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
including France.

One source in Paris said Johnson had

finally followed the policy recommended by President de
Gaulle as long ago as August, 19 6 3 .

The Canadian

Government, whose Prime Minister Pearson had called for a
bombing pause a week before the speech, offered to play a
"full part" in Johnson's international development effort.
"Canadians were generally enthusiastic about the speech,"
reported the New York Times, "and took some of the credit
for having helped to shape Mr. Johnson's course of
action.
Seemingly, the President had achieved what he set out
to do at Johns Hopkins:

to redeem his policies regarding

Vietnam by quieting his critics and obtaining more support
for the air war by offering to participate in "unconditional
discussions" and by identifying all the divisive elements
within the world hierarchy.

The euphoria of rebirth did not

last, however.
The Carrot and the Stick:
Same Agency, Same Purpose, Same Result
According to Evans and Novak, "Peace Without Conquest"
had a haphazard pattern that was disturbing and that "would
mark future policy initiatives in the President's desperate

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

181

search for a solution to Vietnam."7^

While initial reaction

to the speech was favorable, the disturbing aspects of the
speech became more apparent as responses started to trickle
in from the communist bloc.
The Chinese claimed that Johnson's speech was "full of
lies and deceptions" and that his offer of peace
negotiations was a trick.75

Partially, this response was

due to Johnson's reaction to peace overtures in the past.
The President historically took a negative view of
negotiations for negotiations meant defeat.

Each time the

U.S. Government had been faced with the possibility of
negotiating with the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese during
his Presidency, Johnson responded with the requirement that
aggression had to cease prior to discussion and, in turn,
raised the level of killing in Vietnam.76
The Chinese communists responded further in saying the
offer was a move to force Hanoi to negotiate for peace on
United States terms.77

According to the Pentagon Papers,

the Chinese were correct in their assumption because of
Johnson's unusual expression of the secrecy motive.

The

speech, says the analyst, masked unstated conditions for
peace that "were not 'compromise' terms, but more akin to
'cease and desist' order that, from the DRV/VC [North
Vietnamese and Vietcong] point of view, was tantamount to a
demand for their surrender."76

As North Vietnamese diplomat

May Van Bo put it, "In the present circumstances, to
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negotiate would signify capitulation."^

Ironically, the

enemy viewed negotiation the same way Johnson did.
In the swirl of hopeful talk of "negotiations"
following the speech, Johnson's actual words had gotten
lost.

The President had never offered to "negotiate."

offer was for "unconditional discussions."

His

Just as he had

diffused the Panamanian crisis a year before, Johnson's
offer for discussions promised only to talk, not to reach a
settlement that the term "negotiation" implied.8®

Besides,

knowing that the North Vietnamese were winning the war and
that discussions or negotiations meant only capitulation,
Johnson felt that the enemy would refuse to do so.
Confiding with members of his staff at the time, Johnson
admitted use of the secrecy motive, saying, "If I were Ho
Chi Minh, I would never negotiate."8!
China's response to the speech uncovered yet another
disturbance hidden by President Johnson's secrecy.

"While

the United States trumpets peace by word of mouth," they
said, "it is actually pushing on with preparations for
expansion of the war."8^

in addition, Hanoi claimed that

Washington was using the "peace" label to conceal its
aggression and the development program as a "carrot" to
offset the "stick" of aggression.83

Filled with such

phrases as "we will do only what is necessary" and "it
became necessary to us to increase our response and to make
attacks by air," the Johns Hopkins speech gave the public
the impression that only the American air war continued in
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Vietnam.

In reality, however, ground troops had already

landed on the beaches near Danang and more were on the way.
In late February, General William Childs Westmoreland,
commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam had requested two marine
battalions to protect the American air base at Danang from
which many of the Rolling Thunder missions were initiated.
On February 26, with a minimum of debate, President Johnson
approved the request and on March 8, 1965, 3500 U.S. marines
splashed ashore at Danang.®4

Although the landing was to be

as low key as possible, the South Vietnamese arranged a
greeting party for the marines.

Grinning Vietnamese girls

draped garlands of flowers around the necks of the soldiers
and displayed a banner proclaiming:

"Welcome to the Gallant

Marines."86
On April 1, six days before the speech at Johns
Hopkins, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor returned to Washington
for high-level discussions on the progress of the war.

At

that time, the President decided to give Westmoreland two
more marine battalions as well as eighteen to twenty
thousand logistical troops.

In addition, Johnson dictated a

change in tactics for the soldiers.

Agreeing with

Westmoreland who argued that "a good offense is the best
defense," the President consented to "search and destroy"
missions in the area around Danang.86
According to George Reedy, Johnson could never trace a
connection between public words and private actions.87

Even

though these decisions marked a radical turn in U.S. policy,
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Johnson claimed in a news conference following the meetings
that he knew "of no far-reaching strategy that is being
suggested or promulgated."

Further, the use of ground

troops was not mentioned in "Peace Without Conquest."
According to National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 328,
the President asked that "premature publicity be avoided by
all possible precautions," thus invoking the secrecy motive
to protect the hierarchy of credibility.
The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly
as practicable, but in ways that should minimize
any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and
official statements on these troop movements will
be made only with the direct approval of the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Secretary of State.

The President's desire is

that these movements and changes should be
understood as being gradual and wholly consistent
with existing policy.®®
With a great deal of irony, again, the Chinese and the
North Vietnamese could have told Americans more about U.S.
military intentions than their own President, criticizing
the Johnson speech as "full of lies and deceptions."

As

members of more primitive societies, the Asians likely
viewed behavior as more credible than words.

The North

Vietnamese knew of U.S. troop movements while the American
public did not.

On the day following the speech, North
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Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong reacted with his famous
"Four Points," which enunciated the requirement of American
evacuation before peace talks could begin.®9

Further, the

enemy viewed the acts of benevolence that Johnson found
"impressive" with a great deal of distrust.
In the preceding cluster analysis of Johnson's
speeches, "power" or "the wise application of modern
technology" was found to be a primary means of achieving
both "peace" and for "standing firm" in Vietnam.

When the

"stick" of Rolling Thunder failed, President Johnson turned
to the "carrot" of his American billion dollar investment.
Ironically, both shared a common goal (peace and order) and
a common means:

America's big technology.

According to Johnson, the use of technology as a carrot
could "replace despair with hope, and terror with progress"
and there was much to be done.

Linking the pathos of

Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal to Vietnam, the President
said, "A dam built across a great river is impressive" and
"the vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power
on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA."

Further, the

technological "wonders of modern medicine can be spread
through villages where thousands die each year from lack of
care."

Schools could be built in order to "manage the

process of development" and that "the sight of healthy
children in a classroom is impressive."
In a testament to Johnson's personal hierarchic
illusions, the President cited as evidence the vital role
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technology played in the development of the Texas hill
country.
In the countryside where I was born, and where I
live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the
kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once
the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held
sway.

And all this happened because electricity

came to our area along the humming wires of the
REA.

Electrification of the countryside— yes,

that, too, is impressive.
On the one hand, the offering of such "carrots" to the
North Vietnamese can be seen as acts meant to redeem the
President in the eyes of the enemy and the American public
and to transfer the burden of peace onto the Vietnamese.
According to Doris Kearns, Johnson was never an anonymous
donor.

"Rather, his was a most visible benevolence which

reminded recipients at every turn of how much he had done
for them."

Giving, and therefore the offer of technological

"carrots," "was a necessary part of a mission to reform,
reshape, and thereby redeem."90
On the other hand, Johnson's extension of American
technology to Vietnam is exemplary of Burke's conception of
"entelechy."

Again, entelechy is the principle of

perfection by which all members of a certain class define
themselves.

"Man's entelechy is technology," says Burke in

that man redefines and tries to perfect himself through his
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own machines.

At a certain point, however, Burke concludes

that man becomes "rotten with perfection," his machines so
perfected that they rot and destroy him.®2- At such a point,
technology is ironic.
The turning point of "Peace Without Conquest" occurred
after the President had redefined world hierarchy and before
the offer of economic development to Southeast Asia.

"This

war, like most wars," Johnson said, "is filled with terrible
irony."

The President then differentiated between the

technology of the carrot, which the American nation believed
to be "impressive," and the power of the stick, which he
considered to be "witness to human folly."

"The guns and

the bombs, the rockets and the warships," he said, "are all
symbols to human failure."

So impressed was Johnson with

his offering of "good" technology to the needy of Southeast
Asia, on the helicopter flying back to Washington following
the speech, the President leaned over and patted Bill
Moyers' knee, saying, "Old Ho can't turn that down.

Old Ho

can't turn that down."®2
Ho Chi Minh turned it down.

While impressive to Lyndon

Johnson, the promise of electricity not only illuminated the
night and heated kitchens in east Texas but also carried his
words around the world.

The electric speed by which

Johnson's speech brought world-wide social and political
concerns together, in the words of Marshall McLuhan,
"heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense
degree."®2

In Vietnam, the President's words only created
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more tension, though, more anxiety toward western influence.
Throughout the address, Johnson had portrayed the Vietnamese
as unreasonable, underdeveloped, and unschooled.

When

electronic messages bring together East and West, the non
literate with the literate, and the irrational with the
rational, the results are explosive.

"The mere existence of

a literate and industrial West," says McLuhan, "appears
quite naturally as dire aggression to non-literate
societies."94
Coupled with the rhetorically oriented "cold war," the
North Vietnamese likely viewed all American machines and
promises of technological development as weapons of
invasion.

As the President made Ho Chi Minh an offer he

could not possibly refuse, the entelechial principle carried
technology, in Burke's words, "to the end of the line" in
Vietnam.

To Johnson, "a dam built across a great river is

impressive."

To Ho Chi Minh, however, the same dam

represented an act of war.

As Johnson spoke, American

marines carried out the logistics of NSAM 328 including an
intensification of the air war.

The President's

"electrification of the countryside" certainly impressed the
North Vietnamese in that it came in the form of B-52 bombers
instead of by "humming wires."

The distrust Johnson

suffered with the Vietnamese as a result of his deceptions
gives credence, in retrospect, to Prime Minister Pearson's
urgings for a bombing halt to induce negotiations.
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Irony and the "Arrogance of Power"
President Johnson's policy of the "carrot" and the
"stick" was thus doomed to failure before its unveiling.
The presence of "terrible irony" presented Johnson with the
unique opportunity to identify with Ho Chi Minh, to form a
cooperative effort among the world hierarchy, and to bring
the opposing forces together for "unconditional discussions"
and ultimately, peace.
The failure to take advantage of these ironic
conditions can be found in Lyndon Johnson's lifelong
attitude toward public speaking.

"The difficulty," says

George Reedy, "was his inability to see a public speech as
anything other than a crowd pleaser."^5

At the beginning of

this analysis, Johnson's preoccupation with a new negative
was noted and that "thou-shall-not criticize the President"
had taken priority over "thou-shall-not attack the United
States."

Johnson failed to achieve the lofty goals of the

Johns Hopkins speech because he never intended to.

To

understand this, a closer look at the concept of irony is
needed.
Irony is a technique which deals with opposites.
Johnson's terminology at the beginning of the speech clearly
demarcated two opposing viewpoints in his hierarchy of
reality.

"True irony, humble irony," Burke says however,

"is based upon a sense of fundamental kinship with the
enemy, as one needs him, is indebted to him, is not merely
outside him as an observer but contains him within, being

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

190

consubstantial with him."®®

In irony there is

identification whereby diametrically opposed forces can be
brought together into a state of oneness.
needed Minh as much as he opposed him.

Johnson thus

By identifying with

Ho Chi Minh, by identifying South Vietnam with North
Vietnam, and by urging the members of the world hierarchy to
join together in a cooperative development program, the
burden of peace could be easily unloaded on the North
Vietnamese when they refused America's technology,
cooperation in the development program, and a part in
"unconditional discussions."
words:

Remember the President's

"If I were Ho Chi Minh, I would never negotiate."

Further, by expecting the communists to refuse such
"crowd pleasing" offers, Johnson portrayed himself as a
mortified martyr, transferred the burden of credibility onto
his critics, and diffused dissent against his Vietnam
policies.

Every night, before he turned out the lights,

Johnson asked himself if he had done everything he could to
"bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world."

He

also told his audience tc a.'k themselves the same question.
If they did, they would think of their President, doing all
he could.

He had tried his best to bring the North

Vietnamese to the conference table.

He had offered them a

billion dollars and all the marvelous technology America had
to offer.

Yet, they had responded, as Johnson said ten days

later, with "tired names and slogans," and "a refusal to
talk."
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As President Johnson failed to achieve the peaceful
objectives of "Peace Without Conquest," he would also
continue to fail in his military goals as well.
was the same:

The reason

the inability to fully understand the

"terrible irony" inherent in his contest with Ho Chi Minh.
"True irony, however, irony that really does justify the
attribute of 'humility,’" according to Burke, "is not
'superior' to the enemy."97

In his instinct to personalize

the war in Vietnam, President Johnson thought he could
achieve a certain political victory over Ho.

In

Halberstam's words, the President thought he could "find
Ho's price, Ho's weakness, whether it was through bombing
the North or through threatening to use troops and then
offering Ho a lollipop, massive economic aid and regional
development, a Mekong River Delta development project."98
Johnson thought he could give Ho Chi Minh "the treatment" as
he gave it to senators and bureaucrats— standing face to
face, imploring, cajoling, flattering, maybe threatening,
putting the squeeze on him, touching him up a little bit,
squeezing his small, thin arms with his massive hands— then
Ho would see the light.
Exemplary of the basic hierarchic illusion regarding
the Vietnamese, Johnson thought he could meet Minh on
American terms.

This was a grave mistake for it implied

what Stroessinger calls, "the strategy of the strong against
the weak."99

By offering Ho Chi Minh massive economic

development, the President offered the North Vietnamese the
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avoidance of pain, death, and material destruction.

Such

was a logical strategy for someone who feared pain, loved
life, and owned a ranch in southeast Texas.

For the first

time in his life, though, Lyndon Johnson dealt with a true
revolutionary, someone who could withstand pain, being
"touched up," someone who was willing to die for his cause,
and who did not care about "a little medical care, a rug on
the floor, a picture on the wall, a little music in the
house, and a place to take Molly and the grandchildren when
he retires."
Such a person was beyond Johnson's comprehension.
Chi Minh appreciated and took advantage of irony.

Ho

He

shunned monuments, military uniforms, general's stars, and
always preferred his simple tunic— the "black pajamas" that
LBJ made fun of.

H o ’s tunic was symbolic of his

appreciation for irony, for it allowed the person at the top
of the North Vietnamese social hierarchy to walk humbly
among the peasants, his own people.^®®
In their own arrogance, Johnson and his American
advisers fully expected the Vietnamese to roll over and die
once the American soldier took the field.

With all their

technological firepower, their helicopters, their air
support, their napalm, their dams, their schools, their
hospitals, and "electrification of the countryside," the
North Vietnamese would have to cave in.
that down," Johnson said.

"Old Ho can't turn

Ho Chi Minh turned it down and in
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the ultimate irony of all, turned world hierarchy upside
down.
Conclusion
"Peace Without Conquest" was by far President Johnson's
most important statement on the war in Vietnam to date.

The

analysis above reveals a tormented Johnson who sought to
relieve domestic criticism while escalating the military war
at the same time.

Viewing the speech as a rhetoric of

rebirth, the following conclusions can be made.
1.

A new negative emerged in Johnson's Johns Hopkins

address.

The President's attempt to quell domestic

criticism had become a priority by April, 1965 and was
Johnson's primary purpose in giving the speech.

"Thou-

shall-not attack the United States" became a
justification for the more important "thou-shall-not
criticize the President or his policies."

The primacy

of the new negative was proven by the revelation that
Johnson never thought the North Vietnamese would
negotiate or accept his offers of economic development.
2.

In order to support the new negative, President

Johnson redefined the peace-aggression hierarchy of the
world.

For the first time since early 1964, he

included the South Vietnamese and identified them with
the god-terms of "peace," "democracy," and "freedom"
thus linking them with the United States.

At the same

time, Johnson identified North Vietnam with Communist
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China and associated the two nations with the devilterm of "aggression."

A sharp division between the two

groups constituted the majority of the hierarchy.
3.

A tendency to over generalize caused Johnson and

his Administration to replace the realities of the
conflict in Vietnam with incorrect abstractions.

This

resulted in the practice of viewing the Vietnamese as
Americans and judging them on the basis of American
values.

Since the American military code dictated that

the South Vietnamese subordinates produce results at
any cost, the lie became the norm and the U.S.
intelligence network suffered.

The Administration's

decision-makers thus based many of their actions on
illusions.
4.

Abstractions and illusions within the peace-

aggression hierarchy allowed Johnson to attempt a new
strategy of controlling the war and maintaining order
within both the peace-aggression hierarchy and the
hierarchy of credibility.

When Operation Rolling

Thunder failed to do either, the President offered to
take part in "unconditional discussions," identified
North with South Vietnam based on economic need, and
proposed the identification of all members of the world
hierarchy through cooperation in an economic
development program for Southeast Asia.
5.

In rejecting his own hierarchy, Johnson created a

burden of cooperation.

Through the vehicle of
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mortification, the President transferred this burden
onto the North Vietnamese after explaining that he had
done everything he could to help unite the world.

Once

again, Johnson used the North Vietnamese as scapegoats
for the guilt produced by the burden of peace.
6.

In a rhetoric of rebirth, Johnson offered the

national audience choices between the effects of
aggression and the works of peace— really no choice at
all.

Given the choice between life and death, the

President announced that "we will choose life" and
prevail "over the enemies within man, and over the
natural enemies of all mankind."

This rebirth of

national goals and Presidential policy, though, was
based on Johnson's hierarchic illusions of seeing all
peoples as western or potential Americans.
7.

The concept of "irony" played a central role in

both Johnson's offering of discussions and an economic
plan and their failure to be accepted by the North
Vietnamese.

It was "ironic," first of all that both

Rolling Thunder and the economic development plan
depended on the same agency for success:
technology.

American

Because of this, both plans failed in that

any introduction of western technology into the
primitive Asian culture was seen as aggression.
Secondly, while the "terrible irony" of the war offered
Johnson a chance to permanently redeem himself and his
Administration through negotiations, the President
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failed to take advantage of this unique opportunity.
Johnson chose rather a temporary transfer of burdens to
the enemy through scapegoating.

President Johnson's

hierarchic illusions kept him from seeing Ho Chi Minh
as he really was and the American's own "arrogance of
power" kept him from approaching the conflict with a
sense of "humility" characteristic of any truly
"ironic" situation.
In the end, Lyndon Johnson failed and Ho Chi Minh
triumphed.

The reasons for this failure were first

chronicled in "Peace Without Conquest," thus making it the
President's most important speech of the period.

Johnson,

though, had one more statement to make before the scores of
flag-draped coffins began returning from Southeast Asia and
the tragedy of Vietnam became apparent to the American
public.
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JULY 28, 1965:

A PRESIDENT IN SEARCH OF HIMSELF

"Dear Mr. President:
In my humble way I am writing to you about the
crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam.
My husband served in World War II. Our country was at
war, but now, this time, it is just something that I
don't understand. Why?"*
With this letter, President Lyndon Johnson opened his
press conference on July 28, 1965.

In an attempt to answer

the questions of "a woman in the Midwest," the President
revealed his failure thus far to rally support for his
policies regarding Vietnam.

In April, his concern for a

seventeen nation appeal for negotiations was evident at the
beginning of "Peace Without Conquest."

Now, by giving

primacy to the doubts of the common citizen, concern for his
reputation, evident at Johns Hopkins, had intensified,
rendering the hierarchy of credibility of utmost importance.
In the drama of human relations, according to Rueckert,
all men have their burdens.
are guilt and identity.2

Two principal types of burdens

The ensuing guilt from North

Vietnam's rejection of the world hierarchy and from the
critics' rejection of the hierarchy of credibility has been
discussed.

In turn, Johnson's "burden of credibility,"

produced a "burden of identity"— a continuous struggle to
project himself as a trustworthy President of the United
States at the top of a credible, decision-making hierarchy.
More and more, as Johnson continued to face doubt and
203
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criticism from greater segments of the American society, his
"drama of the self in quest" became more important than the
saving of South Vietnam from communism.

That the defense of

that "small and brave nation" played an integral role in
that quest is unmistakable.

Somehow, Johnson apparently

felt he could find himself or "identify" himself with the
presidency by preventing the loss of South Vietnam, by
standing up to the communists.

Later, the President told

Doris Kearns, in effect, that the maintenance of order in
the hierarchy of credibility depended almost entirely on his
control over the peace-aggression hierarchy.

"Everything I

knew about history told me that if I got out of Vietnam and
let Ho Chi Minh run through the streets of Saigon," he said,
"there would follow in this country an endless national
debate--a mean and disastrous debate, that would shatter my
presidency, kill my administration, and damage our
democracy."3

If South Vietnam fell to the communists,

Johnson would say later in his press conference, "all will
be swept away."
Living in the Past:

Peace-Aggression

In answer to the questions asked in the opening letter,
Johnson said he had already "discussed it fully in Baltimore
in April [the Johns Hopkins speech], in Washington in May,
in San Francisco in June."

As if repeating the same

justifications would work, the President chose the authority
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of the scene to make his points saying, "Let me again, now,
discuss it here in the East Room of the White House."
As noted in chapter five, Johnson returned to the world
hierarchy of the past to define the requirements of a
"lasting peace" at the time of the Tonkin Gulf attacks.

In

much the same manner, the President looked to the glories of
his past in an attempt to define himself.

"Three times in

my lifetime, in two World Wars and in Korea," Johnson said,
"Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom."
Applying the lesson of Munich, the President claimed
Americans "have learned at a terrible and a brutal cost that
retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring
peace."
Instead of addressing public doubts and possible
criticism within the hierarchy of credibility, Johnson
restated the question to fit his own purposes, asking, "Why
must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope
and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die
in such a remote and distant place?"

The letter and much of

the criticism at the time dealt with the public's inability
to understand Vietnam policy.

Yet, Johnson answered with

the same ambiguous peace-aggrc-ssion hierarchy on which his
foreign policy and, in his mind, his identity as president,
stood.
As in the past, the President associated the United
States and South Vietnam with the god-term of "peace."
was the lesson that "weakness does not bring peace" that
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brought the United States to Vietnam in the first place,
Johnson said.

America's technological power was "a very

vital shield" and Americans themselves were "the guardians
at the gate."
At the same time, Johnson continued to identify North
Vietnam and China with the devil-term of "aggression."

In

announcing that "this is really war," the President claimed
"it is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by
Communist China."

Their goal was "to conquer the South, to

defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of
communism."

Johnson said this dominion had "growing might"

and "grasping ambition."

This image of hierarchic "growth,"

claimed the President, "would certainly imperil the security
[order or control] of the United States itself."
In keeping with his traditional approach of dealing
with communist "aggression," Johnson chose a typically
American response.

When force did not work at Tonkin or

with Operation Rolling Thunder, the President offered Ho Chi
Minh a "carrot."

When Johnson found out he could not buy

peace in Southeast Asia, he answered once again with
entelechial force— more, bigger, and better.

"I have asked

the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he
needs to meet this mounting aggression," the President said
in his news conference.

"He has told me.

We will meet his

needs."
President Johnson announced that he had ordered the Air
Mobile Division and other forces to Vietnam raising American
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fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men.
men would be sent later.

Additional

Three days earlier the President

had said American success in Vietnam required "power,"
"power on land, power in the air, power wherever it is
necessary.
The entelechial impulse is very much evident in any
military escalation.
"aggression."

This was Johnson's response to

This was the President's way of maintaining

order or control in the peace-aggression hierarchy and of
"finding" himself.

Johnson knew, though, that inherent to

any escalation is a "terrible irony."

In the words of a New

York Times editorial, "the less effective it [escalation]
proves, the more insistent become the demands to do more and
more.
Lyndon Johnson In Quest
Even though Johnson found solace in a vision of himself
as a cold warrior, a flaw appeared in the safety of the
peace-aggression hierarchy and its enforcement.

While the

President claimed that the lesson of Munich had brought the
United States to Vietnam and that Americans had fought for
freedom in three other far off wars, he admitted that the
current struggle was "a different kind of war."

A different

war would have required a different policy or approach.
different policy would have required a different agent or
president.

Since Johnson felt he was dealing with a
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"different kind of war," it is apparent that he had not
really "found" himself in the persona of a cold warrior.
According to Rueckert, the searcher for the self often
"finds what seems to be his proper self, defines himself in
those terms, and begins to act.

It soon becomes apparent,

however, that this is not the true self."6

Given the

importance of Johnson's hierarchy of credibility, his quest
for peace in the peace-aggression hierarchy could not have
left the President at "peace" with himself.
The control and order with which Johnson came away from
his Baltimore speech in April was only temporary.

Following

the North Vietnamese rejection of the "billion dollar
American investment" and offers of "unconditional
discussions," the bombing continued and so did public
dissent.

Within the Administration, only George Ball, Under

Secretary of State, remained to argue forcefully for a U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam.

In a memorandum circulated exactly

one month prior to the President's announced escalation,
Ball stated that the United States could not avoid losing
face before its Asian allies if it negotiated its way out of
Vietnam.

The loss in prestige, Ball claimed, would be of

only short term duration.

Johnson read the memo one weekend

at Camp David and was deeply affected by it.

Ball's "cold

blooded analysis," says Berman, may have even caused the
President to question whether or not to make a major
military commitment to South Vietnam.7
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Other members of the Administration saw Ball's dissent
not as insightful but as a challenge to the President's
credibility.

In order to maintain order in the hierarchy of

his own administration, President Johnson followed the
consensus of the paper trail on his desk which included
recommendations for escalation from the secretary of
defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Westmoreland, and, perhaps most important, Ball's superior,
the secretary of state.®
Ball persisted throughout the month of July, though,
and finally received one last chance to make an appeal
before the President on the twenty-first.

On that day,

Johnson began a week long series of meetings described by
Bill Moyers as "a thorough and penetrating review of the
many facets of the situation in South Vietnam."9

The

discussions, however, resulted from the President's motive
of secrecy.

Receiving great publicity, Johnson used the

conferences, in the words of the New York Times, "to prepare
the country psychologically for a stepped-up United States
military effort in Vietnam."10

Further, the paper said the

meetings were held in an atmosphere of "urgency and
secrecy"11 and that there was "daily official emphasis on
the secrecy by which the President has bound the
participants to reveal no details of the conferences."12
Ultimately, Evans and Novak emphasize the control the
President had over the hierarchy of his administration at
the time.

"Johnson never had been more authoritative, more
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restrained, or more in control of the debate than hs was
during that fateful week."13
Unfortunately, Johnson planned the meetings for the
psychological benefit of himself and his advisers as well—
especially Ball.

The President had sent Secretary of

Defense McNamara to Saigon the previous week for a review of
the American military situation.

On July 17, the secretary

received a cable from his deputy, Cyrus Vance, reporting
that the President had decided to go ahead with General
Westmoreland's request for an additional forty-four
battalions.

On the first day of conferences back in

Washington, representatives from all parts of the
Administration patiently listened to McNamara’s report on
the situation in Vietnam.

Most of them did not know of

Johnson's decision because the President still wanted debate
on the issue--something he felt a president ought to do.
That afternoon, Ball argued for well over an hour for
withdrawal.

His attempts were fruitless, however.

Johnson

merely used the occasion to give the impression that every
alternative had been considered.1^

In the search for

himself, the President wanted everyone to think that he had
patiently listened to all sides.
Dissent continued on Capitol Hill as well during the
summer of 1965.

The White House had been taking soundings

from the Congress as to its response to a major military
commitment.

Most Democratic Senators who did not speak out

in favor of the President, said they did not want to
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encourage any expansion of the war.18

Members of the "peace

bloc" attacked Johnson's policies as vociferously as ever.
"No doubt about it," Senator Wayne Morse said upon hearing
Johnson was to address the nation with his findings of the
policy review, "we are galloping toward a major, massive war
in Asia."I®

An addition to the "peace bloc" most disturbing

to Johnson was that of Senator J. W. Fulbright.

A strong

supporter of Johnson's "Great Society" and a man who ushered
the Southeast Asia Resolution through the Senate, Fulbright
had been a reluctant critic of Vietnam policy.

When the

President sent marines to the Dominican Republic in late
April, the Senator bitterly attacked the action claiming
Johnson had acted on misinformation.

According to Turner,

this marked a breaking point in the relationship and
Fulbright henceforth felt less constrained to criticize the
President's foreign

p o l i c y . ^

The day before the address, Johnson called
congressional leaders to the White House to brief them on
his intentions.

In previous meetings that summer, the

President had been extremely careful to call on the "hawks"
of Capitol Hill first, especially if Senator Mike Mansfield
and Fulbright were there together.18

This way the burden of

proof fell on those who wanted to justify a way out of
Vietnam, rather than a way in.

Again, Johnson fostered the

appearance of listening to all sides.
The Republicans in Congress generally called on the
President with two requests.

Senator Everett Dirksen urged
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the President to give a nationally televised speech on his
findings saying the public should be fully informed as to
the nature of the commitment.

Senator Gerald Ford asked

that Johnson obtain congressional approval before calling up
the reserves.19

Both of these suggestions had been avoided

all summer by the President due to his secrecy motive.

It

was generally felt in the Administration that either a
national address or a decision to activate the reserves
would have set off an intense debate in the Senate damaging
Johnson's domestic support and giving the international
community the impression that the nation did not stand
behind its president.20
Even though the President delivered a nationally
televised speech on July 28, he prepared the Congress and
the general public for what was to come with the publicity
surrounding his policy review.

In addition, Johnson

insisted that the speech take place at mid-day, when the
television audience would be much smaller.

In contrast with

the sixty million that watched his address at Johns Hopkins,
only twenty-eight million viewed the news conference on July
28.21

in an attempt to avcid discussion and subsequent

criticism over the use of reserve forces, Johnson merely
decided not to use them.

"After this past week of

deliberations," the President said in his news conference,
"I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve
units into service now."

By downplaying the announcement

and by sidestepping the opposition, this speech clearly
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lacked the "evangelizing tendency" that Burke says usually
accompanies experiences of rebirth.

Lyndon Johnson was

still clearly searching for himself.
The quest had by this time become a spiraling struggle
and all of Johnson's efforts to avoid criticism and enhance
his own credibility turned into an irony more terrible than
the war itself.

"In deciding not to mobilize the Reserves,

not to seek a congressional resolution or declaration of
national emergency, not to present the program in a prime
time address to Congress or to the nation," Berman points
out, "the president's credibility soon came unraveled."22
In his paranoia to control the hierarchy of credibility, the
secrecy motive eventually negated what order existed.

In

his search for himself, those aspects he had apparently
"found," disappeared and he was left with nothing to hang on
to.
By attempting to be a consensus president, a president
for all the people, Johnson reached up the hierarchy toward
perfection.

The entelechial motive goaded the President to

reach for it all.

Due to what Berman has called Johnson's

"greatest fault as a political leader," the President feared
the loss of his precious domestic legislation if he
emphasized foreign over domestic policy or vice versa.
Instead, says Berman, "he sought a pragmatic guns-and-butter
solution for avoiding what he believed would have surely
been a divisive national debate in order temporarily to
protect his Great Society. "2.3
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Events in Vietnam also contributed to the hierarchic,
spiraling effect of Johnson's quest.

Quoting Emerson,

George Ball warned Johnson that once certain commitments
were made, the United States would not be able to pull out
of Vietnam, saying, "Things are in the saddle and ride
m a n k i n d . "24

to Ball.

Unfortunately, President Johnson did not listen

In March, Johnson had sent "my boys" to protect

"my planes."

By April, he sent more of "my boys" to protect

the "boys" who were already there to protect "my planes."
Late that month, military intelligence confirmed the
presence of a regular North Vietnamese regiment in the
Kontum province and by mid-June, according to the Pentagon
Papers, a "Vietcong summer offensive was in full stride."25
On June 12, another coup toppled the South Vietnamese
Government and on July 1, the Vietcong launched another
mortar attack on the Danang airbase.

Although there were

few casualties, world-wide publicity pointed to the failure
of American technology to stop the aggression and to the
continued vulnerability of American bases.26
In late July, President Johnson found himself back
where he had started in February.

South Vietnam was on the

brink of collapse and something had to be done quickly--in
Washington.
though.

Two glaring exceptions faced the President

Unlike his alternatives in the aftermath of Pleiku

in which Johnson ordered the initiation of Operation Rolling
Thunder, the President did not have the option of "touching
Ho up a bit" with "air action."

That option had failed.
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Secondly, the American casualty list grew daily inducing not
only public nervousness but also Johnson's determination
that their suffering not be in vain.

According to George

Reedy, "this meant that the United States had to 'win' in
order to vindicate its

casualties.

"27

jn other words, the

President felt he had to send "more boys" to atone for the
deaths of "my boys."

Coupled with his "solemn pledge,"

Johnson concluded in his press conference:

"We just cannot

now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave
those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and
repression and murder that would follow."
President Johnson felt not only the pressure of events
and his critics but the judgment of history as well.

On the

day he disposed of George Ball's dissent, the President
reminded his closest advisers that the historians were going
to write books about his and their decisions.

"They are

going to write stories about this like they did in the Bay
of Pigs." Johnson said.

"That is why I want you to think

carefully, very, very carefully about alternatives and
plans."28

Reedy says one of the President's greatest fears

was becoming "the first president ever to lose a war" in
American history.29
Outsiders saw a tormented man in July of 1965, in
search of a policy that would work which, for Johnson,
equaled a search for himself.

"I think that period was the

most anguished I ever saw," said Reedy.

"He wanted to do

anything, anything rather than send more troops."30

The
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morning of the news conference, John Sparkman says Johnson
sought assurance up to the very last minute.

"If I ever saw

a man literally torn to pieces, it was he that morning,"
recounts Sparkman.

"He asked each one— he went around the

fifteen or twenty of us who were there, and said, 'What
would you advise?'"31

Here was the pragmatic president, in

the pragmatic country in the pragmatic century and he could
not maintain control of a "fourth-rate, little piss-ant
country."

As a result, with dissent among members of his

administration, with the numbers of the congressional "peace
bloc" growing by the day, with a skeptical press, with a
steady increase in national bewilderment, with the arrival
of more and more body bags from Vietnam, and with a failing
foreign policy, Lyndon Johnson felt he was no president at
all and in search of himself.
where to start looking.

Further, he did not know

As Johnson told Bill Moyers at the

time, "I feel like a hitchhiker caught in a hailstorm on a
Texas highway.

I can't run.

I can't hide.

And I can't

make it stop."3^
Guilt, Identity, and the Irony of Dying:

"I know them all."

As Lyndon Johnson searched for a workable policy in
Vietnam and thus for a successful presidential role, the
presence of guilt in his opening statement on July 28 was
evident.

Guilt appeared once again in the form of the

burdens of peace and credibility, now no longer separate but
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intertwined and dependent on one another just as their
respective hierarchies had become.
Johnson, in his torment, realized to a certain degree
that the application of himself as a cold warrior would not
be adequate in the summer of 1965.

Given his sensitivity to

criticism and public opinion, something else was needed for
success— at least for the appearance of success.

According

to Rueckert, when the search for the self reaches a point
where the true self is not found in the present persona, "a
gradual, agonizing in-turning" occurs culminating in the
loss of the self.33

The initial steps of this "in-turning"

resulted from the President's burdens of peace and
credibility and materialized in a series of statements which
mixed war with peace, aggression with goodwill, etc.
The burden of peace, of course, was evident in
Johnson's orders to send an additional fifty thousand men to
Vietnam to maintain order within that hierarchy.

The

soldiers were there "to convince the Communists that we
cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power."
In addition, said Johnson, steps were being taken to
"substantially increase" the effort of the South Vietnamese
on the battlefield.
Along side this burden, though, was the burden of
credibility.

While it was necessary to send fifty thousand

troops to Vietnam and increase the monthly draft from
seventeen thousand to thirty-five thousand, Johnson
concluded that "it is not essential to order Reserve units
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into service now," thus avoiding congressional debate.

If

that necessity arose, the President said he would give the
matter "most careful consideration." Since some
congressional members had voiced concern over the expansion
of the war, Johnson sent Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to
the Congress to increase accountability with the "peacebloc."

"I have asked them to be able to answer the

questions of any Member of Congress," Johnson said.
Johnson sought to transfer the burdens of peace and
credibility to the North Vietnamese by mixing the images of
the "battlefield" and the "conference table."

"I have

stated publicly, again and again," the President said,
"America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions
with any government, at any place, at any time."

Johnson

claimed that fifteen efforts had been made with the help of
forty nations throughout the world, "but there had been no
answer" from the communists.

In offering a "carrot" to both

North Vietnam and domestic war critics, the President said
he was ready to discuss North Vietnam's "Four Points," a
peace plan initiated by the communists after the Johns
Hopkins address:

"We are ready to discuss their proposals

and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose
people may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no more
than we fear the battlefield."
While Johnson's offers appeared to be "unconditional,"
the President made it clear that North Vietnam must become
"identified" with the United States before discussions could
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take place.

The enemy first had to realize, like the United

States, that "aggression" was not the answer.

"Once the

Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is
impossible," Johnson said, "then a peaceful solution is
inevitable."

The only way to prove this point to the North

Vietnamese, though, was for the United States to use
aggressive means.
discussions."

War was thus necessary for "unconditional

"We are going to persist," continued the

President, "if persist we must, until death and desolation
have led to the same conference table where others could now
join us at a much smaller cost."
The entelechial motive had once again reached the point
of irony.

Johnson had become "rotten with perfection" in

proposing the use of military aggression in order to attain
peace through negotiation.

To the President, the conference

table depended on the battlefield for its importance just as
Johnson depended on Ho Chi Minh for a scapegoat.

As a

result, the mortification from the deaths of "my boys" on
the battlefields of Vietnam could ritualistically transform
Lyndon Johnson from a cold warrior president to a president
of moderation and restraint, transfer the burden of peace
onto Ho Chi Minh, and the burden of credibility onto his
critics.
The President's "agonizing in-turning" became sharper
in the last section of the speech as mortification took
place resulting in a redefined self and ultimately, rebirth.
By adding what Johnson called "a personal note" to the
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speech, the President drew attention to the personal guest
that the issue of Vietnam had become.

Revealing his

torment, Johnson said he "did not find it easy to send the
flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle."
With every form of victimage, however, whether it be
scapegoating or mortification, a symbolic sacrifice is
involved.

Johnson, the cold warrior, could symbolically die

alongside "his boys" in Vietnam if he could "identify"
closely with them.

Even though a major portion of the

President's speech dealt with the divisions of the peaceaggression hierarchy, Johnson linked himself with the
soldiers in order to become a president of restraint and
bring together the divisions of the hierarchy of
credibility.
I have spoken to you today of the divisions and
the forces and the battalions and the units, but I
know them all, every one.

I have seen them in a

thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every
state of this Union— working and laughing and
building, and filled with hope and life.

I think

I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their
families sorrow.

This is the most agonizing and

the most painful duty of your President.
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Rebirth:

"And now I am the President."

As the old self dies, a new one is born and the
President's statement reflected this transformation.

While

Johnson filled the first part of his statement with images
of "standing firm," the latter sections revealed acts of
restraint.

All of the steps announced in the speech,

Johnson said, were "carefully measured to do what must be
done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful
settlement."

In reference to America's technological

superiority which made escalation possible, the President
said, "we will not surrender and we will not retreat," but
at the same time, we will not "bluster or bully or flaunt
our power."

While "we insist and we will always insist that

the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice,
the right to shape their own destiny in free elections,"
Johnson said "we do not seek the destruction of any
government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory."
Following the week of consultations at the White House,
President Johnson had sought to gain approval for his
actions from those he needed approval from the most:
critics.

On July 27, the first of these groups,

congressional leaders, attended a briefing in which Johnson
carefully outlined the alternatives he had been faced with.
The first choice was to blast the North off the face of the
earth with bombers.

Far from being a Curtis LeMay (who had

advocated, "Bombing the chinks into the stone age"34), the
President said he had been painstakingly cautious about
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Chinese intervention from the north, personally approving
which targets were to be bombed and the many more to be
avoided.36

"They can't bomb the smallest shithouse without

my approval," Johnson boasted.
to pack up and go home.

The second choice was simply

But this was just like the Alamo:

"someone had to go to their aid."

A third was to "hold the

line" in our present positions, maybe lose more territory
and suffer more casualties.

The President countered,

however, "You wouldn't want your boy to be out there crying
for help and not get it."

The fourth choice was to ask the

Congress for great sums of money, to call up the reserves
and go on a wartime footing.

In doing this, though, Johnson

said North Vietnam would turn to China and Russia and
receive even more aid than the U.S. gave to the South.
fifth choice was the best choice of all.

The

This choice

allowed Lyndon Johnson to do all the things called for in
the fourth choice but with secrecy attached, without
alarming everyone to the idea that America was becoming
involved in a land war in Asia.

This choice called for the

expansion of the war without going on a wartime footing, to
give the commanders what they needed.
choice, the centrist, moderate one.

This was the correct
As Halberstam noted

afterward, "only Lyndon Johnson could go to war and be
centrist and moderate."36
Nonetheless, the President's decision to redefine
himself as a president of restraint seemed to please the
congressmen.

Tom Wicker of the New York Times said after
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the speech that it had been the reluctance of Democratic
Senators to accept a great expansion of the war that kept
Johnson from announcing stronger action in the first
place.37

The President thus formulated the right message

for the right audience to have the desired effect.

In

addition, representatives said Johnson's choice would find
favor with the country as a whole.

Republican George D.

Aiken, an influential member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, said this alternative "won't satisfy those who
have been advocating a great expansion of the war or those
who say 'get out, lock, stock, and barrel.'

Under the

circumstances," the Senator continued, "the President's
middle course will find general acceptance throughout the
country and will probably be more conducive to ultimate
peace than a more extreme statement would have been."33
The only group dissatisfied with Johnson's restraint
were those actually fighting the war for peace.

Many

officers told Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times that the
slow pace of the expansion thus far had barely compensated
for the deterioration of the U.S./South Vietnam military
position.

They feared that America was doing "too little,

too late."33

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,

though, the negative of "thou-shall-not criticize the
President" along with the hierarchy of credibility had
become much more important than the "thou-shall-not attack"
of the peace-aggression hierarchy.

In short, President

Johnson gave salience to the domino theory only as it
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pertained to the falling dominoes of his Administration, not
to the countries of Southeast Asia.
For the moment, though, he had pulled it off, adopting
what Goldman called the "dawk" policy— ’halfway between the
doves and the hawks.

It was good for the country and,

better yet, politically s o u n d . T h e country breathed a
sigh of relief.

Johnson acted with restraint.

was not going to war--or so it seemed.

The country

According to Evans

and Novak, the President acted as he always had in the
Senate, "refusing to make an all-out commitment to one side
or the other, keeping all paths open."
Senate, however.

This was not the

This was war, but the President was

talking peace; this was guns, but the President still wanted
guns and butter.41
In his search
the Great Society.
Society were one.

for himself, Johnson always came back to
It was as if

Johnson and the Great

Since the hierarchy of credibility, his

administration, his presidency, and his own identity
depended on the conflict in Vietnam, so the Great Society
would stand or fall with the war's outcome as well.

In

addition to knowing the suffering and sorrow, Johnson said
there was "something else" in his personal note.

"When I

was young, poverty

was so common

that we didn't know ithad

a name," he said.

"An education

was something that you had

to fight for, and water was really life itself."
Remembering this, Johnson proclaimed the end of his
quest for the self:

"And now I am the President."

Johnson
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said it was now his "opportunity to help every child get an
education, to help every Negro and every American citizen
have an equal opportunity, to have every family get a decent
home, and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to
the old."

Since his identity depended on "victory" in

Vietnam, the President identified himself (the Great
Society) with Vietnam as he had done at Johns Hopkins— even
though the technological irony of "electrification of the
countryside" was more evident with the introduction of fifty
thousand more soldiers and more materiel.
As battle rages, we will continue as best we can
to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich
the condition of their life, to feed the hungry
and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and
shelter the homeless, and to help the farmer to
increase his crop, and the worker to find a job.
All

of these things, the new President said, were "what

I have lived for,

that

is

since I was a little boy."

what I have wanted all my life

All of these things, were what

Johnson was reborn to do and their success, his identity as
a paternal provider, depended on the fight in Vietnam.
I do not want to see all those hopes and all those
dreams of so many people for so many years now
drowned in the wasteful ravages of cruel wars. . .
. But I

also

know, as a realisticpublic servant,

that as

long

as

there are men whohate and
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destroy, we must have the courage to resist, or we
will see it all, all that we have built, all that
we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom—
all, all will be swept away on the flood of
conquest.
Speaking to a colleague at the time, Johnson voiced his
dependence on Vietnam in more parochial terms.

"If I don't

go in now and they show later I should have gone, then
they'll be all over me in Congress," the President said.
"They won't be talking about my civil rights bill, or
education, or beautification.
up my ass every time.

No sir, they'll push Vietnam

Vietnam.

Vietnam.

Vietnam.

Right

up my ass."^2
In answer to this challenge, Johnson ended his
statement proclaiming, "This shall not happen.
stand in Vietnam."

We will

The President could have confidence in

this statement due to his new identity.

Again, however, in

redefining himself as a president of restraint, Johnson
failed to consider the alternatives down the road as he had
failed to do at Tonkin Gulf.

The next time the military

situation or the domestic political climate called for a
change in policy or a redefining of the presidential persona
(a continued search for the self), his alternatives would be
even more restricted, having used the "moderate, centrist"
option in July of 1965.

What alternatives would he have

then, and the time after that, and the time after that?
This, Johnson did not consider.

His "finding" of himself
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was again temporary due to the fact that Johnson had really
not come to terms with himself or policy in Vietnam.
According to Rueckert, as a new self is found, the
searcher continues "equipped with some knowledge he did not
previously have."43

Johnson's redefinition of himself was

not new or unexpected, however.

In attempting to find a

workable policy in Vietnam, the President clearly looked for
a successful persona to present to the American people.

By

softening his escalation decisions via the secrecy motive,
Johnson returned to the familiar theme of "restraint" that
was present in both the Syracuse and Johns Hopkins
addresses.

Extending the Great Society to the third world

also reflected his "billion dollar American investment."
In short, Lyndon Johnson took nothing away from July
28, 1965 that he did not know already.

In the quest for

himself, the President had not yet considered the
possibility that this policy too would fail.

He had not yet

considered the possibility that a president of restraint
could fail.

Coupled with his unspoken belief in pragmatism

and "action," the can-do president figured like the others
in his Administration that if they kept their shoulders to
the wheel long enough, old Ho would give in.

Despite all

the gloomy predictions rolling in from trained analysts in
the field, Johnson shared a staunch faith with his advisers
that somehow everything would turn out alright.
By focusing almost exclusively on the domestic
political effects of the decision, Johnson's search for
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himself neglected those aspects of the presidency regarding
foreign policy.

"Restraint" and the Great Society were

short-term domestic concerns that had little or nothing to
do with the Vietnamese— no matter how hard Johnson tried to
make them apply.

Because of the importance the President

attached to Vietnam, it is surprising that he did not find a
part of himself that was willing to deal with Vietnam as a
foreign war instead of a domestic barnstorming tour.

This

only led to failure— failure to find himself, failure to
convince his critics, and failure in Vietnam.
So, the quest continued.

Almost every night for five

months after the July 28 announcement, the President failed
to sleep.

Inevitably, he found his way to the White House

situation room well past midnight to learn the results of
the engagements between the Americans and the Vietcong.
many planes had been shot down?
boys"?44

How

Did they rescue any of "my

Lyndon Johnson was still a deeply troubled

president.
Conclusion
The decisions made by the Johnson Administration during
July of 1965 defined the temper of American political life
in the 1960s.

The President's announcement of these

decisions, though, was far from momentous.

Softening his

statements with a veil of secrecy, Johnson feared negative
reaction to his decision to escalate the war in Vietnam.
The curious manner in which the President led the country

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

229

into war has been revealed by this study with the following
conclusions.
1.

In order to justify his decision to send an

additional fifty thousand troops to Vietnam, President
Johnson relied on the peace-aggression hierarchy that
American presidents had used, including himself, during
the cold war era.

The existence of this hierarchy not

only called for the maintenance of order or control
through the use of force but also succeeded in
identifying Johnson's persona as that of a classic cold
warrior.
2.

In addition to the burdens of peace and credibility

that Johnson had been carrying since the attacks in the
Gulf of Tonkin, a burden of identity began to emerge as
the President became more tormented by and unsure of
his policy in Vietnam.

As he had done at Johns

Hopkins, Johnson transferred the burden of peace onto
the North Vietnamese and the burden of credibility onto
his critics by offering to "talk anywhere, anytime, to
anyone" about "our proposals, their proposals, or
anyone's proposals."
3.

Because the President announced that the conflict

in Vietnam was "a different kind of war," the situation
called for a different kind of president.

Facing a

mounting wave of protest over the war, Johnson needed
more than a cold warrior persona in order to define
himself as a successful president.

Dissent, criticism,
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and failure in Vietnam made Johnson feel like no
president at all.

Events, history, and his own secrecy

motive made Johnson's quest for himself a spiraling
struggle.
4.

Once again, irony allowed the President to purify

his guilt and redefine his identity through the vehicle
of mortification.

By identifying with "his boys" in

the field, Johnson used their suffering to "die" and,
in turn, emerge with a new identity.
5.

Reborn as a president of restraint, escalation of

the war in Vietnam did not seem like war to the
American people at all.

Johnson had scored yet another

short-term, domestic political victory— one that would
come back to haunt him.

By defining himself as a

president of restraint and the curator of the Great
Society, Johnson neglected the needs of the foreign war
in Vietnam.

This spelled failure not only in his

domestic quest but also on the battlefield.

The

President's search for himself thus continued.
In closing out the first chapter of America's tragedy
in Vietnam, President Johnson said, "We will stand in
Vietnam."

Few could forsee at the time that such a stand

would initiate such a climactic fall for a nation and a
president.
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CONCLUSION
The decade of the 1960s marked a turning point in the
history of post World War II America.

The presidency of

Lyndon Baines Johnson took place during five pivotal years
in the middle of that decade.

His administration initiated

the policies that set in motion a myriad of socio-political
forces that changed the way Americans viewed themselves and
the world.

The effects of his social legislation and his

policies in Vietnam are still felt today.
The driving force behind Johnson's domestic and foreign
policies was technology.

Its prevalence in the western

world allowed Americans to reach into unfamiliar realms of
their own land and the world through the technology of
communication.

The result was a heightened sensitivity to

the point of anxiety.

With the presidency of Lyndon

Johnson, Americans seemed to lose their innocence.

They

began to realize that the people who lived in tar-paper
shacks on the other side of the tracks were Americans too,
that the so-called international conspirators who lived in
bamboo huts on the other side of the world were human, that
American soldiers don't always pass out chewing gum, and
that American presidents don't always wear white hats and
tell the truth.
Within two years of Johnson's move into the Oval
Office, all of these changes had begun to take place and the
President's rhetoric played a central role in the
235
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transformation.

This study has attempted to bring into

focus some of the words and symbols that we now associate
with the rhetorical blur of the 1960s.

As critics, we,

along with the rest of the world, are forced to view history
and reality through Burke's "fog of symbols."

Our duty is

to help man realize he is looking through this fog and that
he tends to perfect himself and the world through the
symbolic use of language.

With President Johnson's example

before us, it is evident that the entelechial process can
often have disastrous results.
In Part I of this study, the fog surrounding President
Johnson's symbols of Vietnam was lifted with the use of a
cluster analysis.

Johnson's verbal acts were clustered

together to produce a variety of equations charting meaning,
intentions, and ultimately motives in the President's
rhetoric.

Part II analyzed the larger symbolic meaning of

the verbal acts as they produced a rhetoric of rebirth for
Johnson.

The following concordance is a compilation of

equations and their relationship with symbolic meaning.

The

emerging patterns reveal Johnson's perception of what
particular agents did, in certain situations, using specific
means, for a single purpose.

The patterns also reveal how

certain parts of the dramatistic pentad can be stressed for
the purpose of redemption or rhetorical rebirth.
The concordance also reveals what Burke calls the
"particular recipe of overstressings and understressings
peculiar to the given institutional structure."1

These
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patterns show the tendency of the Johnson Administration, if
not the American government, tne United States, and perhaps
our culture at the time, to see the Vietnam conflict in
terms of this particular recipe and to use such terms as
symbolic acts in justifying policy.
The equations are grouped around the symbolic "godterms" that emerged during the cluster analysis.

Each

cluster takes the form of the "arrow," progressing from one
symbolic point to another.

In this way, a sense of process

emerges in Johnson's rhetoric always moving toward the goal
of redemption or rebirth.
The God-term of "Peace"
From The Symbolic Negative:
Act:

Thou-Shall-Not Make War

"that they resolve their differences peacefully,"
and:

Symbolic Negative:
Act:

Thou-Shall-Not Criticize the President

"we are joining those 17 countries and stating
our American policy tonight which we believe will
contribute toward peace in this area of the
world," to:

The Symbolic Place of America in World Hierarchy
Scene:

"this quiet campus," "bursting with opportunity

and promise," "exultant with hope and with golden
promise," "serene atmosphere," equals:
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Agent:

"sentinel of peace," "readiness for peace," and

"flower of our youth," "working and laughing and
building, and filled with hope and life," equals:
Act:

"do all that strengthens the hope of peace,"
"preserve their freedom," and "we dream of an end
to war" equals:

Agency:

"air action," and "full exchange of views,"

equals:
Purpose:

"peace," "to survive and prosper in freedom,"

"to prevail over the enemies within man," "Peace
is the only purpose of the course that America
pursues" and "we must fight if we are to live in a
world where every country can shape its own
destiny," and:
Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in World Hierarchy
Scene:

"not a serene or peaceful place," and:

Symbolic Place of Communist China in World Hierarchy
Act:

"destroyed freedom," to:

Symbolic Maintenance of Order (Entelechy)
Act:

"retreat does not bring safety and weakness does
not bring peace," "raise our fighting strength
from 75,000 to 125,000 men," equals:

Agency:

"we have answered this aggression with

action," "air units of the United States Seventh
Fleet," "armed," "appropriate," "a much more
massive effort," "greatly expanded cooperative
effort for development," "billion dollar American
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investment," "program to make available our farm
surpluses," "we have the power and . . . the
opportunity to make that dream come true," "a dam
built across a great river is impressive,"
"wonders of modern medicine," "electrification of
the countryside," "a very vital shield," to:
Symbolic Burden of Peace
Agent:

"for 10 years three American presidents . . .

and the American people have been actively
concerned with threats to the peace and security
of the peoples of Southeast Asia," to:
Symbolic Scapegoat for the Burden of Peace
Agent:

"swift peace in the hands of others besides
ourselves," and:

Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Peace
Act:

"there can be no doubt about the responsibilities
of nations that are devoted to peace" and "peace
requires that we and all our friends stand firm
against the present aggressions of the government
of North Vietnam."

The Devil-term of "Aggression"
From The Symbolic Negative:

Thou-Shall-Not Attack the

United States
Scene:

"hitherto shall thou come but no further,"

equals:
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Act:

"the United States destroyer Maddox was
attacked," equals:

Agency:

"by hostile vessels of the Government of North

Vietnam," and:
Symbolic Negative:
Act:

Thou Shall Not Make War

"North Vietnam has attacked the independent
nation of South Vietnam," to:

Symbolic of World Hierarchy
Scene:

"will be a disorderly planet for a long time,"

"forces of the modern world are shaking old ways,"
"for centuries nations have struggled among each
other," "this is really war," and:
Symbolic Place of America in World Hierarchy
Act:

"we 'would view any renewal of the aggression in
violation of the 1954 agreements with grave
concern and as seriously threatening international
peace and security,'" and "armed attack on South
Vietnam would endanger the peace and the safety of
the nations signing that solemn agreement
[SEATO]," and:

Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in World Hierarchy
Scene:

"Vietnam is far away," "remote and distant

place," "dirty and brutal and difficult,"
"Vietnam's steaming soil," "not a serene or
peaceful place," "conflict torn," "very
dangerous," "serious," "death," "desolation," "war
strained" and "the world as it is," equals:
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Agent:

"hostile," "the infirmities of man,"

"unparalleled brutality," "bound to dominate all
southeast Asia," "growing might," "grasping
ambition," "hostile," "threatening," "source of
brutality," "men who hate and destroy," "violent,"
"aggressive," "disregard for life," "dominion and
empire," "arrogance and adventure," "ruthless,"
"terror," "enemies of freedom," "new face of an
old enemy," and "urged on by Peking," equals:
Act:

"deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression,"
"aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed,"
"To the south it is engaged in aggression against
the Republic of Vietnam.

To the west it is

engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.
To the east it has now struck out . . . in an act
of aggression against the United States of
America," "North Vietnam has attacked the
independent nation of South Vietnam,"
"assassination and kidnapping," "strangled in the
night," "ravaged by sneak attack," "terror
strikes," "create division," "renewed hostile
actions," "attempt to envelop," "explode their
bombs," "hitting our compounds at 2 o'clock in the
morning," "the cruel course of battle," "acts of
violence," "intensified terrorists actions," "men
must still die," "combat operations," and "largescale raids," equals:
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Agency:

"the heartbeat of the war," "the wastes of

war," "war . . . guided by North Vietnam," "lethal
fantasies," "preaching hatred," "support
facilities," "violence," "aggressive means,"
"armed attack," "indiscriminate murder,"
"torpedoes," "a number of hostile vessels,"
"trained men and supplies, orders and arms," "the
guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships,"
"bombs exploded in downtown movie theaters,"
"direction, training, and supply of personnel and
arms," "guerrilla warfare," and "assassination and
kidnapping," equals:
Purpose:

"fight for territory and colonies" "total

conquest" "to show that American commitment is
worthless" and "to conquer the South, to defeat
American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion
of communism," and:
Symbolic Place of Communist China in World Hierarchy
Agent:

"old enemy," "deepening shadow," and "forces of

violence on almost every continent," equals:
Act:

"attacked," "condemned," and "aggression in
Korea," and "destroyed freedom," equals:

Agency:

"war . . . spurred by Communist China,"
equals:

Purpose:

"aggressive purposes" to:
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Symbolic Burden of Credibility

Act:

"the attacks were deliberate," and "the attacks
were unprovoked," to:

Symbolic Scapegoat for the Burden of Peace
Act:

"Maddox was attacked," "I call heaven and earth
to record this day against you,"and "aggression
unchallenged is aggression unleashed," equals:

Agency:

"by hostile vessels of the Government of Worth

Vietnam."
The God-term of "Stand Firm"
From The Symbolic Negative:

Thou-Shall-Not Criticize the

President
Purpose:

"there are those who say that all our effort

there will be futile," "there are those who wonder
why we have a responsibility there," and "there is
no end to that argument until all the nations of
Asia are swallowed up," and:
Symbolic Negative:
Scene:

"hitherto shall thou come but no further," and:

Symbolic Negative:
Purpose:

Thou-Shall-Not Attack the United States

Thou-Shall-Not Break Agreements

"that the governments of Southeast Asia honor

the international agreements which apply in the
area," and:
Symbolic Negative:
Purpose:

Thou-Shall-Not Make War

"that those governments leave each other

alone," to:
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Symbolic of World Hierarchy

Scene:

"small and turbulent world" "not a serene or

peaceful place," "conflict torn," "very
dangerous," "serious," "death," "desolation,"
"will be a disorderly planet for a long time,"
"forces of the modern world are shaking old ways,"
"for centuries nations have struggled among each
other," "this is really war," and "war strained"
and:
Symbolic Place of America in World Hierarchy
Agent:

"patience as well as bravery," "conviction,"

"determination," "not weary," "firmness to
defend," "strength to support firmness,"
"outrage," "indignation," "courage," and "most
powerful," equals:
Purpose:

"our generation has a dream," "our own

security," "the safety and well-being of our
country," "to reach our own goals in our own
land," "we fight for values and we fight for
principles," "to work out their own destinies in
their own way," and "we must fight if we are to
live in a world where every country can shape its
own destiny," to:
Symbolic Maintenance of Order (Entelechy)
Act:

"Americans and Asians are dying," "acted at
once," "we will do everything necessary,"
"continue to persist," "we will not withdraw,"
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"resist aggression," "stand firm," "we will stand
in Vietnam," "prompt and unmistakable reply,"
"toil and suffer and die," "air action," "action,"
and "retreat does not bring safety and weakness
does not bring peace," equals:
Agency:

"75,000 to 125,000 men," "air units of the

United States Seventh Fleet," "the wise
application of modern technology," "ammunition and
training," "additional equipment," "resources
equal to any challenge," "military assistance,"
"700 million dollars," "a full exchange of views,"
"air units," "bombs and bullets," "warships and
rockets," "power" and "three times in my lifetime,
in two World Wars and in Korea," equals:
Purpose:

"to carry out our full commitment," "to

preserve our own image in the world," "peace and
security," "to bring communist aggression under
control," and "to be free from terror, subversion,
and assassination," to:
Symbolic Burden of Credibility
Act:

"we just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon
our commitment," and:

Symbolic Burden of Peace
Purpose:

"to convince the Communists that we cannot be
defeated by force of arms," to:
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Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Peace

Act:

"Americans and Asians are dying," "there can be
no doubt about the responsibilities of nations
that are devoted to peace," "peace requires that
we and all our friends stand firm against the
present aggressions of the government of North
Vietnam," and:

Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Credibility/
Identity
Act:

"most agonizing and most painful duty of your
President," "toil and suffer and sometimes die,"
"I know them all, every one," and "I know, too,
how their mothers weep and how their families
sorrow," and:

Symbolic Scapegoat for the Burden of Credibility
Act:

"we are going to persist . . . until death and
desolation have led to the same conference table,"
to:

Symbolic Redemption
Act:

"the challenge that we face in southeast Asia
today is the same challenge that we have faced
with courage and that we have met with strength in
Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon
and in Cuba," "as long as there are men who hate
and destroy, we must have the courage to resist,"
and "this shall not happen.

We will stand in

Vietnam," equals:
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Purpose:

"I would like to say to ally and adversary

alike:

let no friend needlessly fear— and no foe

vainly hope--that this is a nation divided in this
election year."
The God-term of "Discussion"
From The Symbolic Place of America in the World Hierarchy
Scene:

"exultant with hope" equals:

Agent:

"ready to talk," "wisdom," "interest,"

"vigilant," "reasonable," "responsibility," "keeps
her word," "courage," "do not fear the conference
table," "reason," "independence," and "prayerful
judgment," equals:
Act:

"carry out existing agreements," and:

Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in the World Hierarchy
Scene:

"half a world away," and "remote and distant,"

equals:
Agent:

"unreasonable," "unwilling to negotiate," and

"violating," to:
Symbolic Burden of Credibility/Identity
Act:

"unconditional discussions," "discussed it fully
in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in
San Francisco in June," "let me again, now,
discuss it here in the East Room of the White
House," "I have asked them to be able to answer
the questions of any Member of Congress,"
"America's willingness to begin unconditional
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discussions," "provide leadership and judgment,"
"consider everyone's judgment," "making
decisions," and "reflect on these moves," to:
Symbolic Mortification for the Burden of Credibility/
Identity
Act:

"Have I done everything to help unite the world,"
"America's willingness to begin unconditional
discussions," "I will talk to any government,
anywhere, any time, without any conditions," "we
are ready to discuss their proposals," "free and
serious debate," and "I have listened to every
voice," equals:

Agency:

"full exchange of views," "active and

continuous consultation," "the meeting room," and
"the conference table," and:
Symbolic Victimage for the Burden of Credibility
Act:

"that government of North Vietnam is now
willfully and systematically violating those
agreements of both 1954 and 1962," "there had been
no answer," "ignoring the agreements of Geneva,"
and "they want no talk with us," equals:

Agency:

"a refusal to talk," "tired names and

slogans," "slander and invective," and "campaign
of subversion," equals:
Purpose:

"to show that American commitment is

worthless."
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The God-term of "Restraint"
Symbolic of the Burden of Credibility/Identity
Agent:

"most cautious," "extremely careful,"

"patience," "restraint," and "moderation," equals:
Act:

"actions careful and measured," "carefully
measured to do what must be done to bring an end
to aggression," "will not bluster or bully or
flaunt our power,"

"we will do only what is

absolutely necessary,"

"not essential to order

Reserve units into service," and "limited and
fitting," equals:
Agency:

"effective and efficient," "power with

restraint," and "moderation in the use of power,"
equals:
Purpose:

"no military, political, or territorial

ambitions" and "do not seek the destruction of any
government, nor do we covet any foot of
territory."
The God-term of "Helping"
From The Symbolic Place of America in the World Hierarchy
Scene:

"exultant with hope" and "golden promise"

equals:
Agent:

"helpful," "actively concerned," "compassion,"

and "most powerful," and:
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Symbolic Place of North Vietnam in the World Hierarchy

Agent:

"they want what their neighbors also desire,"

equals:
Act:

"destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or
understand" and "take its place in the common
effort," to:

The Symbolic Burden of Credibility/Identity
Scene:

"exultant with hope" and "golden promise"

equals:
Agent:

"helpful," "actively concerned," "compassion,"

and "most powerful," equals:
Act:

"American people have helped generously," "strike
away the chains of ignorance," "act of necessity,"
"Christian act," "extend the hand of compassion,"
"to build," "to help manage the process of
development," "to help South Vietnam import
materials for their homes," "to enrich the
condition of their life," "to teach the young,"
and "to help the farmer increase his crops,"
equals:

Agency:

"the wise application of modern technology,"

"billion dollar American investment," "89 million
dollars," "cooperative effort for development," "a
dam built across a great river is impressive,"
"wonders of modern medicine," "medical supplies,"
"electrification of the countryside,"
"fertilizer," and "power," to:
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Symbolic Redemption

Purpose:

"and now I am the President," "opportunity to

help every jhild get an education," "as battle
rages, we will continue as best we can to help the
good people of South Vietnam," "Well, we will
choose life," "to prevail over the natural enemies
of all mankind," "for progress and hope," "a world
where all are fed and charged with hope," "to
replace despair with hope and terror with
progress," and "to reach our goals in our own
land."
Thus ends a "dictionary of limited war escalation"
compiled from President Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam speeches in
1964 and 1965.

Since the war in Vietnam was a "limited"

conflict, some unusual aspects appeared in Johnson's
rhetoric.

Those characteristics are among the major

findings of this study and are listed along with other
conclusions as follows.
1.

As the starting point in the symbolic process
leading to rebirth, the negative played an
important but highly predictable role.

In the

wake of North Vietnamese attacks against United
States destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, the
President's primary negative or "thou-shall-not"
dealt with attack or aggression, two "acts" found
in the aggression cluster.

As criticism of policy
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began to mount in the spring of 1965, Johnson,
fearing a loss of consensus, gave primacy to a new
negative regarding presidential criticism.
Significantly, the new negative not only revealed
itself through the "act" of joining seventeen
countries in an effort for peace, but also as a
"purpose" for "standing firm."

Further, in

assuming that Ho Chi Minh would "never negotiate"
or accept Johnson's development plan, the
President could silence his critics and continue
to escalate the war in Vietnam.

Hence, both

negatives worked to reinforce each other as in
both the "peace" and "stand firm" clusters.
2.

From the negatives of "thou-shall-not attack, make
war, break agreements, etc.," President Johnson
used agonistic form to establish a world
hierarchy, referred to as the "peace-aggression"
hierarchy.

Johnson identified the United States

and South Vietnam with "peace" at the top of the
hierarchy and North Vietnam and Communist China
with "aggression" at the bottom.

The importance

of this hierarchy to the President's arguments is
underscored by the extent to which the symbolic
place of America and North Vietnam are revealed in
the "peace" and "aggression" clusters.

A tendency

to over generalize, though, caused Johnson and his
Administration to replace the realities of the
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Vietnam conflict with incorrect abstractions.

The

resulting confusion found its way into the
President's rhetoric as he pictured U.S. agents as
being both "determined" or "powerful" and
"restrained" and "cautious," the South Vietnamese
as both "vigorous" and "helpless," while the North
Vietnamese represented both "aggression" and "love
and hope."

A corresponding hierarchy of

credibility grew out of "thou-shall-not criticize
the President."

Although unspoken in the

speeches, this hierarchy, like its inherent
negative, relied on the maintenance of the "peaceaggression" hierarchy for stability.

As the North

Vietnamese continued to reject the world hierarchy
in 1965, critics of the President continued to
reject the hierarchy of credibility.
3.

In an effort to maintain "order" or control of both
hierarchies, Johnson relied on the "act" or
"action" and even more so on the "agency."
Appearing in both the clusters of "peace" and
"standing firm," agency clearly emerged as the
term around which the President clustered his
escalation rhetoric, principally because of its
inherent characteristic of "irony."

As

"technology is man's entelechy" and as technology
was Johnson's primary if not sole agency in
achieving peace and standing firm, the inescapable
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result was irony.

Thus, the "confused nature of

this war," a war "filled with terrible irony,"
revealed itself with agents who were both
"powerful" and "restrained," with acts of "peace,"
"compassion," "restraint," etc. and acts of
"standing firm" or "air action" by the same
agents.

In committing these acts, whether they

were retaliatory raids, Operation Rolling Thunder,
or initiating an economic development plan, the
President relied on the same agency:

technology.

The results of each action were thus the same.
Any introduction of an American agency into the
primitive Asian culture, whether for peaceful or
aggressive ends, was an invasion to Ho Chi Minh.
The use of technology thus failed to maintain both
the hierarchies of "peace-aggression" and of
credibility.

The American belief in its

technology fostered a false sense of superiority
while the "terrible irony" of the war demanded
equality and humility on the part of its
opposites.

Seeking only to redeem himself,

Johnson never took advantage of the ironies
created by technology to consider Ho as an equal.
4.

American guilt appeared in the form of burdens.
Johnson's burden of peace appeared in the "peace"
cluster in the form of an agent, "your present
President," and as a purpose in the cluster of
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"standing firm."

The importance of the burden of

credibility to Johnson and ultimately his
identity, though, is reflected in its appearance
in the clusters of "aggression," "stand firm,"
"discussion," "helping," and constitutes the
entire cluster of "restraint."

At first, this

burden appears only in the form of "actions," in
the form the pragmatic president felt most
comfortable with.

As Johnson's credibility burden

turned into a burden of identity in the summer of
1965, more extensive references were made in the
forms of scene, agents, agencies, and purposes in
the clusters of "helping" and "restraint."
5.

Once again, technology played an important role in
Johnson's symbolic transfer of his burdens onto
other parties.

Generally, American use of

technology in an agent-act-agency relationship
constituted mortification of Johnson's burden of
credibility and the North Vietnamese use of
machinery in the same ratio created the scapegoat
the President needed to transfer the burden of
peace.

In most cases, the President'identified

with the suffering of "his boys" to expatiate the
burdens of peace, credibility, and identity and
points to the aggression of the communists as the
cause of war.

In the "discussion" cluster,

Johnson sacrificed himself through the
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technologies of communication and transportation,
saying, "I will talk to any government, anywhere,
any time."

The North Vietnamese were likewise

used as scapegoats for "refusing to talk."

Irony

again played an important role here by fusing the
"conference table" and the "battlefield" and
"mortification" with "victimage."

In attempting

to transfer his burdens on July 28, 1965,
President Johnson said the communists would have
to experience "death and desolation" before a
negotiated peace would be possible.

The ultimate

irony of Johnson's rhetoric exists in the use of
technological warfare as a means for peace and the
offer of peace negotiations as a means of
escalating technological warfare.
6.

Statements of redemption or President Johnson's
"rhetoric of rebirth" appear only in the clusters
of "stand firm" and "helping," clusters with
actions totally reliant on the agency of
technology.

Johnson was totally reliant on

"agency" when proclaiming the three key phrases of
rebirth:

"We will choose life," "Now I am the

President," and "We will stand in Vietnam."
And so it goes.

If there is in this study what Burke

calls a "representative anecdote" or if thare is to be found
in Johnson's symbolic acts "some underlying principle of the
agent's character, some fixed trait of his p e r s o n a l i t y , "2 it
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can be found in the three statements above.

Whether

standing firm or choosing life, Lyndon Johnson never learned
to be the president, to rely on himself.

Laswell claims

Johnson "was very much concerned about remaining independent
of outside influences."3

The agency-oriented president,

however, never relied on himself as an agency.

Johnson's

rhetoric reveals a presidency reliant on outside forces,
technological and human.

At the mercy of his own

technology, he became a slave to public opinion, submissive
to his own consensus government, and, eventually, a
"workhorse" with "things in the saddle, riding mankind."
In the end, there was nothing left to hold on to.

By

failing to rely on himself, Johnson never had faith in his
own rhetorical expressions.

Whenever he had the chance to

avoid escalation and propose a meeting with Ho Chi Minh as
an equal, his reliance on superior "power" impeded such a
rhetorical alternative.

Such was the legacy Lyndon Johnson

left on the rhetoric of the twentieth century presidency.
With similar alternatives facing presidential rhetoric in
the 1980s, the lessons of the past must become the agenda
for the future.
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NOTES
3 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (1945; rpt.
Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1969), 113.

3 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (1941;
rpt. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1973), 27

and Grammar, p. 59.
3 Cited by David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest
(New York:

Fawcett Crest, 1972), 537.
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